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ABSTRACT 
Social cohesion is an assessment of the functional nature of a polity, particularly how a society 
perceives, assesses, and interacts with the political system and others in society. This dissertation 
sets out to clarify our understanding of social cohesion within the field of political science. As a 
discipline we have diverging definitions and conceptualizations of the term. By laying out a 
comprehensive individual level theory of social cohesion this dissertation aims to open up the 
black box of social cohesion, moving beyond the aggregate level analyses that largely occupy the 
academic and policy literature. I set out a new theory of how three components of social 
cohesion interact and influence the way that a society produces and maintains or degrades social 
cohesion. The three attitudinal and behavioral areas discussed and scrutinized include political 
legitimacy, social capital, and political participation. To assess the relationships between these 
individual level attitudes and behaviors I examine original data collected from student sample 
from Queen’s University Belfast from 2014-2015. An online survey including a trust game and 
priming experiment were conducted to test several hypotheses about the relationship between 
elite behaviors and the three areas of social cohesion. Evidence and findings in this study should 
be taken as preliminary and a jumping off point for future research. I find preliminary evidence 
in support of behaviors of elected officials influencing attitudes about certain institutions. 
Attitudes about actors and institutions are associated with social trust and reciprocity as well as 
preferences of interacting with the outgroup. Lastly, I argue that legitimacy and social capital 
will have an interactive effect on when and how individuals participate in politics. I find limited 
evidence of this relationship. Ultimately there is mixed initial evidence for my individual level 
theory with the given data.  I provide several prescriptions for how research in this area and 
further tests of social cohesion at the individual level should move forward.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Often we see societies breaking down along social or cultural fault lines. These divisions can 
manifest into violent conflict and political upheaval. In the most severe cases domestic and 
international actors try to manage peace in societies through institutions of inclusion (i.e. power 
sharing mechanisms), and through programs and policies that aim to foster positive interactions 
and cohesiveness within a society. Unfortunately, studies attempting to measure the success of 
efforts at managed peace focus disproportionately on aggregate data -- namely, macro-level 
economic indicators, distribution of attitudes and behaviors at the country level, and even 
number of years that a relative level of peace has been sustained. These macro-indicators can 
mask important variation and explanatory power of citizen groups’ and individuals’ progress, or 
lack of progress, towards social cohesiveness. There are three central questions that this 
dissertation takes on. First, what is social cohesion? Second, how does social cohesion operate at 
the individual level? Third, in societies with embedded cleavages and histories of violent 
conflict, how might elite behaviors affect social cohesion? This dissertation sets out a 
comprehensive definition of polity social cohesions, describes an individual level theory, and 
details a preliminary plausibility test of the theory with original data from Northern Ireland.  
Many scholars have constrained the definition of social cohesion by equating it to social 
capital (e.g. Hollenbaugh & Ferris 2014; Chowdhrey 2018; Meer & Tolsma 2014; Easterly 
&Woolcock 2006). This limited conceptualization is inconsistent with large scale empirical tests 
that validate aggregate level measures of social cohesion (e.g. Dickes et al. 2010; Acket et al. 
2011). I argue that social cohesion encompasses a broader conceptual framework than social 
capital alone. Definitions must incorporate attitudes and behaviors that capture the context of the 
political system as well as social group structures. Understanding social cohesion is relevant in 
2 
any society, and even more crucial in post conflict societies due to the fragile state of political 
and social stability.   
I define social cohesion as a stable environment of positive horizontal and vertical 
interaction between individuals producing positive ideas about groups and individuals within 
one’s society, and actions that are productive in maintaining social and political norms.  This is 
not to say that stable environments do not experience political conflict, but the political conflict 
in a cohesive society is successfully limited so that it does not threaten the stability of that polity. 
Social Cohesion is produced through an iterative process where individuals process information 
about political leaders, institutions, and events, then interpret the information within the context 
of existing socio-political divisions (identity structures), and form attitudes about other 
individuals and the political system. An individual’s attitudes then inform behavioral decisions 
about interacting with others, and engaging with the political system.  
At the aggregate level social cohesion is a conglomeration of individual level attitudes 
and behaviors. At the highest levels of social cohesion we see attitudes and behaviors supporting 
the current political system through support of institutions, high levels of trust in elected officials 
and in others in society, and high levels of conventional political participation. Participation in a 
highly cohesive society supports the current system even when we see alternation in individual 
representatives or political parties themselves.  At the individual level, social cohesion operates 
as an iterative decision making process. Essentially social cohesion can be broken down into 
three areas of socio-political attitudes and behaviors: 1) attitudes about actors and institutions, 2) 
attitudes about others in society, and 3) political behaviors. The breakdown and importance of 
these three components of social cohesion is discussed in greater detail when I unpack the theory 
of social cohesion in Chapter 2.  
3 
Societies that have experienced civil wars and other violent conflicts are particularly 
susceptible to erosions or a full corruption of social cohesion. During violent conflict the 
perception of threat between groups within a society grows with duration and severity of a 
conflict. Threat, perceived or real, promotes group isolation that again feeds the perception of 
threat. Once resolutions to violence and agreements are set legacies of conflict and threat create 
obstacles to the buildup of social cohesion. Uncivil and intolerant attitudes can linger for decades 
after official ceasefires and political agreements are struck.
1
 Individual defections from social 
cohesion can range from small flare-ups of violent protests by those dissatisfied with the new 
status-quo to large-scale attempts at destabilizing institutions and reversing those post-conflict 
policies meant to ease integration. These defections can affect day-to-day relations and sustain a 
long- term buildup of tensions along cleavage lines. Undetected by conventional macro-level 
indicators, they nevertheless harbor the cumulative potential to slow, halt or even reverse post-
conflict social reconciliation.   
Consociational institutions, while debated in their viability for producing long term 
stability in post conflict societies, have been used to create the political systems in several post 
conflict polities.
2
 There is a great deal of evidence supporting the use of these institutions in 
divided societies where groups have not been able to come together naturally, or one group has 
dominated the political and societal institutions and refuses admittance to another group. The 
main tenants of consociational institutions lay the ground work for required inclusion of a 
minority group(s) within the political system.
3
  
                                                 
1
 See Anna Jarstad’s (2008) explanation of “legacies of war”  
2
 e.g. “Northern Ireland (1998), Bosnia (1995), and Cyprus (1960)” (Horowitz 2007, 1237). See Horowitz (2007) for 
discussion of these agreements and criticisms of consociationalism.    
3
 There are four main requirements of consociationalism: 1) a parliamentary executive that includes all relevant and 
identified groups within that society (in Northern Ireland this is Unionists and Nationalists, in Bosnia the two groups 
identified are Bosniac, Croat, and “other groups” (Kaspović 2005), 2) proportional representation within the 
parliamentary body to ensure representation of all identified groups, 3) a level of group autonomy, and 4) vetoes for 
4 
There is also an assumption of a top down nature to consociationalism. Leaders from 
each community come together and make decisions and form working institutions and ultimately 
deliver their followers, the general population, to the peace process.  Where there is limited to no 
social cohesion these institutions can facilitate a functional and inclusive political system and 
develop the space for future social reconciliation.  
In a consociational system political parties and individual representatives identify along 
the salient divide(s) (e.g language, ethnicity, or religion) within the newly structured parliament. 
The overt group designation along cleavage lines is used to ensure inclusion in the government. 
The idea being that one must clearly identify the excluded group(s) to include the group(s) in the 
political process. Critics argue, however, that the necessity of identification along ethnic lines re-
enforces group differences and propagates the division long into the future.
4
 Despite this 
problem, many believe that while the divisions dominate in the political discourse and political 
violence has made it impossible for a stable and inclusive government to exist, consociational 
agreements and governments are necessary to mitigating violence and building a working 
governance structure. A question that remains is if consociational institutions, in post conflict 
societies, provide sufficient stability to grow and maintain social cohesion.  
Political elites, comprised of parties and individuals who negotiate peace deals and hold 
offices in the new government, can have an important influence on these individual level 
attitudes and behaviors. The political will exhibited by actors to cooperate by building peace and 
within a consociational political system provides cues to citizens about relationships across 
                                                                                                                                                             
the minority group in the legislature (see McGarry and O’Leary (2004) for indepth discussion of consociational 
mechanism and defense of consociationalist institutions and power sharing mechanisms in post-conflict societies, 
particularly Northern Ireland).      
4
 See works by Donald Horowitz (e.g. 1985, 2014) for detailed criticisms of consociationalism. Horowitz highlights 
the problems of powersharing throughout his work because of the many problems he finds with the top down 
consociational approach for being sustainable and for propagating social transformation.  
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community groups and the health of the political system itself. Indeed consociationalism is a top-
down theory of peace building, meaning there is an expectation that elites are leading the way by 
creating an initial peace and building institutions and a structure of political space of operation. 
When elites continue to cooperate with each other within the consociational institutions these 
group leaders are facilitating stability that will be echoed by the population and generate a 
durable peace.  
Northern Ireland illustrates notable examples of the destructive potential of a post conflict 
society, including political conflict and stagnant assembly proceedings, sectarian marches 
turning into street violence against others and police, and protests which turned violent over the 
decision to limit the number of days that the Unionist flag will fly over the capital.
5
 Clearly, in 
societies with embedded cleavages and histories of violent conflict, it is imperative that we better 
understand the mechanisms by which elite interactions can bias and inform individual citizen 
attitudes and behaviors as they adapt to new institutional realities.  
Discerning how specific individual attitudes and behaviors are formed and changed will 
shed light on how social cohesion manifests within a polity. I argue that three attitudinal and 
behavioral areas comprise social cohesion: legitimacy, social capital, and political capital. Other 
studies look at one of the three areas, but scholars rarely examine the interactions between and 
among these core components. The extant literature has, moreover, focused too restrictively on 
aggregate country-level analyses and too frequently overlooked vertical elite-mass linkages. I 
investigate the complex nature of social cohesion at the individual level and the influence that 
political elites have on individual-level components of social cohesion. 
This dissertation advances an original theoretical framework that connects the disparate 
components of social cohesion within a single dynamic model.  The model generates a set of 
                                                 
5
 See McDonald 2013, and BBC News 2013.  
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testable hypotheses to explain how attitudes and behaviors manifest and how elite interactions 
shape these individual-level attitudes and behaviors in predictable ways.  In particular, this 
dissertation argues that political elite interactions across established cleavage lines, through 
cooperation or conflict, will increase or decrease, respectively, individuals’ feelings of 
legitimacy, levels of social capital, and frequency and form of participation. Beyond advancing 
an original theoretical framework, this dissertation makes important new contributions to the 
literature through its use of experimental methods and its application to the case of Northern 
Ireland.  Although tested within the confines of a single case, the arguments advanced and tested 
here provide the basis for subsequent comparative analysis in other societal contexts.  
1.1 Road Map 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 details the ways different academic 
disciplines and policy studies have utilized social cohesion to date. Exploring how social 
cohesion has been used in the past, I clarify a definition of social cohesion for this project and 
explain its three distinct components: legitimacy, social capital, and political participation. I then 
set out a theoretical model of how political eliete behaviors influence the components, and how 
each area interacts with the others. Next, in Chapter 3, I introduce the Northern Ireland case used 
to test the theory at hand, and detail the methods of research used. I detail the historical political 
context of the Northern Ireland case and the current structure of regional government that makes 
it optimal for testing this theory of social cohesion. I will then discuss the two primary sources of 
original data for this project; an online survey that includes an elite prime and social trust game, 
and interviews with elected members of the Northern Ireland Assembly.  
The following three chapters include empirical studies using one of the three components 
of social cohesion as the dependent variable of interest. Chapter 4 deals with the first component, 
7 
legitimacy, and looks at an experiment that tests the influence of political conflict between the 
most successful political parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly on individuals’ attitudes. 
Chapter 5 unpacks how elite behaviors and legitimacy attitudes indirectly and directly impact 
social capital. Elite actor behavior has the potential to impact social capital directly and 
indirectly impact social capital when it is filtered through attitudes about actors and institutions, 
while legitimacy attitudes have direct impacts on social capital.  I utilize a social trust game and 
revisit the elite conflict experiment to better understand trust and reciprocity between community 
members and preferences for interaction across community lines. I focus on the importance of 
contextualizing social capital indicators according to ingroup and outgroup relationships. 
Chapter 6 moves on to the third component of social cohesion: political participation Using 
original survey data I  investigate how individuals make decisions about voicing political 
preferences through voting and other modes of participation. I test the interactive effect of 
attitudes about institutions and political actors, and social capital. Chapter 7 concludes this 
dissertation, summarizing findings from the empirical chapters, discussing implications, and 
outlining future research that this study lays the ground work for.   
 
2 SOCIAL COHESION AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL THEORY 
Social cohesion is identified as an important factor for supporting democratic regimes (e.g. Mann 
1970; Forrest and Kearns 2001; Labonte 2004; Frayha 2003; Heyneman 2003; Manole 2012). 
Social cohesion has been discussed and studied broadly across many disciplines but with little 
consistency in conceptualization; therefore this dissertation aims to consolidate a workable 
definition and working theory of social cohesion. Social cohesion is usually measured at the 
aggregate societal level. Social cohesion is therefore utilized as an indicator variable but is little 
8 
understood in its internal workings. This study will go beyond existing methods to extend our 
understanding of social cohesion by unpacking the concept at the individual level.   
Investigating social cohesion at the individual level allows for exploration of a greater 
level of nuance into what might drive or deter the building of social cohesion within a society. 
Focusing only on macro level or aggregated society level neglects understanding the individual 
level causal factors discussed in social psychology, communication, and political behavior 
literatures. Obviously how social cohesion is defined and especially how it is measured will 
impact the outcome of our assessments within the discipline of political science and of the 
expected influence of social cohesion on a polity.  Therefore determining a suitable scope of the 
term, appropriately measuring the component parts at the individual level, and testing the 
relationships between the individual level components are the aims of this dissertation. This 
chapter will outline a broad theoretical framework for defining and assessing social cohesion at 
the individual level, propose theoretical expectations for the role of elite behavior in influencing 
social cohesion, and propose expectations for how the component parts may interact at the 
individual level.  
2.1 Defining Social Cohesion  
Social cohesion is defined various ways depending on the field of study and if the work is 
written for policy purposes or academic ones. Many times, however, the term is used without any 
sort of definition attached.  Hence writers expect readers to understand social cohesion, perhaps 
based on some preexisting, approximately unified or consistent idea about what a “society” that 
is “cohesive” looks like. This implicitly assumes readers can imagine a “society” that lacks 
“cohesiveness”. However, the assumption that we are all picturing the same conditions and 
outcomes is a false one. The importance of clarifying and consolidating what is meant by social 
9 
cohesion within the field of political science and preferably across policy and in a multi-
disciplinary context would serve well for conducting research and determining policy processes. 
I define social cohesion as a stable environment of positive horizontal and vertical interaction 
between individuals that generate 1) positive ideas about groups and individuals within one’s 
society, and 2) actions that maintain social and political inclusivity, and policy productivity. 
Social cohesion is thus, at the individual level, comprised of legitimacy, social capital, and 
political participation.  This definition and conceptualization is an improvement on other 
definitions of social cohesion because it encompasses the full range of the concept. Social 
cohesion as I define the term captures the horizontal and vertical nature of social and political 
cohesion of a polity. Rather than narrowing the term to social capital alone, as is the most 
common practice. Some may argue still that social capital is the dominant area or measure of 
social cohesion and that legitimacy attitudes and participation are lesser parts of the cohesion 
picture. It is possible that these areas of social cohesion could be weighted differently when 
measuring at the aggregate level. While this question is outside of the scope of this project the 
iterative nature of social cohesion should be remembered when making determinations about 
weighting the three components more heavily or lightly.   
Social cohesion is an attitudinal and behavioral element of societies. Societies have high 
levels of social cohesion when individuals hold positive preferences and attitudes about others in 
society and those who have political power, and when individuals behave positively towards the 
political system and towards others through interactions. Low levels of social cohesion, 
therefore, exist when these positive preferences are absent, eroding, or replaced with negative 
10 
attitudes and behaviors.
6
 These attitudinal and behavioral orientations exist horizontally, towards 
fellow citizens, and vertically with relation to the government.  
Social cohesion has many moving parts and is the conglomeration of three interrelated 
dimensions for the individual: legitimacy, social capital, and political participation. Legitimacy 
exists when citizens view the current political institutions and those who have power within the 
system as right and proper (Lipset, 1959; Easton 1975). A sufficient level of support for the 
government, institutions, and actors is critical to sustaining a stable socio-political environment 
in a polity. Social capital is the second component accounting for attitudinal and behavioral 
patterns of trust and reciprocity of individuals within the context of the existing socio-political 
structures (e.g. Putnam 1993, 1995). A society with a great deal of social capital, especially 
bridging social capital is the foundation for social stability and can undercut the viability of 
political discord shoring up the endurance of a polity. Finally, political participation allows 
individuals to reaffirm or reject the political system and social structures supported by the 
politics of the day by taking some action. The actions or behaviors that individuals choose to 
engage in, or not, are incredibly important to the stability of a polity, as voting and violent 
protest have very different implications for a society.   
In the next sections I will discuss other conceptualizations and measurement schemas that 
have been used and why I argue that these three component concepts are the most appropriate 
way to define, measure, and analyze social cohesion.  
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 This definition of social cohesion and social capital is the reason tolerance is not included within the 
conceptualization or operationalization here.  Tolerance is not positive preference or attitude toward a group or 
other.  To the contrary tolerance is negative association or preference with allowance for inclusion in the political or 
social system (see Sullivan et al. 1982 for discussion of the definition and measurement of tolerance). While 
tolerance might provide some sort of system stability in a liberal democracy it is not full stop social cohesion to have 
tolerance. Social cohesion requires a more genuine positive preference by individuals. Tolerance is not a good 
measure of the societal aspect of social cohesion and therefore is not included in my conceptualization or measures. 
Arguably, where there is tolerance versus no tolerance this could be an indicator of acceptance of political norms of 
inclusion more than social capital as it pertains to social cohesion. 
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2.2 Other Definitions  
Scholars have employed a variety of definitions for social cohesion, most of which locate the 
unit of analysis at the societal level rather than the individual level. Modern attempts have been 
made to consolidate a definition and measurement of social cohesion.   I build off of definitions 
and measurements used by Bernard (1999) and Chan, To, and Chan (2006) to conceptualize 
social cohesion for this study. Both works advanced the consolidation of the concept of social 
cohesion by defining specific domains and measures that encompass the term. Bernard (1999) 
and Chan et al. (2006) propose similar conceptualizations of social cohesion with a focus on 
social and political attitudes and behaviors. The two differ where Bernard includes economic 
indicators which focus on economic inclusion, equality of opportunity and equality of condition.  
Chan et al. alternatively argue that the economic factors (i.e. inclusion or exclusion of 
individuals or groups in the labor market, and other conditions for economic equality and 
opportunity) are predictors of social cohesion but not measurement component of the concept.
7
 
Bernard’s argument focuses largely on the role of economic equality in producing social order 
and social cohesion. Bernard in some ways conflates social order and cohesion, which are not 
equivalent terms. Beauvis and Jenson (2002) use social order as a component of social cohesion 
as an update to Jenson’s (1998) five dimension conceptualization of social cohesion, discussed 
below.  
Bernard states that social cohesion is a “quasi” concept that remains ambiguous. He does 
not state a clear definition but instead makes an argument for six dimensions of social cohesion 
specifying two axes “character of the relation” (Formal and Substantial), and “sphere of activity” 
(Economic, Political, and Sociocultural). Bernard generates the  two axes in an effort to create a 
typology of Jenson’s (1998) five dimensions of social cohesion. Jenson’s (1998) five dimensions 
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 See Table 2.3, also Bernard (1999, 19-20), and Chan et al. (2006, Table III p.294).  
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of social cohesion in sum are: 1) A feeling of belonging or shared values, 2) Inclusion or 
exclusion from the labor market via employment, 3) Participation in or abstention from Politics, 
4) Tolerating or rejecting differences in others, and 5) the Recognition or Rejection of 
Institutions.  Through these overlapping typologies Bernard argues that he discovers a “sixth 
type”, 6) social justice and equality. Table 2.1 a recreation of a Bernard’s typology table (1999, 
19) shows how his two axes overlap with Jenson’s five dimensions of social cohesion.  
 
Table 2.1 “Typology of the Dimensions of Social Cohesion”  
   
Character of the Relation 
  
Formal Substantial 
S
p
h
er
e 
o
f 
A
ct
iv
it
y
 
Economic (2) Insertion/Exclusion (6) Equality/Inequality 
Political (5) Legitimacy/Illegitimacy (3) Participation/Passivity 
Sociocultural (4) Recognition/Rejection (1) Belonging/Isolation 
Table recreated  from Bernard (1999, 19) 
 
Chan et al. have a more deliberate definition for social cohesion. They state that “Social 
cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among 
members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of 
belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioral manifestations” 
(290; bolded in original). Chan et al. argue for a concise and sensible definition; they create a 
two by two framework rather than the three by two organization of Bernard by excluding the 
economic factors. The two by two includes Vertical dimensions and Horizontal dimensions on 
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one side, and subjective and objective on the other. Table 2.2, a recreation from Chan et al. 
depicts how the subjective, objective, horizontal, and vertical overlap in their conceptualization.  
 
Table 2.2 Measuring Social Cohesion: a two-by-two framework  
   
 
  
Subjective component  
(People’s state of mind) 
Objective component 
(Behavioral 
manifestations) 
S
p
h
er
e 
o
f 
A
ct
iv
it
y
 
Horizontal dimension 
(Cohesion within civil 
society) 
General trust with fellow 
citizens 
 
Willingness to cooperate and 
help fellow citizens, including 
those from “other” social groups 
Sense of belonging or identity 
Social participation and 
vibrancy of civil society  
 
Voluntarism and donations  
 
Presence or absence of 
major inter-group alliances 
or cleavages 
   
Vertical dimension 
(State-citizen 
cohesion) 
Trust in public figures 
 
Confidence in political and 
other major social institutions  
Political participation (e.g. 
voting, political parties 
etc.)  
 
 
Table recreated  from Chan et al. 2006, 294 Table III) 
 
Dickes et al. (2010) and Acket et al. (2011) test the empirical validity of a range of social 
cohesion dimensions for which Bernard and Chan et al. argue. Dickes et al. use individual level 
data from 33 countries in the European Values Survey (EVS) and confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) to validate that the expected survey questions are relevant component measures. Acket et 
al. use first use individual level measures from 47 EVS countries to construct a two dimensional 
metric, the VALCOS Index, for measuring social cohesion along attitudinal/formal and 
behavioral/substantial dimensions as conceptualized by Chan et al. and Bernard. 
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Table 2.3 Dimensions of Social Cohesion  
 
 Dickes et al.  
CASE Formal (Bernard) / Attitudinal (Chan et al.) 
 
 
A 
Formal/Economic 
Insertion/Exclusion in 
Economy (particularly in the 
labor market) 
 
 not included as part of 
social cohesion 
n/a 
Legitimacy 
 
 
 
B 
Formal /Political 
Legitimacy/Illegitimacy of 
public and private institutions 
 
Subjective Vertical 
Trust in public Figures. 
Confidence in institutions 
Social 
Capital 
 
 
C 
Formal/Sociocultural 
Acceptance/Rejection of 
pluralism;  Tolerance of Other 
groups 
 
Subjective Horizontal 
“General trust in others, 
Willingness to cooperate intra 
and inter group, Feelings of 
belonging shared identity” 
     
  
 Substantial (Bernard) / Behavioral (Chan et al.) 
 
 
D 
Substantial/Economic 
Equality/Inequality  of 
Economic conditions and 
opportunity  
  none n/a 
Political 
Participation 
 
 
E 
Substantial/Political 
Participation/passivity in the 
Political System 
 
Objective/Vertical 
Political Participation (e.g. 
voting, political parties…)  
Social 
Capital 
 
 
F 
Substantial/Sociocultural 
Affiliation/Isolation in/from the 
community, feeling of 
belonging, Shared values 
 
Objective/Horizontal 
Social Participation, i.e. 
Voluntarism/donations, 
Presence of intergroup 
cleavage  
Source: Chan et al. 2006; Dickes et al. 2010, Bernard 1999. This table is a derivation of Table 
1, Dickes et al., p.455, showing dimensions of social cohesion and groups the areas within 6 
Case areas classified by Dickes et al.   Chan et al. dimensions italicized as in Dickes et al.  
Column 1 is added to specify the three dominant concepts that underlie the meta-concept of 
social cohesion.  
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While Acket et al. and Dickes et al. use individual level, Acket et al. go on to using macro 
comparisons at the country level and Dickes et al. do not go beyond validating the measures. 
Both studies find support for the components of social cohesion except for Bernard’s economic 
sphere which is not verified due to insufficient existing data to measure economic indicators. 
Neither of these studies delves into theorizing or testing predictive or causal models at the 
individual level. This study aims to understand the individual level factors that may promote or 
restrict social cohesion.   
The conceptualization of social cohesion laid out by the various works discussed above 
overlap greatly with concepts that are already prevalent in political science literature. I argue that 
the array of social cohesion components tested by Dickes et al. and Acket et al. align with the 
political concepts of legitimacy, social capital, and political participation (electoral and non-
electoral). These concepts measured and understood at the individual level will contribute to the 
overall understanding of why we see variation in social cohesion. Table 2.3 shows how the 
component parts outlined by Bernard, and Chan et al. overlap with each other and cases 
identified by Dikes et al. Table 2.3 also depicts how the political science concepts of legitimacy, 
social capital, and political participation align with existing domains. The next section will take a 
deeper look at these three terms, how they overlap with existing spheres of social cohesion, and 
why they are important components of social cohesion.  
2.3 Social Cohesion’s Three Dimensions 
I conceptualize social cohesion in this dissertation as a socio-political phenomenon comprised of 
three attitudinal and behavioral areas: legitimacy, social capital, and political participation. 
Before turning to my theory that will discuss how these components are associated and might 
work in supporting overall social cohesion, I will define and discuss the three components with 
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an eye to prior research in each area as well as to my research question. Then I will elaborate my 
top-down theory of social cohesion. 
2.3.1 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy deals with how citizens and individuals perceive the institutions, individuals, groups, 
and ideals that construct a government. Legitimacy is a critical component of social cohesion 
because the political environment and contexts shape the way that individuals interact with each 
other. Legitimacy of the government captures the political and vertical components of a society. 
Exclusion of these factors would prevent a  full understanding of how individuals and groups 
feel and behave within a society. The political environment and actions taken by various political 
actors filters through what political scientists call legitimacy, which are the perceptions about the 
governmental structures that exist and operate the day to day politics and business of the state. 
Political scientists often measure legitimacy by gauging confidence or trust in specific actors, 
specific institutions such as the parliament, the president, the judiciary, and of specific regime 
norms such as democracy.  High levels of legitimacy exist when citizens are confident in and 
have high levels of trust in the government, its actors, and its institutions.  
Many scholars have grappled with how to define political legitimacy and argue about the 
role of legitimacy on “system stability” (Booth and Seligson 2009). Booth and Seligson (2009) 
deliberate over the concept of legitimacy in great depth, empirically validating a variety of 
individual survey measures. Booth and Seligson define six areas of support for measuring the 
structure of legitimacy:  1) “existence of political community”, 2) “support for core regime 
principles”, 3) “support for regime institutions” , 4) “evaluation of regime performance”,8  5) 
“support for local government”, and 6) “support for political actors or authorities” (49-55). 
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 In Booth and Seligson’s study and others, economic evaluations are the basis of measurement for regime 
performance.  
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Mishler and Rose emphasize the role of political trust as being an especially important part of 
legitimacy. They find support for institutional theories for trust which underscore the ability to 
nurture and grow trust in newly developed democratic institutions (2001, 33). Norris (2011) 
makes the argument that voter turnout is an insufficient measure for legitimacy and a deeper 
understanding of the attitudes and behaviors is necessary and now possible with growing 
individual level survey data.  
Additionally, I argue that voter turnout falls under the scope of political participation 
rather than a direct measure of legitimacy. Legitimacy in my conceptualization is only an 
attitudinal measure, not behavioral. The attitudes about a government eventually lead to actions 
taken by individuals, but these are conceptually different aspects of social cohesion. Looking at 
the social cohesion literature legitimacy overlaps with Dickes et al. “Case B”, Bernard’s 
“Formal/Political” cell, and Chan et al.’s “Subjective Horizontal” area (see Table 2.3). Bernard’s 
and Chan et al.’s (2006) “spheres of social cohesion,” the component of legitimacy includes trust 
in public figures, and confidence in or feelings of legitimacy towards political institutions.  I 
constrain the measures of legitimacy to the attitudes framed by Bernard and Chan et al. 
including, support of public institutions, trust in elected officials, and confidence in institutions. 
These three areas are particularly relevant to the political legitimacy which focuses on the 
vertical attitudes of an individual’s support of governmental institutions and representatives, the 
first of three components that comprise the overarching concept of social cohesion.  
2.3.2 Social Capital 
Political science and sociology scholars have long studied social capital. Social capital links the 
role of individual and group relationships and actions to economic success and social and 
political functionality. Largely, social capital deals with the existence of trust and reciprocity 
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between individuals or other actors (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000). In its original conception, 
social capital was defined in relation to other forms of capital, economic or “physical capital” 
and human capital (Coleman 1988). Social capital was considered to be the third important form 
of capital that could, through its presence within a society, produce positive conditions for 
growing economic capital. I define social capital in the tradition of Coleman (1988) and Putnam 
(1993, 2000). Social capital exists when actors believe that commitments by other actors will be 
upheld. The accumulation of trust and reciprocity
9
 between actors within a social structure, 
establishment of norms to constrain behaviors, and formation of viable networks of actors can 
create and reinforce this belief in the credibility of commitments (Putnam 1993, 164-67).
10 
   
Putnam (2000) further tested the viability of social capital in its relation to the success of 
democracy and extended the conceptualization to include two sub-categories: bonding social 
capital and bridging social capital. Bonding and bridging social capital were argued to be 
important distinctions in type and in outcome. Bonding social capital occurs within an existing 
group structure while bridging social capital occurs between individuals or group actors outside 
of the group or of two separate groups. Levi (1996) discusses the dynamic roles bridging and 
bonding social capital play. Levi disagrees with Putnam that both bonding and bridging social 
capital will contribute to generalized trust, and states that neighborhood associations in West 
Belfast, Northern Ireland, “…promote trust of those you know and distrust of those you do not, 
those not in the neighborhood or outside the networks” (50). Bonding social capital thus 
strengthening social ties and trust within existing groups but perhaps prevents the growth of 
                                                 
9
 Trust and reciprocity here fall within this transactional definition of social capital. One trusts when they believe 
that another person is committed to a transaction and that the other will return favor. A trustor believes that a trustee 
is trustworthy. Reciprocity is an act of returning the favor by upholding the commitment themselves once trust has 
been put in them by a trustor. A trustor forms an attitude (a belief) and then takes action based on that attitude. A 
trustee receives some action, this action is moderated by preexisting attitudes (knowledge and beliefs), the trustee 
then takes action based on this information (the trustor’s action and preexisting attitudes). 
10
 Putnam uses the term “credible commitments” in his explanation of social capital and linking the concept of 
collective action to the concept of social capital (1993, 164).  
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these ties and trust outside of the bounds of that group and thusly limiting broader bridging social 
capital.
11
  
Social capital captures the horizontal relationships that exist within a socio-political 
system, when individuals believe that other individuals will hold up their end of any given 
agreement. The horizontal social trust and reciprocity that exists (or is absent) within a society 
between individuals can play a part in how political participation manifests. Social capital can be 
reinforcing to higher levels of cohesion or divisions that exist depending on if we see bridging or 
bonding social capital, respectively.  
Newton (1999) argues that interpersonal trust is a distinct concept from political trust, 
and therefore always must be distinguished between when discussing trust. Political trust refers 
to a vertical trust and reciprocity relationship between citizens and their representatives and in 
some cases other community leaders.  Interpersonal trust at the societal level encompasses the 
horizontal relationships captured in the concept of social capital. Additionally, Newton speaks to 
the likely causal direction of influence between the two forms of trust. He states that political 
factors rather than social ones influence political trust, and that political capital likely influences 
social capital in a top-down manner (186).  Sønderskov & Dinesen (2016) also find support for 
institutional trust having a causal effect on social trust.
12
  This is important to my theory of social 
cohesion in terms of how legitimacy is likely to influence social capital.  Social capital is widely 
discussed in its importance for, and role within, democracies (Putnam 1993, 2001; Fukuyama 
2001; Levi 1996; Brehm and Rahn 1997). Areas that fall under social capital within the social 
                                                 
11 Social psychology literature also contributes heartily to our understanding of how group identities and 
interactions shape attitudinal outcomes with three dominant areas of research: intergroup contact theory (see Allport 
1954), extended contact hypothesis (Wright et al 1997; Turner et al. 2007), and social identity theory (Tajfel 
generally e.g. 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979).  
12
 Sønderskov & Dinesen (2016) use panel studies from Denmark that track individual attitudes for up to 18 years in 
their study.  
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cohesion conceptualizations as discussed earlier include: general trust, out-group trust, tolerance, 
norms of reciprocity, cooperation, feeling of belonging, and participation in social organizations 
(see Table 2.3). Each of these areas of social capital, when we see high levels, contribute to the 
belief that commitments by others are being upheld. Additional contextualization between 
bonding and bridging social capital must be taken into consideration. High levels of bonding 
social capital have been found to reinforce in-group trust and reciprocity while high levels of 
bridging social capital have been found to grow outgroup trust, tolerance and so on. Of the 
indicators that comprise social capital, interpersonal trust is considered to be the most formidable 
and informative to the likelihood of increased social participation and positive social opinions.
13
   
2.3.3 Political Participation 
Political participation is the final constituent part of social cohesion. Political participation is a 
set of bottom up vertical of actions that an individual might take to voice their preferences about 
the state of the socio-political system and their support or rejection of the current government. 
Bernard, Chan et al., Dickes et al., and Acket et al. all include political participation in their 
measures of social cohesion.  Electoral participation and various forms of non-electoral 
participation are of concern for social cohesion. Electoral participation refers to the act of an 
individual voting in representative election, arguably the most formal form of political voice. 
Non-electoral participation includes acts of political voice outside of or beyond voting. Voting is 
an important indicator of engagement with politics, however protesting and signing a petition are 
other methods of engagement and voicing political preferences. Additionally, non-electoral 
participation may feel like a more viable and vocal option for some individuals and groups, 
                                                 
13
 While interpersonal trust can exist at various levels depending on the context, for the purposes of this study, 
interpersonal trust is constrained to the salient socio-political cleavage. Operationalization and measures are 
discussed in more detail within the empirical chapters of this dissertation.  
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either when discontent with the electoral options or when groups are disenfranchised in some 
way. It is important to include both electoral and non-electoral participation because the 
motivations for using one over another or both will likely vary. Political participation is relevant 
and important to social cohesion because it closes the loop between the political and the societal 
spheres of a polity. Citizen voice, either through formal or informal channels is important to the 
full picture of representative governance.     
Now that I have briefly defined the component parts of social cohesion; legitimacy, social 
capital, and political participation, I will explain in greater detail the expected relationships 
between these three spheres. I will also discuss the role of elected representatives on social 
cohesion. Following from Newton’s argument that political trust impacts interpersonal trust I 
expect a top-down relationship to exist between political actor behaviors and individual level 
citizen behavior. The next section makes the argument for why political actions matter for social 
cohesion and how the component parts of social cohesion matter to each other at the individual 
level.  
2.4 A Top-Down Theory of Social Cohesion  
The actions and policy decisions of political elites have the potential to influence individual 
perceptions and behaviors in political and social spheres (cf. Zaller 1992). Therefore, I argue, the 
role of political elites is incredibly important when trying to understand the individual attitudes 
and behaviors that foster social cohesion. This is particularly true where consociational 
institutions exist and have been established to mitigate group conflict. This study focuses on 
political elites within a society, because the absence or presence of cooperation at the elite level 
has the potential to drive divisions or unify the political as well as the social sphere. Namely, 
inclusive (or divisive) elite behavior may encourage (or discourage) an array of attitudes, forms 
22 
of political participation, and interpersonal behaviors that stabilize a cohesive regime-citizen 
equilibrium in society. As explained below, this question of political elite influence is 
particularly important in, but not limited to, societies that have strongly defined reinforcing 
ethno-political cleavages, such as Northern Ireland.   
While I argue that elites are vital to propagating social cohesion, we first need to 
understand how identity at the individual level may impact interpretations of elites, as well as 
attitudes about and actions towards others. The structure of society and where an individual finds 
themselves within that structure can impact their perceptions and actions. Social identity is 
important to understanding the full scope of social cohesion in any given polity. Social identity 
theories (e.g. Tajfel & Turner 1979; Levin & Sidanius 1999; Abrams 1984; Kelly 1988; Hinkle 
& Brown 1990), social distance (Bogardus 1959), and group threat and conflict theories (e.g. 
Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Levin and Sidanius 1999; Crighton and McIver 1991; Bobo 
1999) posit that societies are broken into groups, individuals identifying with one or more social 
groups affects how an individual understands the world and interacts with others in this social 
structure. That is, when individuals identify with a subgroup of a society, whether it is political, 
ethnic, class, linguistic, or otherwise, the individual’s identity will moderate perceptions and 
behaviors. The embedded cleavage structure and categorization of cleavage will vary across 
different societies. The degree to which these cleavages polarize a citizenry will also vary. The 
context of socio-political structure must be taken into account to fully understand how social 
cohesion functions.  
General political trust and social trust is usually measured to gauge aspects of social 
cohesion, but salient cleavages are an important context that must be accounted for. General trust 
values likely have use in assessing social cohesion, however including the additional context of 
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embedded cleavages can help researchers to understand how individuals’ perceptions and 
decision making is informed. At both the social and political level the context of salient socio-
political or ethno-political cleavage context must be included in the trust calculous. Transue 
(2007) uses a survey experiment to determine the varying effects of superordinate and subgroup 
(racial) identities on support for particularized educational (to a particular race group) and 
general educational funding in the United States.  Transue (2007) found that the “salient identity 
of the respondents” matters for their preferences (88). This and other studies (e.g. Carlin and 
Love 2018) highlight the importance of the identity context within the larger question of social 
cohesion and political processes generally. Additionally, recent studies dealing with polarization 
are highlighting the importance of identifying relevant partisan cleavages beyond the traditional 
left-right divide to better understand the ways division arise and become entrenched within 
different societal and polity contexts (e.g. Somer and McCoy 2018; Lauka et al. 2018). This 
study focuses on these the role of subgroup identity by investigating the impact of elite behaviors 
across socio-political cleavages on the three areas of social cohesion.  
2.4.1 Elite Conflict and Legitimacy Attitudes  
Reik et al. (2008) lay the groundwork for elite influence on public social preferences (e.g.  trust 
towards members of a social outgroups). Reik et al. building on extended contact 
hypothesis/theory (see Wilner et al. 1952; Wright et al. 1997; Turner et al. 2007) that establishes 
the idea that an individual knowing another ingroup member has had contact with an outgroup 
member increases favorable attitudes towards that outgroup. Essentially you do not need direct 
contact with an outgroup member, rather a friend that is part of your ingroup having outgroup 
contact can affect your attitudes and behaviors about the outgroup. Like direct contact, extended 
contact works best under certain conditions (e.g. self-disclosure which establishes intimacy; see 
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Pettigrew & Tropp 2006, and Turner et al. 2007), but we still see reductions of bias even when 
these most favorable conditions are not present. Extended contact hypothesis was originated at 
the horizontal or mass level, where individuals interacting making friends with outgroup 
members.  
Riek et al. expand the idea to a vertical or top down exchange whereby witnessing cross-
national elite interaction might influence citizen adoption of positive attitudes towards foreign 
countries. Here the country identity is isolated as the salient ingroup and the elites (e.g. Prime 
Ministers, Presidents, notable diplomats) interacting work as an ingroup member in contact with 
an outgroup member, the other countries elite. Reik et al. find that when state leaders interact in 
cooperative ways with other state leaders, citizens from those countries are more trusting of the 
other country (State A Leader and State B Leader cooperate  State A citizens are more trusting 
of State B, and State B citizens are more trusting of State A). The elite behavior acts as a signal 
to individuals that the other state is trustworthy.    
I argue that this extended contact theory, or top-down elite behavioral influence on the 
general public can be adapted to a fully domestic context. Societies that have experienced violent 
conflict based on an ethno-political cleavage and have political systems that remain divided 
along these lines will also have political elites that can be easily identifiable as attached to a 
specific group. Cooperation or conflict between elites of different groups can therefore be easily 
interpreted by the public as such and ultimately influence societal level attitudes. If this is the 
case, divided societies should benefit from increases in overall social cohesion following elite 
cooperation.  
Therefore fully understanding how domestic political elites can inform the attitudes and 
behaviors that comprise social cohesion is an important socio-political question to address. 
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Looking at the three spheres of social cohesion individually, links between elite behavior and the 
three areas (legitimacy,
14
 social capital,
15
 and political participation
16
) have been made in the 
past, but clarity about the relationship and influence of cross-community interactions at the elite 
level have not been investigated. Elite-to-citizen influence is often referred to as a top-down 
relationship, this emphasizes the connection between elite behaviors and individual perceptions 
of government and institutions. Booth and Seligson (2009) and Mishler and Rose (2001) both 
discuss this direction of influence. The top-down flow of information about elite behaviors has 
the potential to greatly influence attitudes and behaviors within and across existing socio-
political cleavages.  
This new model of social cohesion at the individual level takes into account the social 
cleavages that are present within a society. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between elite 
behaviors and the three components of social cohesion. A brief description follows and a more 
exact and detailed explanation of the mechanisms behind these expected relationships is 
discussed in the next section and tested in the following empirical chapters. I will also state 
specific expectations that will inform hypotheses stated and tested in later chapters of this 
dissertation (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6).  
Elite interaction across community lines, either through cooperation or conflict, is the 
starting place in this model. Elites behave in ways that signal conflict (not working together for 
common goals), or cooperation (working together successfully through compromise or 
agreement). Citizens become aware of this cross-community elite behavior through the news 
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 e.g. Seligson’s (2006) study on corruption and government legitimacy, and  Svolik (2013) who points to “good 
performance” of individual politicians as important to support for democracy  and the consolidation of new 
democracies.  
15
 e.g. Fox (1996) uses a “political construction” approach for investigating how  social capital is built in Mexico 
where he argues elite political conflict may affects the developing social capital.  
16
 e.g. Eisinger (1973) linking  government responsiveness to likelihood of political activity.   
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media or other sources. Cross-community trust or mistrust is signaled to individuals in society. 
These signals should directly impact individuals’ feelings about the government and those 
political leaders and political parties that are interacting. Hence, I expect elite behavior to 
influence individual attitudes about the government (legitimacy component).  
 
 
Cross-Community 
Elite Behavior 
 
 
   
 
Legitimacy 
Cross-Community 
Political Trust 
Confidence in 
Institutions 
  
 
  
Form of Political Participation 
Voting 
Non-Electoral Participation 
Non-Conventional Participation 
 
 
Social Capital 
Social Trust 
Cross-Community 
Social Trust 
Willingness to 
Integrate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dotted line indicates expected interaction between social capital measures and 
legitimacy measures.  
Figure 2.1 Cross-Community Elite Behavior and Social Cohesion  
 
Legitimacy, in this model, then impacts the formation of social capital and political 
participation. Social capital is encouraged (or stifled) by support for (or rejection of) the actors 
and institutions that comprise the government. The social identity context is overlaid here, where 
trusting ingroup and outgroup political elites impacts social level (horizontal) attitudes and 
behaviors. There is, therefore, an expectation of some direct effect from elite behavior on social 
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capital. Legitimacy attitudes are also likely to impact decisions about participating or not 
participating politically and the form of participation utilized by an individual. Social capital will 
also influence theform of political participation individuals use to voice their support or 
opposition to political events and elites. Again it is likely that there is some direct effect form 
elite behavior to political participation indicated by the line connecting the two.  
2.4.2 Moving from Elite Behavior to Individual Attitudes  
Citizens observe and interpret public behaviors and policy decisions made by political elites (e.g. 
elected members of the Legislative Assembly
17
).  Many factors might influence how individual 
interpret actions. The way that individuals receive cues from elites is affected by the media’s 
coverage or lack of coverage of events and issues through agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw, 
1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Brewer, Graf and Willnat, 2003), and framing of the issue 
(Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997; Scheufele 1999). Depending on what the media decides is 
salient, and the way information is portrayed can influence the public’s perceptions of an issue or 
event. The way individuals are affected by media also varies because of an individual’s 
predispositions (see Scheufele 1999).  
Other works have begun to question the magnitude of influence that the media has on the 
public given shifts in media formats and reduced attention to news media (see Davis 2003 for 
discussion). Davis (2003) argues that the role of the media may be shifting to an elite-elite model 
rather than an elite-mass model, meaning that elites communicate with each other through the 
media. Davis also emphasizes that elites use the media to communicate what they find to be 
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 In the Northern Ireland context, the consociational institutions are specific to the Northern Ireland Assembly. In 
other country contexts the parliamentary leaders would be the elected officials working within the powersharing 
structure. While there are many other groupings of individuals that can be considered “elites” these elected officials 
are actors within the post-conflict consociational institutions. This study limits the scope of “elites” to these 
individuals. While other actors may influence citizen attitudes and behaviors I am particularly interested in those 
individuals that are a part of the power sharing governing structure.   
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important (agenda setting). Increased easy access to communication technologies has modified 
the modes of communications available to political figures. Beyond mainstream media, internet 
websites, and online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter have entered into the arena of 
political communication. Aragón et al. (2013) discusses the role of Twitter in campaign 
communication. Aragon et al. track Twitter posts, or Tweets, that political parties and political 
candidates post, re-tweets, and comments made by other politicians or citizens in the Spanish 
2011 campaign cycle. Aragón et al. find support that these communications are largely one 
directional, meaning there is little citizen to elite dialogue. Instead, political elites communicate 
with citizens and other elites through Twitter (internet social media).
18
  
Additionally, Aragón et al. argue and find, similarly to Lawrence et al. (2010) and 
Bennett and Iyengar (2008; 2010) that individuals seek out media information from sources, 
media and individuals that reinforce what that individual already believes. This relationship 
between media seeking behaviors and new ability of elites to communicate directly to 
constituents has particular bearing on societies with ethno-political cleavages. Individuals are 
more likely to seek information from ingroup elites and therefore elites have a particular 
potential for influence of ingroup citizens through behaviors and targeted communications.  
Beyond media influence theories, extended contact theory argues that the knowledge of 
others from one’s in-group interacting with a member of an out-group can increase positive 
attitudes about the out-group (Wright, Aron, McLauglin-Volpe, and Ropp 1997, 73). Reik et al. 
use extended contact theory to explain leaders interacting with international counterpart in a 
“friendly way” as influential in “altering attitudes of the general population” about a country 
(2008, 268). I argue that this will apply within country as well. Following the logic of extended 
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 Aragón et al. also found that smaller and newer parties with less access to main stream, traditional media outlets 
engaged with other individuals more frequently. 
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contact theory, positive cross-community elite interactions should increase trust in out-group 
elites. Additionally, Catterberg and Moreno (2006) find a positive association between 
government performance and political trust. Therefore, if elected members of an assembly are 
able to make good governing choices, which would require compromise and working together 
political trust will likely rise. However, if the government is not getting their job done trust is 
likely to decline. Within any democracy, but especially one with consociational institutions, 
cooperation can be seen as the government performing well while conflict is seen as a failure.  
In a sectarian divided society contextualizing political trust along existent cleavage lines 
should, therefore, clarify the relationship between government and political trust and confidence 
in institutions. In sum, good performance and interactive behaviors will lead to increased cross-
community trust because the interactions act as an exemplar of extended contact and successful 
governance. This will increase legitimacy, namely trust in government and confidence in 
institutions.  Alternatively, when conflict exists between groups and policy making is stagnant 
trust and confidence are likely to decline. I expect that elite public behaviors and policy decisions 
will influence trust in cross-community elites and confidence in institutions. 
Expectation 1: Cross-community elite conflict (cooperation) will increase 
the likelihood than an individual will mistrust (trust) cross community 
political elites.  
 
Expectation 2: Cross-community elite conflict (cooperation) will decrease 
(increase) an individual’s level of confidence in political institutions.  
 
2.4.3 Social Identity and Social Capital  
The next concept in the dynamic individual relationship of social cohesion is social capital. 
Determining how social capital and social identity interact to produce different outcomes within 
politics and society are an important aspect for understanding how social cohesion operates at the 
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individual level. Social capital and social identity theories inform the expectations about trust 
and reciprocity within the context of ingroup and outgroup identifications, which are particularly 
important to informing attitudinal and behavioral outcomes amongst and between societal 
subgroups. 
Social capital studies draw attention to the difference between bridging and bonding 
social capital, which contextualizes interactions between people according to group identities. 
Bridging social capital exists when inter-group trust and interactions occur. Bonding social 
capital exists when ingroup trust and interactions are present. Strong bonding or bridging social 
capitals are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They each have implications for how the political 
system and society as a whole function. Bridging social capital has positive implications for an 
enduring and high functioning democracy while high levels of bonding social capital can weaken 
and divide a society (e.g. Putnam 2000). Trust and Reciprocity are attitudes or actions that 
undergird interactions between individuals. Kenneth Newton argues that trust and reciprocity as 
a part of social capital are “crucial for social and political stability and cooperation. Treated in 
this way, social capital focuses on those cultural values and attitudes that predispose citizens to 
cooperate, trust, understand, and empathize with each other – to treat each other as fellow 
citizens, rather than as strangers, competitors, or potential enemies.” (1997, 575-76).   Trust and 
reciprocity are, thus, key to social capital’s contribution to the functioning of society and 
democracies.  
Given social capital and social identity theories, I argue that there are a few likely 
outcomes of individual level attitudes and behavior: 1) identity informs attitudes, 2) individuals 
generate positive feelings about members of their own group, and 3) negative feelings about 
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individuals and groups that are on the outside of one’s own group will exist.19 Thus there are 
three primary ways that identity will inform feelings about trust and reciprocity. There are a few 
broad expectations that follow from these three assertions:  
Expectation 3: Individuals will demonstrate outgroup mistrust. Individuals will 
be less trusting and show less reciprocity for trusting behaviors to a political 
outgroup member than they will trust or show reciprocity to members of a 
political ingroup or individuals that cannot be identified as members of the 
political outgroup or ingroup.  
 
Social and political hierarchies also inform identify formation. Social identity theory 
argues that social identities, how people identify themselves as a member of a group within a 
larger social structure of many groups, can produce a zero-sum mentality (Tajfel 1974). The idea 
that one’s own group is pitted against another group, this us versus them mentality develops 
because individuals use these groups to structure the meaning of their own identity. The 
perceived clash of social identities can become entrenched creating stronger, reinforced ingroup 
attachments. In the social capital terminology, it builds bonding social capital within group lines 
and minimizes bridging social capital as divides grow stronger.  
Sidanius and Pratto (2001; 2011) further argue that when groups interact one group will 
be dominant and assert their dominance in a variety of ways including discrimination, bias, and 
hostility (social dominance theory). Social dominance leads to inequality, discrimination, and 
conflict in many societies.  In a polity, one group may rise as the dominant political or social 
group, either because they are the numerical majority or leverage power to gain the political 
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 Because this expectation is within the context of a consociational agreement, I am assuming that there is a level of 
salience of identity with those who identify with the groups identified within the agreement. In Northern Ireland 
those who identify as Unionist and Nationalists, this is a salient identity and relevant to the social and political 
environments. Thusly, I assume that there is at least a base level of “us versus them” mentality that Reik et al. and 
others discuss as essential to intergroup conflict, for individuals who identify as one group or the other. The 
distinction between groups is likely more difficult to isolate and determine if the “us” vs. “them” mentality is present 
and producing perceptions of zero-sum between groups. (See Reik et al. 2008, 2576 for three essential elements of 
intergroup conflict: “us v. them”, zero sum terms, and support of ingroup norms, rejection or “distain” of outgroup 
norms).    
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majority. In democracies we often see numerical and political majorities aligning, however, this 
is not always the case. South Africa, for example, during colonization and apartheid saw the 
white Dutch and their descendants as the numerical minority but the political majority. Therefore 
in the political context of South Africa whites would be considered the historically dominant 
socio-political group maintaining political dominance until apartheid ended in the early 1990s.  
Dominant group structures can exist outside and inside of liberal democracies, and can 
threaten the stability of working liberal democracies. Identification with any group has the 
potential to produce ingroup bias, but scholars find that this association between identity and 
ingroup bias can be stronger for dominant groups because of fears of losing dominant status (see 
Levin and Sidanius 1999, Hinkle and Brown 1990, Abrams 1984, Kelly 1988, O’Callaghan 
2010). 
Expectation 4: Individuals who are members of a historically dominant group 
will show stronger ingroup bias than others. Individuals who are members of a 
dominant group will have higher trust levels and show more reciprocity to the 
ingroup than they show to unidentified individuals or outgroup members.  
 
The next expectation deals with how trusting behavior impacts reciprocity. There is a vast 
literature on the value of intergroup contact in mitigating biases (see Pettigrew 1998; 2006; 
Pettigrew et al. 2011).
20
 Contact, broadly, has been found to reduce prejudice, and positive 
contact magnifies prejudice reduction. Additionally, many studies specifically on trust and 
reciprocity find that receiving trust from another person, whether it be from an ingroup or an 
outgroup member increases an individual’s likelihood of reciprocating trusting behaviors.  
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 Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) and Pettigrew et al. (2011) analyzing hundreds of contact theory studies find that 
contact overwhelmingly produces positive outcomes in terms of reducing outgroup bias. They argue that contact 
works in outgroup relationships beyond those ethnic and racial groupings alone. Additionally, they argue that 
“Allport’s optimal contact conditions” are not requisite in reducing prejudice, although they magnify prejudice 
reduction between groups (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2011)   
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Once trust has been established there is a need to fulfill the contract and uphold the social 
commitment and return in kind. Scholars including Carlin and Love (2013) and Johnson and 
Mislin (2011) have found that being shown trust by another person increases reciprocity. Cross 
community interactions or being the recipient of trusting behaviors should reduce some of the 
group bias motivation for individuals. Therefore, contact or positive trusting behaviors are 
expected to reduce group biases.  
Expectation 5: Trust will moderate group biases for showing reciprocity. 
Individuals who receive trust (approached with trusting behavior), including an 
outgroup member, will be more willing reciprocate trusting behaviors.  
 
The role of elite behaviors is also expected to impact the levels of trust and reciprocity for 
individuals in society. Extended contact theory (e.g. Reik et al. 2008) argues that there is a link 
between elite behavior, political trust, and attitudes about the out-group at the international level 
of elite interactions. This theory explains that when individuals witness positive interactions 
between leaders of their own country and another country they are more likely to have positive 
feelings about the other country. The elite interactions thus act as a proxy interaction for 
individuals in a society and should, therefore, hold at the domestic level.  
I argue that cross-community elite trust will lead to increases in social trust and 
willingness of individuals to interact with individuals outside of their own subgroup. Feelings of 
trust towards out-group elites will act as a cue for attitudes and preferences about other 
individuals in the out-group community.  
Expectation 6: Elite interactions will influence individuals’ attitudes and 
behaviors. Individuals who observe cross-community elite conflict will have 
greater ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust than those who do not observe elite 
conflict. Alternatively, Individuals who observe cross-community cooperation 
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will have less ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust than those who do not observe 
elite cooperation.
21
  
 
Expectation 7: Vertical to Horizontal - Trust in ingroup and/or outgroup political 
elites or parties will affect attitudes and behaviors towards the social ingroup and 
outgroup. E.g. Individuals who trust outgroup party members will be more willing 
to interact with the outgroup in the social contexts.  
 
These five broad expectations about how social capital, particularly trust, reciprocity, and 
preferences for interaction are likely to be associated with or changed by elite behaviors and elite 
(vertical) trust. Additionally, socio-political identity is important context for how elite behaviors 
and trust in elites are associated with shifts in social capital.  
2.4.4 On Political Participation: An Argument for an Integrated Model of Legitimacy 
and Social Capital  
There is a wealth of literature dealing with the conditions that impact political participation (e.g. 
Veba and Nie 1972, Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, Barnes and Kaase 1979, Kaase 1999, 
Mutz 2002, Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). There are many forms of political participation, 
conventional and unconventional methods, as well as abstention from political activity. Verba 
and Nie (1972) look at what factors impact conventional political participation including voting, 
participating in a campaign, and donating money. Verba and Nie classify protesting and parades 
as a form of efficacy. Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979) extended their definition of participation 
beyond measuring conventional participation alone and include unconventional forms of 
participation which they term “protest potential”.22  
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 The cooperation portion of this expectation is unfortunately not tested in this study, but hopefully future studies 
will be able to test the cooperation side of this theory.   
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 Barnes and Kaase et al. forms of unconventional participation included: 1) “writing to a newspaper”, 2) “refusing 
to pay rent, rates or taxes”, 3) “boycotts (eg. avoid buying South African goods, or avoid taking a holiday in a 
Communist country)”, 4) “personal violence (fighting with police, rival demonstrators, etc.)” 5) “obstructing 
traffic”, 6) “occupying buildings (sit-ins, squatting), 7) “signing a petition”, 8) “Damaging property (removing 
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A range studies theorize and test the role of legitimacy and the role of social capital on 
informing voter turnout (legitimacy: Booth and Seligson 2005; Easton 1975; Norris 1999; 
Kornberg and Clarke 1992, social capital: Putnam 1995, Putnam and Leonardi 1993), but few to 
none have looked at the interaction of legitimacy and social capital on the form of participation. 
Booth and Seligson’s (2009) work in particular advances our understanding of how legitimacy 
might produce varying levels of conventional and unconventional political participation.
23
 
Moving away from linear theories of legitimacy and participation they argue for and provide 
empirical evidence in support of a U-shaped relationship. They posit that the extremes of the 
legitimacy spectrum (very high and very low levels of support for the government and regime) 
will lead to different outcomes than moderate positions. This theory countered the argument that 
legitimacy has a continuous linear relationship with likeliness to participation.    
Building on Booth and Seligson’s work U-shaped theory linking legitimacy extremes to 
participation, I theorize that social capital interacts as follows. The extent to which individuals 
holding extreme legitimacy opinions, i.e. those with high levels of support or high levels of 
disapproval, participate in politics further depends on whether they hold bridging and bonding 
social capital. That is, an individual’s propensity for legitimacy extremes to influence 
participation varies with his or her trust and preferences for ingroup/outgroup interaction. 
Particularly in societies with cleavages and reinforcing political divides, as is the case in 
Northern Ireland, this dynamic of outgroup or ingroup trust can impact decisions about the 
viability of voicing discontent inside or outside of the electoral institutions.
24
  It is important to 
                                                                                                                                                             
roadsigns, breaking windows, etc.)” 9) “Unofficial Strikes”,  10) “Use of guns or explosives”, 11) “Non-violent 
demonstrations” (1979; 66).      
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 In fact Booth and Seligson explicitly argue for the disagrgation of participation, arguing that to measure political 
participation correctly one must include “participation’s diversity” rather than dichotomizing it.   
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 Verba and Nie (1972) focusing on conventional participation find some evidence that indicates that individuals 
who have an activated group identity are more likely to participate than others, this is found for both political party 
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account for these social conditions and individual identity saliencies when testing for 
participation outcomes. Confining ourselves to the broad social capital term and measures 
ignores the potential for interactions and trust between people in divided societies to impact 
political participation. Interactions and trust with an outgroup member might reduce the impact 
of low legitimacy feelings towards a stagnant or conflicted legislature. Bonding social capital 
indicated by a strong identification with an ingroup is likely to isolate a population and could 
magnify the impact of divisive messages and change the stakes of political action.  Thus my 
theory explains how these key factors – legitimacy and social capital – interact to influence 
political participation. Thereby I expound on previous theory to include both vertical and 
horizontal factors (not just one or the other) and, in turn, change a two dimensional theory into a 
three dimensional one. In short, I expect the specific forms of participation that an individual 
chooses to engage in to vary depending on an individual’s legitimacy attitudes and social capital 
(see Table 2.4).  
The basis for the three dimensional expectation is of course rooted in extant studies 
which I will expound upon in the following section.  Booth and Seligson (2009) theorized and 
found a U-shaped relationship between legitimacy and participation. Individuals who are 
accepting of the status quo, those who are not adamantly opposed to or in support of a 
government and regime norms are less likely to participate than those who have more extreme 
positions. I combine this U-shaped expectation about legitimacy predictors with expectations 
about bridging and bonding social capital.  
Each form of social capital, bridging and bonding, is theorized to have a differing effect 
on participation within or outside of the political system. Individuals with more extreme attitudes 
                                                                                                                                                             
attachment and race (blacks during the civil-rights era – racial identity here has political saliency at the time). This is 
an example of how ingroup attachment, identity salience, and bonding social capital might affect participation.  
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about political actors and institutions should be more likely to participate but I argue that 
depending on levels and form of social capital (low or high, bridging or bonding), the form of 
participation will also vary. Individuals who have high levels of bonding social capital are more 
likely to discount the voice of the outgroup both at the societal level and the political level. Their 
political positions will be more polarized than those of individuals who have had interactions 
with the outgroup and have high levels of bridging social capital. Individuals with high bonding 
social capital will, therefore, be more willing to engage in more radical forms of voice outside of 
the political institutions. Those with high bridging social capital will be less likely to engage in 
extreme outside forms of participation and more likely to stick to traditional forms of voice. 
Table 5.1 depicts expectations about how forms of participation may vary based on this 
interaction. Individuals with low legitimacy attitudes and low social capital levels (neither high 
levels of bonding or bridging social capital) will be less likely to participate than their 
counterparts with high bridging or bonding social capital. I also expect that those with high 
levels of bonding social capital and low legitimacy attitudes will be more likely to resort to 
violent conflict than those who have low levels of legitimacy but high bridging social capital.  
There are a few expectations that come from these expectations about legitimacy and 
social capital on political participation. First I expect, as Booth and Seligson find, a U-shaped 
relationship between legitimacy and political participation.  
Expectation 8: Individuals with extreme legitimacy positions are more likely to 
participate by voting than individuals with moderate positions.   
 
 
I also expect that individual attitudes about system legitimacy will be moderated by the 
individual’s level of social capital to determine the form of political participation.  
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Expectation 9: Individuals with high bonding social capital and low legitimacy 
will be more likely to engage in violent protest.  
 
Expectation 10: Individuals with high bridging social capital and low levels of 
legitimacy will be more likely to participate by voting and in non-electoral forms 
of participation, but less likely to participate in violent protest.  
 
Expectation 11: Individuals with low levels of social capital and low levels of 
legitimacy will be less likely to participate in politics than individuals with high 
levels of bridging or bonding social capital.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 The Interaction of Legitimacy and Social Capital on Participation
25
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 Inside participation refers to conventional non-electoral participation methods. Outside Participation refers to the 
participation used to voice preferences that are less conventional forms of participation. 
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In this chapter I have illustrated in detail the relationships between the components of 
social cohesion and elite behavior in broad context, introduced a top-down individual level 
theory of social cohesion, and discussed the Northern Ireland case that will be used to test the 
stated expectations derived from my theory of social cohesion. Eleven expectations have been 
stated and will be tested in the following empirical chapters (Chapter 4, 5, and 6). The empirical 
chapters will include discussion of methodology and measures for the legitimacy, social capital, 
political participation, and elite behavior. In the next chapter I will discuss and justify the 
Northern Ireland case for testing my theory on social cohesion at the individual level and provide 
an overview of the methodology used in the elite prime experiment, trust game, and survey used 
to test the expectations laid out in this chapter as well as the MLA interviews conducted in 
Northern Ireland.   
 
3 THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Northern Ireland Background and Justification 
Twenty years after the Good Friday Agreement, a power sharing agreement struck between 
Unionists and Nationalists the regional assembly struggles to come to agreements on the most 
important policy and political issues.  Political conflict and sectarian unrest remain in Northern 
Ireland, elected officials butt heads and, in some cases refuse to communicate with each other or 
share an elevator.
26
 Policy decisions are often hindered by the sectarian political divide, making 
stagnation within the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly the norm. Citizens are frustrated 
with the lack of consensus, and occasional low-level ethnonational violence breaks out.   
Northern Ireland is an appropriate test case for mapping the individual level components 
of social cohesion across subgroup cleavages because of its historical religious and socio-
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 Personal Interview (Unionist Assembly Member) October 2014.   
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political divisions that still remain salient within the political system. The persistent cleavage 
within Northern Ireland exists along Unionist/Protestant/Loyalist and 
Nationalist/Catholic/Republican lines. These are reinforcing divides along social, religions, and 
political lines.  
Northern Ireland has a long history of conflict and suppression of the Catholic/Nationalist 
segments of the population within society and politics. The “Troubles” (1968-1998) were a large 
scale modern manifestation of an ongoing struggle between the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican 
minority and the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist majorities who supported and were supported by 
the British Government. Historically there were many clashes between Catholics and Protestants 
supported by the British Government. The Battle of the Boyne is a glaring example. Loyalist 
Protestants still celebrate the victory every July with raging bonfires and parades by the Orange 
order and supporters. These parades meandered through cities and often purposely through 
Catholic neighborhoods to revel in their dominance. These parades often lead to violent 
outbreaks and were specifically addressed during peace talks in the late 1990s leading to a 
parades commission that evaluates the routes and merits of parades in Northern Ireland.   
The electoral system for the regional assemblies has taken on many forms including, 
proportional representation single transferable vote (PR-STV), first past the post (FPTP), and 
PR-STV party list. FPTP instituted in 1929, reduced the representation of the Catholic minority 
in the regional assemblies by creating over representation of the Protestant/Unionist majority.
27
 
The “Troubles”, a period of violent conflict were spurred on by frustrations within the population 
regarding representation, social and economic inequality, and bias by the British Government. 
Protests, both non-violent and violent, inspired in part by a feeling of solidarity with the civil 
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 See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/electoralsystem.htm for detail on electoral system 
evolution.  
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rights movement in the United States, propelled the voice of the Catholic minority. Paramilitary 
activity by both Loyalists and Republican factions and reaction by the Westminster Government 
with military deployment entrenched communities and the society as a whole in an ongoing 
conflict for nearly thirty years (1968-1998). The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) struck in 1998 
was an accord between the population of Northern Ireland, the UK Government, and the 
Republic of Ireland’s Government. The construction of the accord was supported and at certain 
points mediated by the United States. Support from the European Union also buttressed the 
sustainability of the agreement over time.  
The GFA sought, in part, to rectify the electoral system and increase the representation of 
the Catholics and Nationalists within the formal institutions of representation. The GFA 
instituted a more inclusive system for representation in Government with a consociational 
structure that was meant to reduce and ultimately eradicate the need to violently voice 
discontent. Of course during peace negotiations there are always factions that feel ignored or 
unrepresented. Fractions in various paramilitary organizations were a clear indication of this in 
Northern Ireland.
28
  
Minority group inclusion in the political process is important for democratic 
representation. The absence of this inclusion and methods for propagating inclusion is the focus 
of many studies (e.g. Norris 1997, Dryzek 1996, Reynal-Querol 2002, Chandra 2005). In 
Northern Ireland the hurdle of inclusion was largely addressed through consociational measures 
including PR-STV, and an inclusive government that requires Unionists and Nationalist parties 
to run the government institutions together. After the Good Friday Agreement eighteen, six 
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 The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) splintered during this time as they felt any negotiations that did not lead 
to the immediate inclusion into the Republic of Ireland were insufficient.  
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member districts elected the 108 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs).
29
 In 2017 the 
number of MLAs reduced to 90 seats, each district losing a seat. The reduction of seats was 
originally planned to take place in 2021 but a snap election in March 2017 incited due to fallout 
from a heating scheme scandal led to the dissolution of the Assembly (BBC News 2017). The 
legacies of public protest and activism, violent protest, paramilitary activity, and sectarian 
parades remain and inform choices about how to participate in politics.  
Identity continues to play a role in politics. The GFA requires parties and individuals to 
identify along sectarian political designations, Unionist or Nationalist. Some parties and 
representatives choose to remain “undesignated”, but this minimizes their role in certain types of 
policy and petitions of concern that require cross-community votes. . Critics of this type of 
institutionalized identity politics (e.g. Horowitz 1985, 2014; Roeder and Rothchild 2005) argue 
that identification along sectarian divides (e.g. ethnic, religious, linguistic) entrenches division 
and does not work in the long term.  
The consociational system set up under the Good Friday Agreement required political 
parties in the regional assembly to designate as Unionist, Nationalist, or Un-designated for 
voting purposes on certain issues. Two of the four largest electorally successful parties are 
Unionist (Democratic Unionist Party and Ulster Unionist Party) and the other two are Nationalist 
(Sinn Féin and Social Democratic Labor Party).The Alliance Party, an undesignated party, is the 
fifth party with enough electoral success to gain seats in the executive.. The designation system 
sets up a clear delineation for citizens to observe and assess cooperation and conflict along the 
traditional cleavages at the political level. Conflict between Unionists and Nationalist parties and 
party members varies but there is gross policy stagnation and occasional tension flare ups. Some 
Unionist Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) still oppose the inclusion of Sinn Fein, 
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the more extreme Nationalist party that has historical ties to the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army.
30
 More recently in 2016 and 2017 political scandal over a renewable heating incentive 
program flared and blame was cast on the First Minister of the DUP, Arlene Foster who was the 
Minister of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI) under which the flawed 
scheme was run. The RHI lead to the loss of £490 million for the government (BBC News 2017).  
Many called for Foster’s resignation and when she did not resign the Deputy First Minister 
Martin McGuinness (SF party) resigned. When Sinn Fein did not replace the position the 
government was dissolved and new elections were called in January 2017 and held in March, 
2017.  
Ultimately this is a good test case for my theory on the role of cross community elite 
behavior on social cohesion because consociational agreements, like the GFA, are largely 
considered to be top down agreements. Clear delineation along socio-political cleavage lines will 
be helpful in identifying and testing the social identity aspects of my theory. Assessing if the 
cooperation, or continued political conflict that exists is trickling down to the societal level is 
important politically to the Northern Ireland context and to the wider context of consociational 
agreements and representative democracies. I will now discuss the methods original data 
collection utilized to study social cohesion in Northern Ireland.   
3.2 Methodology 
Several methods were incorporated into research undertaken in this study in Northern Ireland to 
test the probability of the individual level theory of social cohesion. The primary method of 
utilized was an online survey that included an elite prime, a trust game, and a posttest 
questionnaire. A secondary data collection of interviews with Members of the Legislative 
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 The PIRA was the most active Republican Paramilitary organization during the height of violent conflict in 
Northern Ireland.  
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Assembly (MLAs) was also collected. Specific variables and measures used in analysis will be 
discussed in appropriate chapters. In this chapter, I give details on the methodology for sampling 
and collecting data.  
3.2.1 Online Survey 
The primary data that is used in this investigation of social cohesion comes from original data 
collected from October 2014 through early 2015. A non-representative student sample was 
recruited online through a Queen’s University Belfast School of Psychology program. Each 
student that completed the survey received course credit. 218 students entered the study with 161 
fully completing surveys. The median age of the sample is 19. Eighty percent of those reporting 
gender in the sample are Female. Much of the analysis in the following chapters looks at 
Unionists and Nationalist identifying individuals within the sample and therefore the sample size 
is often much smaller in quantitative analyses. 40 respondents (25.2 percent) identified as 
Unionists, 36 as Nationalists (22.6 percent), and 83 (52.2 percent) respondents stated that they 
were other, neither, or didn’t know their political attachment. The sample is not representative 
and therefore all findings in this dissertation should be taken as preliminary and inferences about 
the full population of Northern Ireland cannot and should not be made. The value of this study, 
while it does not shed light on the full population’s attitudes and behaviors in Northern Ireland is 
still valuable for understanding and testing the individual level theory at hand.  
 The online survey has several sections I discuss them briefly here and provide more detail 
in the empirical chapters (4 - 6). First, an experiment that primes an elite conflict interaction 
between the five largest parties in the assembly breaks the sample into four randomized groups. 
Two of these groups received a short story pulled from a news story. And the other two, the 
control groups, did not read a story. Assignment to the treatment or control is used to determine 
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if conflict between governing parties impacts attitudes and behaviors of individuals.  Second, a 
trust game where participants play three iterations of a raffle ticket exchange game. Individuals 
were randomly assigned as a first or second mover in the game and played an unidentified 
individual, an individual identified as a Unionist, and an individual identified as a Nationalist. 
The data from this game play are used to measure trust and reciprocity, an important aspect of 
the social capital area of social cohesion. The third and last section of the survey is a posttest 
section measuring various attitudes and behaviors as well as demographic information about 
respondents. Areas of questions include political attachments, trust and confidence in actors and 
institutions, religious upbringing, preferences for interactions with Protestants and Catholics, 
political participation, and demographic information such as age and income. The second set of 
data collected comes from a series of interviews with the regional assembly members working 
within the consociational institutions.   
3.2.2 MLA Interviews  
The original data collection included interviews with several Members of the Legislative 
Assembly (MLAs) during October 2014. Within this study I am particularly concerned with the 
elected officials that work within the consociational institutions established with the GFA. 
Therefore, I focus on the Northern Ireland Assembly, the regional assembly that operates within 
the consociational framework of proportional representation and policy making rules. I contacted 
all 108 MLAs first with an email and then by calling to get in contact for scheduling 
interviews.
31
 I interviewed eleven members who responded during the timeframe of the study.
32
 
Of the MLAs I interviewed six designated as Unionist, four as Nationalists, and one Un-
designated representative. Interviews were conducted face to face when possible at Stormont or 
                                                 
31
 The MLAs interviewed were elected in the 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly elections or replaced empty seats that 
opened between 2011 and 2014. In the 2017 election the number of seats was reduced from 108 to 90.  
32
 Notes were hand written and later transcribed. Interviews were not recorded.   
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local district offices, and via phone if requested by the representative. Interviews were conducted 
using a semi-structured format allowing for open-ended responses and follow-up discussion. 
Topics of discussion included: representation, role as an MLA, communication with constituents, 
the effectiveness of the media, institutional legitimacy, legitimacy of consociationalism, and how 
MLAs might influence social cohesion.  
 This chapter has set out the background information for Northern Ireland and explained 
why Northern Ireland is a particularly good case for studying social cohesion. I have also given a 
brief explanation of the methodology used for original data collection to orient the reader for the 
empirical chapters that follow. In the next chapter I examine how cross community elite 
behaviors impacts individuals’ assessments of support of the government’s actors and 
institutions.   
 
4 LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy is the first component of social cohesion. The actions of elites are syphoned through 
individual perceptions and have the potential to impact attitudes about the government and others 
in society, and participation behaviors.  Legitimacy consists of attitudes and behaviors 
regarding government structures and government agents, particularly trust and confidence in 
players and institutions. This dissertation broadly asks how elites impact the components of 
social cohesion and how the three components of social cohesion (legitimacy, social capital, and 
participation) work to impact each other.  
Legitimacy is the most direct measure for how individuals internalize the actions of 
elected officials, the actors of government, and the institutions that the government is built upon 
and operate within. There are many measures of legitimacy that have been developed and 
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utilized to measure the state of support for an operating polity. This chapter focuses on trust in 
elected officials in the Assembly, and confidence in several institutions.  My theory, discussed in 
Chapter 2 more thoroughly, argues that elected officials/party members behaviors impact 
attitudes and behaviors including attitudes about the government and its leader’s cohesion and 
gives detailed discussion of definitions and measures of legitimacy.  
In this chapter I focus on the expectations to be tested in relation to how elite behaviors 
impact legitimacy to highlight how elite behaviors impact trust and confidence in Members of 
the Legislative Assembly (MLA) and various political institutions. What do individuals feel 
about the government in Northern Ireland?  Can elite behavior impact feelings about the 
institutions and actors? Do elites think their actions have impact on social interactions? I utilize 
several methodologies in this chapter including interviews with MLAs and an elite priming 
experiment with a Queen’s University Belfast student sample to find answers to these questions.  
In the following sections I discuss two important characteristics of the power-sharing 
system in Northern Ireland and how MLAs themselves perceive and interact within the 
Assembly. Next, I revisit the theoretical expectations about how interactions between MLAs 
might impact individual’s attitudes about the government. Third, I present measures of  
legitimacy and the experimental treatment used to test elite conflict between the main parties in 
Northern Ireland. Fourth, I analyze experimental and survey findings about legitimacy measures. 
Last, I discuss implications of the various findings regarding legitimacy.  
4.1 Assembly Member Perceptions of Institutional Inclusion  
One cannot understand the legitimacy elite’s accord to democratic institutions in Northern 
Ireland without appreciating the mechanisms of conflict resolution adopted to end its long 
history of violent political conflict. The height of the most recent violent conflict in Northern 
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Ireland’s history lasted from the late 1960s to the late 1990s and is most commonly known as 
“the Troubles”. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) established a devolved regional government 
with a power sharing assembly executive in Northern Ireland.  At times the Assembly has been 
very successful and at other times close to failure. The success of the Assembly and support of 
the institution is important to the stability of politics and arguably a linchpin in maintaining a 
level of peace.  
Political parties identify along sectarian lines as Unionist or Nationalist. Parties and 
independent members can select an undesignated or “other” designation, but there are 
consequences on voting outcomes for issues that require cross community support. Cross 
community support requires support from a majority of those voting and 50 percent of both 
Unionist and Nationalist members or 60 percent of those voting and 40 percent of members from 
both sects. Petitions of concern may be used to require cross community support on issues. The 
intent is to protect the minority, but many within the assembly and outside of it argue that 
members over use and improperly use the petitions as a stalling mechanism.  
Between 1998 and 2013 a petition of concern has been used 56 times. Twice the measure 
was used jointly with Unionist and Nationalist support, 29 times by Unionists only, and 25 by 
Nationalists only. During the 2010-11 sessions Unionists used petitions of concern 17 times, the 
most used on issues during this period. In the 2012-13 sessions 8 were successfully submitted by 
Nationalists, the most by that group during this period (McCaffrey 2013).
33
  During the 2011-
2016 mandate it was found that the petition of concern had been used 115 times, 60 times in 
2015 alone. This uptick is attributed largely to highly contested welfare reform legislation. 
                                                 
33
See the following link for more details about petitions of concern in Northern Ireland.  
http://niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/assembly-and-executive-review-2011---2016/reviews/petitions-of-
concern/additional-info-on-petitions-of-concern.pdf 
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Members and Parties that designate as “other” are obviously not counted in the cross community 
portion of the vote.  
The power sharing executive was also a major point of frustration for some MLAs. The 
executive is determined by the d’Hondt method to ensure both Unionists and Nationalists both 
have a hand in the Government. The method by which power is shared and who is included in 
the Assembly and executive is a problem for some MLAs. Legacies of violent conflict are still 
relevant and palpable. Many MLAs lived through the troubles and lost family or friends during 
the conflict. One Unionist MLA argued that including Sinn Féin’s inclusion was absurd given 
their ties to violent activity and compared the proposition of including Sinn Féin in the 
government as the equivalent of the United States Congress allowing terrorists as a represented 
party after 9/11.
34
   
The executive issue came to a head in August of 2015 after Kevin McGuigan, a former 
IRA member, was murdered on August 11th. McGuigan’s murder was alleged to be retaliation 
by “ex-Provisional IRA veterans taking revenge for the killing back in May of former Belfast 
IRA commander Gerard ‘Jock’ Davison in the Market district of central Belfast” (McDonald 
2015a). This activity by former PIRA members set off a series of political reactions by Unionists 
in the Assembly.   Unionists argued that Sinn Féin had been aware of continued military action 
by the PIRA, placing Sinn Féin in clear violation of the Good Friday Agreement 
(GFA).  Although on August 22nd the Chief Constable of the PSNI George Hamilton released 
information indicating that the PIRA still existed, and members of the PIRA were involved in the 
murder of McGuigan, but added that the PIRA leadership did not order the murder. “Hamilton 
                                                 
34
 Personal Interview (Unionist Assembly Member) October 2014.  Quote from interview representative was 
discussing the loss that many  experienced during the Troubles and the difficulty that exists in a post-conflict power 
sharing arrangement. “After 9/11 Americans weren’t expected to have terrorists sit in their government, but they 
expect for terrorists to sit in ours”. The MLA also voiced frustration with external powers brokering deals and trying 
to “fix the government” in Northern Ireland, particularly the United States.  
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declined to answer questions if any senior PIRA members connected to the McGuigan murder 
had links to Sinn Féin’s leadership. He also refused to discuss if any of individual PIRA 
members with knowledge of the killing once held senior command positions in the organisation” 
(McDonald 2015b). Regardless of Hamilton’s statements Unionists remained adamant about 
their displeasure with Sinn Féin’s presence in the Assembly. Mike Nesbitt, leader of the UUP at 
the time, announced on August 26th that his party would be resigning from the Executive and 
forming an opposition (Bell 2015). Jeffrey Donaldson, the DUP MP for Lagan Valley, spoke out 
against Sinn Féin on a radio program. Donaldson stated that Sinn Féin should be suspended from 
the Assembly over continued PIRA activity, “In the end, if the other parties are not prepared to 
support the exclusion of Sinn Féin, then we will act unilaterally, and if that means that we have a 
period in Northern Ireland where we don’t have a government until we resole and sort out these 
issues then so be it.” (McDonald 2015d).   
Theresa Villiers “admitted she was not surprised that the Provisional IRA (PIRA) still 
exists” as confirmed by the report on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland35 (McDonald 
2015c). Villiers stated that “it didn’t come as a surprise to me. My understanding, very much in 
line with that of the chief constable, that a number of the organizational structures of the 
Provisional IRA still exist but that there is no evidence it’s involved in terrorism or paramilitary 
activity”(McDonald 2015c).36 The question that was of concern to the Unionists was to what 
degree was Sinn Féin aware of the PIRA activities and while Villiers and the chief constable did 
not find a link between the leadership, the McGuigan family and others were not convinced. 
                                                 
35
 Report on paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland was ordered by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
Theresa Villiers. The report was written by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and MI5 and released in 
October 2015.  
36
 It is important to note that Loyalist Paramilitary structures still exist within Northern Ireland as well. See Nolan 
(2018) for discussion of post 1998 paramilitary activity. Between 1998 and 2017 71 deaths  are attributed to Loyalist 
paramilitaries, and 74  to republican paramilitaries (including 26 from the 1998 Omagh bombing).   
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However, if the investigations are right and the existence of PIRA and other organizations is not 
surprising, Unionist political leaders may have been using events surrounding the McGuigan 
murder as an opportunity to take actions against Sinn Féin in an attempt to affect the structure of 
the Executive that had been on Unionists agenda long before August 2015.  
Interviews conducted in October 2014 showed that several MLAs disapprove of the 
structure of the Assembly’s inclusive executive.  A forced coalition under consociationalism 
frustrated many of the Unionist MLAs who argued for a more traditional structure of Majority 
Government and an Opposition party or coalition. Six of the eleven MLAs interviewed 
mentioned problems with the five party executive. Many of the Unionists see the absence of an 
official opposition as a serious problem to successful governance in the Assembly and a failing 
of the GFA.  Five of the six Unionists mentioned changing the system and moving away from 
the mandatory coalition. The Un-designated MLA I spoke with wanted an end to designation so 
that his vote would count more on all issues. He called for the end to designation while pointing 
to issues with the two largest parties in the executive: an “end to designation so that my vote 
would be equal to everyone else. Minorities promote from the right issues not those seen as key 
by SF and DUP.”  
Nationalists still largely support the self-admitted imperfect system as the best option 
given the legacies of the past. One of the Unionist MLAs summed up the debate over the system 
and preference for change when he said: “We (the party) have always advocated towards the 
voluntary coalition rather than a mandatory one, but there is apprehension from the Nationalists 
that we will return to a Majority rule.” In the minds of many Nationalists return to Majority rule 
would mean underrepresentation of the Catholic/Nationalist portion of the population that 
existed in the past, and which many fought so hard to reverse. While many might argue against 
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the power sharing institutions, McCrudden, McGarry, O’Leary, and Schwartz (2017) argue that 
consociational power sharing mechanisms are still necessary to the stability of peace in Northern 
Ireland. These are two of the ongoing arguments surrounding the structure of the Government.  
There are also many contentious sectarian and policy issues that lead to conflict in the Assembly. 
I argue in my theory that conflict witnessed by citizens may impact there levels of support for the 
government itself, attitudes about others, and decisions to participate. There are many points of 
conflict within the Assembly as touched on in this section. In the next section I will begin to 
unpack legitimacy attitudes at the individual level to understand better how these elite behaviors 
might be impacting citizen perceptions and attitudes.  
4.2 Legitimacy Expectations Revisited 
Legitimacy, once again, refers to the attitudes and perceptions about the government institutions 
and actors. Two expectations are set out in the theory (see Chapter 2) that relate specifically to 
legitimacy. Expectation 1 and 2 state that interactions between elected officials will influence 
public perceptions about the elected officials themselves and political institutions. The first 
expectation pertaining to legitimacy, Expectation 1, argues that when there is conflict or 
cooperation between cross-community elites this will influence trust in those elites. Individuals 
who are aware of conflict between elites of two political groups will be less trusting of that 
group. If my theory is correct we should observe a positive association between cooperation and 
individual trust in political elites, and a negative association with political conflict and trust in 
political elites. This chapter will test this relationship and focus on conflict rather than 
cooperation.  
The second expectation for legitimacy, Expectation 2, deals with confidence in 
institutions. Like the first legitimacy expectation, Expectation 2 pertains to the influence of elite 
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interactions. Cooperation and conflict leading to increased or reduced levels of confidence in 
regime institutions, respectively. In Northern Ireland the elites are the Members of the 
Legislative Assembly, and the regional political parties. The designation system in Northern 
Ireland established with the GFA in 1998 allows for clear lines of cross-community interaction. 
Where political parties and ideological scores might be a useful break point in other 
democracies, the designation system is even clearer in classifying political parties and individual 
representatives along community group lines. The context of political identity is relevant not 
only to the interactions at the Assembly level, but is also a salient identity at the individual level.  
Expectations 3 and 4
37
 posit relationships between social identity and positive biases 
towards the ingroup and mistrust of outgroup individuals. I expect that these biases will 
influence trust in elite actor trust and social trust.  I test the latter of these, social trust, in the next 
chapter. It is thus expected that an individual’s political identity is relevant to the understanding 
of legitimacy and how the individual will trust parties and individual representatives from their 
own community and those from the “other” community.  In the next section I look at measures of 
legitimacy and the elite behavior experiment used to test these assertions.  
4.3 Individual Level Legitimacy Measures 
I use several variables measuring aspects of legitimacy: general trust, party trust, confidence in 
institutions, and component variables constructed from confirmatory factor analysis. Trust in 
Politicians and MLA Satisfaction are both measures of generalized elite trust. Trust in Politicians 
response options ranged from 0 (definitely do not trust) to 4 (definitely trust); however the actual 
range in the sample is only 0 to 3 (probably trust). None of the study participants trust politicians 
                                                 
37
 See Chapter 2  
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wholly.
38
 MLA Satisfaction asks how satisfied individuals are with job Members of the 
Legislative Assembly are doing, response options range from 0 (Very Dissatisfied) to 4 (Very 
Satisfied). Again, no respondents felt very satisfied with MLAs job performance and therefore 
the actual range of values in the sample is 0-3, topping out at fairly satisfied.
39
 I also include trust 
in specific party members to gauge ingroup and outgroup political trust. Cross-community and 
intra-community trust is a critical part of the theory about social cohesion, particularly in a 
society that has a clear and active socio-political divide.  Values of trust in specific parties range 
from 0(definitely distrust) to 4(definitely trust). Trust in members of specific parties was asked 
for the five largest parties at Stormont, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP), the Social Democratic Labor Party (SDLP), Sinn Féin (SF), and the Alliance Party. 
I only include the four largest parties in analyses because they are the four sectarian designated 
parties in the Assembly Executive. Confidence variables included measures of the individual’s 
level of confidence in the police, justice system, the government, and political parties generally. 
Values range from no confidence 0(“none at all”) to high levels of confidence 3 (“a great deal”).  
Lastly, I included factor analysis with the general trust (excludes party specific trust variables) 
and confidence values.
40
 Factor analysis finds two dominant components, Assembly 
Legitimacy,
41
 and Justice Legitimacy.
42
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 This follows from 2009 Northern Ireland Life and Times survey response where only 4 respondents of a 1,228 
sample said that they trusted politicians “a great deal”, while the majority 83.9 percent trusted politicians “not very 
much”, or “not at all” (ARK 2010).  
39
 The 2014 NILT survey also found only 1 percent of respondents were “very satisfied”, 45 % were “very 
dissatisfied”. (ARK 2015).  
40
 Variables included in factor analysis: Confidence in Police, Confidence in the Justice System, Confidence in 
Parties (generally), Confidence in the Government, MLA Satisfaction, and Trust Politicians (generally). Cronbach’s 
alpha equals .85.  
41
 Legitimacy Assembly is the component that loaded most strongly with Confidence in Parties and the Government, 
MLA Satisfaction, and Trust in Politicians. LA has an Eigenvalue of 3.58.   
42
 Justice Legitimacy  component loaded strongly with Confidence in the Police and Justice System. The Eigenvalue 
equals .99.  
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In addition to dependent variables measuring aspects of legitimacy in this chapter, 
independent variables included in the following analyses measure the elite treatment prime, the 
individual’s political identification, strength of political attachment, and frequency of church 
attendance. Elite Treatment is a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates the individual was 
assigned to the treatment group and received a short paragraph describing conflict between 
parties and stagnation in making an agreement, 0 values indicate assignment to the control group. 
Individuals in the treatment group received an excerpt from a news story about stagnation and 
political conflict between the dominant parties in the executive. The treatment reads:  
The five main political parties in Northern Ireland: the Democratic 
Unionists, Ulster Unionist party, Sinn Féin, the SDLP and Alliance have 
hit deadlock on outstanding issues in the peace process after a 
marathon overnight session of talks. The talks covered a range of issues 
from Northern Ireland’s history including unsolved murders from the 
Troubles, the route of loyalist parades and the flying of national flags.   
     (McDondald and Murray, December 31, 2013) 
This excerpt was selected to highlight a salient sectarian issues and the parties’ inability 
to make progress or come to a compromise on an important issue. Half of the respondents were 
randomly selected to read this story, the other half skipped and went directly to the trust game 
and then the questionnaire. More detail on the treatment and trust game experiment are in 
Chapter 5 that analyzes findings from the trust game as they pertain to social capital.  
Political identification is measured with three dummy variables: Unionist (1 = those who 
identify as Unionist), Nationalist (1 = individuals who identify as Nationalist), and Other (for 
those who do not identify with either group). The next section includes a range of models testing 
hypotheses regarding elite behaviors and socio-political identity on individuals’ attitudes about 
trust, satisfaction, and confidence in the existing government.  
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4.3.1 Trust and Satisfaction  
I use trust in politicians and satisfaction with Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) as 
dependent variables in Table 4.1. Elite Conflict Treatment is not a statistically significant 
predictor of change in the general trust or satisfaction models. Therefore while both coefficients 
are negative there is not sufficient evidence from the experiment that elite conflict leads to 
reduced levels of trust in politicians or in satisfaction with the MLAs.  
Table 4.1 Elected Representatives  
  
Trust in Politicians 
 
MLA Satisfaction 
  
II 
 
IV 
Elite Conflict 
Treatment  
-.19 
(.29) 
-.13 
(.32) 
Cut1  -1.25* 
(.24) 
-1.02* 
(.26) 
Cut2 .36 
(.22) 
.56* 
(.24) 
Cut3 2.06* 
(.3) 
2.04* 
(.33) 
N 154 129 
Pseudo R
2
 .001 .001 
Χ2 .42 .18 
Trust in Politicians (0-4), MLA Satisfaction (0-2) 
Ordered Logit , * p<.05 
 
4.3.2 Trust in Political Parties  
Next, I argue that cross-community and intra-community elite trust has the potential to drive 
social trust, this is tested more directly in the next chapter, but here I will test what differences 
exist in ingroup and outgroup elite trust and how elite conflict might impact these attitudes. 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 contain models testing trust in specific Northern Ireland political parties with 
reference to the conflict treatment, and then the individual’s sectarian political identity. I analyze 
levels of trust in four parties, the largest parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly:  two Unionist 
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designated parties (DUP and UUP) and two Nationalist designated parties (SDLP and SF). The 
treatment is not significant in any of the four models in Table 4.2. Therefore, like with general 
trust and satisfaction, there is not evidence from this experiment in support of Expectation 1 that 
cross-community conflict leads to reduced trust in elites.  
Table 4.3 provides some evidence for Expectations 3 and 4. Utilizing the control group 
sample and survey questions patterns are consistent in indicating ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup mistrust across models for Unionist Parties, and SF. Identity is not statistically 
significant in the SDLP models. The SDLP, the party of John Hume,
43
 is arguably the least 
divisive and overtly sectarian party of the four tested here, thus it is not surprising that there are 
not large differences in the way that Nationalists, Unionists, and unidentified individuals view 
the SDLP. There are clear and consistent differences in the ways that political identified 
individuals feel about sectarian designated parties for the three other political parties.   
Table 4.2  Elite Conflict and Trust in Main Parties’ Members  
  
Trust DUP 
 
Trust UUP 
 
Trust SDLP 
 
Trust SF 
 
Treatment .02 
(.29) 
-.14 
(.3) 
-.42 
(.30) 
-.04 
(.29) 
Cut1 -.73* 
(.23) 
-1.09* 
(.24) 
-1.89* 
(.24) 
-1.01* 
(.24) 
Cut2 .34 
(.23) 
-.03 
(.22) 
-.89* 
(.24) 
.37 
(.22) 
Cut3 1.36* 
(.25) 
1.25* 
(.24) 
.56* 
(.23) 
1.08* 
(.24) 
Cut4 3.35* 
(.47) 
--- 
4.78* 
(1.01) 
3.14* 
(.44) 
N 146 147 145 148 
Pseudo R
2
 .000 .001 .005 .000 
Χ2 .01 .01 1.9 .01 
Ordered Logit, *p<.05  
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 John Hume was integral in the peace talks and received the Nobel Peace Prize with UUP’s David Trimble in 
1998.  
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Looking first to models in Table 4.3 Unionist respondents are more likely to trust the two 
Unionist Parties than Nationalists or Un-Identified individuals. Nationalist individuals are likely 
to trust the UUP ministers less than Unionists and less than Un-Identified Individuals. Predicted 
probabilities in Table 4.4 clarify the differences in trust levels for individuals given their political 
identity.  
Predicted probabilities for trust in DUP ministers find that Nationalist individuals are 
33.5 percentage points more likely to definitely NOT trust DUP ministers than individuals who 
identify as Unionists.
44
 Unionist identified individuals are 23.5 and 6.3 percentage points more 
likely than Nationalist identifying individuals to probably trust or definitely trust a member of 
the DUP, respectively. Unionist individuals also are more likely to trust the DUP than 
unidentified individuals at 17.4 percentage points more likely to probably trust the DUP. A 
similar pattern is seen with levels of trust in the UUP. Almost half of Nationalists are likely to 
definitely not trust a UUP minister while more than half of Unionists are likely to probably trust 
a UUP member. Unionist individuals are more trusting than Nationalists and unidentified 
individuals. Nationalist individuals are 45.1 percentage points more likely to definitely not trust, 
and 48.7 percentage points less likely to probably trust the UUP as compared to Unionist 
individuals. Unionist individuals are also more likely than unidentified individuals to probably 
trust the UUP by 39.8 percentage points. Nationalists are also less likely to trust the UUP than 
unidentified individuals by 25.6 percentage points. These findings for the two main unionist 
parties indicate ingroup bias by Unionist individuals and outgroup mistrust by nationalists 
Unionist individuals are more trusting of their own party than unidentified individuals and 
                                                 
44
 This is a student sample. No recent national level surveys that I am aware of ask these trust questions to compare 
response outcomes. Many of the question wordings for trust that were taken from the Northern Ireland Life and 
Times Survey have not been included since 2008.  
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nationalist individuals, and nationalist individuals are less trusting of Unionist ministers than 
Unionist individuals are.  
We also see trust patterns of elite outgroup mistrust for Unionists. Unionist individuals 
are more likely to definitely distrust SF than Nationalists by 22.7 percentage points. This is a 
smaller difference than we see between sectarian identifying individuals for the Unionist parties, 
but Unionist individuals are just over 70 percent likely to probably or definitely not trust SF. 
Nationalist individuals are just over 30 percent likely to probably or definitely not trust SF. 
Unidentified individuals are less distrusting of SF than Unionist individuals with a 11.3 
percentage point difference, but more distrusting of the party than Nationalist individuals with a 
percentage point difference of 30.2.  
 
Table 4.3  Sectarian Identity and Trust in Main Parties’ Members  
 Trust DUP Trust UUP Trust SDLP Trust SF 
Unionist 1.69* 
(.66) 
3.12** 
(.74) 
-.32 
(.64) 
-1.29* 
(.64) 
Other .59 
(.54) 
1.14* 
(.55) 
-.17 
(.54) 
-.77 
(.54) 
Cut1 -.08 
(.46) 
-.03 
(.46) 
-2.09* 
(.54) 
-1.86* 
(.50) 
Cut2 1.05* 
(.48) 
1.18 
(.49) 
-.95* 
(.48) 
-.26 
(.47) 
Cut3 2.12* 
(.52) 
2.98 
(.59) 
.36 
(.46) 
.51 
(.46) 
Cut4 4.35* 
(.84) 
--- --- 
2.97* 
(.78) 
N 70 70 70 72 
Pseudo R
2
 .03 .11 .001 .02 
Χ2 7.07 20.6 .26 4.24 
Ordered Logit Model with Control Group Sample Only; *p<.05, **< .001 
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Table 4.4 Predicted Probabilities for Table 4.3  
    Percentage Point Change 
 
Unionist Nationalist No ID 
Unionist-
Nationalist 
Unionist- 
No ID 
Nationalist-
No ID 
Trust the Democratic Unionist Party 
(0)    14.5% 48% 33.9% -33.5 -19.4 -- 
(1)  19.9% 26% 27.4% -6.1 -7.5 -- 
(2)  26.2% 15.2% 21% 11 5.2 -- 
(3)  32.9% 9.4% 15.5% 23.5 17.4 -- 
(4) 6.6% 1.3% 2.3% 6.3 4.3 -- 
Trust the Ulster Unionist Party 
(0)    4.1% 49.2% 23.6% -45.1 -19.5 25.6 
(1)  8.4% 27.3% 27.3% -18.9 -18.9 0 
(2)  34% 18.7% 35.4% -15.3 -1.4 -16.7 
(3)  53.5% 4.8% 13.7% 48.7 39.8 8.9 
(4) -- -- --    
Trust Sinn Fein 
(0)    36.2% 13.5% 25.2% 22.7 11 -11.7 
(1)  37.4% 29.9% 37.1% 7.5 .3 -7.2 
(2)  12.2% 18.9% 15.8% -6.7 -3.6 3.1 
(3)  12.9% 32.8% 19.6% -19.9 -6.7 13.2 
(4) 1.4% 4.8% 2.3% -3.4 -.9 2.5 
 
      
 
In models with the DUP, UUP and SF we see evidence of outgroup mistrust. Nationalist 
individuals are less trusting of Unionist parties, and Unionist individuals are less trusting of 
Nationalist parties. There is also evidence in support of ingroup bias. When an individual has the 
same political identity as a party’s sectarian designation, that individual is more likely to trust 
that ingroup party. So while we are uncertain about the role of elite conflict on trust and 
satisfaction based on this experiment, there is preliminary support for the role of sectarian 
identity on trust and satisfaction in elected members of the assembly. The ways that this political 
identity transfers to societal level trust is investigated in Chapter 5. The last variables used to 
measure aspects of legitimacy are measures of confidence in four specific areas: Confidence in 
the Police, the Justice system, the Government, and Political Parties generally.  I assess 
confidence in the next section.  
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4.3.3 Confidence in Institutions  
I seek to test how elite conflict (treatment) might impact the way individuals feel about the 
institutions. Thus far there has not been clear evidence to support my proposition that exposure 
to elite conflict leads to reduced trust in elites or the government concerning trust in elites 
(Expectation 1). This section dealing with confidence in institutions and provides support for 
Expectation 2 that elite conflict impacts confidence in institutions. Table 4.5 contains models for 
each of the four relevant areas of confidence, Police, Justice System, Government, and Political 
Parties.  
 
Table 4.5 Confidence in Institutions  
 
The treatment effects for models with confidence in the Police, and the Justice System as 
dependent variables are statistically significant and negative. Reading the article excerpt about 
conflict between parties leads to lower levels of confidence in the police and the justice system. 
Elite conflict is therefore an important predictor of confidence in the Police, and the Justice 
System.  Information about elite conflict does not statistically or strongly change subjects’ 
confidence in the Government or Parties. It is perhaps somewhat surprising and counterintuitive 
 
Police 
Justice 
System 
Government Parties 
Treatment  -.54† 
(.30) 
-.74* 
(.31) 
-.48 
(.31) 
.31 
(.34) 
Cut1  -2.8* 
(.35) 
-2.6* 
(.33) 
-1.67* 
(.28) 
-.96 
(.25) 
Cut2 -1.04 
(.24) 
-.67* 
(.23) 
.88* 
(.24) 
2.3 
(.33) 
Cut3 1.09 
(.24) 
2.07* 
(.31) 
3.7* 
(.6) 
5.19 
(1.02) 
N 155 154 155 151 
Pseudo R
2
 .008 .016 .007 .003 
Χ2 3.2 5.82 2.35 .86 
Ordered logit, †p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.001 
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that exposure to elite conflict reduces confidence in the police and justice system, but not in the 
Government or political parties who are directly engaging in conflict.  One could argue that as 
sectarian identified individuals there is an expectation that parties will fight for their ingroup’s 
ideals and therefore they have confidence that the parties are standing their ground. Therefore, it 
may not be surprising to some that the political actors who are interacting are not being punished 
with reduced confidence. Instead the police and justice system, two institutions that individuals 
interact with more than elected officials themselves, are suffering the confidence ramifications of 
elite conflict.  This may pose additional problems within a post conflict society, in that police 
and the justice system are two dominant institutions that deal with ongoing conflicts and past 
events on a daily basis. To better understand the relationship between elite conflict and 
confidence in institutions predicted probabilities are generated and reported in Table 4.6.    
 
Table 4.6  Confidence in Institutions Predicted Probabilities for Table 4.5  
 
 Control  Treatment  
Percentage 
Point Change 
Police 
None  5.8% 9.5% 3.7 
Not Very Much 20.4% 28.3% 7.9 
Quite A Lot 48.7% 45.9% -2.8 
A Great Deal  25.2% 16.4% -8.8 
  
   
Justice System 
None 6.9% 13.5% 6.6 
Not Very Much 26.9% 38.2% 11.3 
Quite A Lot 55% 42.5% -23.5 
A Great Deal  11.2% 5.7% -5.5 
 
Exposure to the treatment reduced the likelihood for higher levels of confidence in the 
police and the justice system. An individual’s likelihood of having a great deal or quite a lot of 
confidence in the police declines by 11.6 percentage points if they received the treatment.  The 
decline in confidence is even greater for the justice system going down 29 percentage points in 
the same two categories of confidence. These findings provide evidence in support of 
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Expectations 2. While we do not see declines in confidence in all institutions, conflict does 
impact confidence in two very important areas, the police and the justice system.  
The last analyses in this chapter utilize dependent variables derived from Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA): Justice Legitimacy, 
45
 and Assembly Legitimacy.
46
 These variables 
were generated using the non-sectarian specific legitimacy measures in this chapter: Confidence 
in the Police, Confidence in the Justice System, Confidence in the Government, Confidence in 
Parties, Trust in Politicians, and Satisfaction with Members of the Legislative Assembly.  Table 
4.7 contains OLS models using these two components as dependent variables.  The elite conflict 
treatment is statistically significant and negatively related to Justice Legitimacy, but not 
Assembly Legitimacy. This echoes findings from confidence in specific institutions tested in the 
previous section. Conflict between parties therefore leads to less favorable legitimacy attitudes in 
areas related to the police and the justice system with a coefficient of -.46. The association 
between Assembly Legitimacy is uncertain, although we see a similarly negative direction.   
The reduction of confidence in police and the justice system could have serious 
consequences on the ground level of society in terms of the areas of the government that 
individuals have the potential to interact with on a more frequent and even daily basis. While the 
same elite level conflict may or may not impact future electoral outcomes, resulting from 
individuals punishing party members. Looking again at specific areas of confidence (models in 
Table 4.5), there are negative associations with elite conflict and confidence in the government. 
The absence of accountability checks by the people may lead to continued stagnation and 
conflict in the assembly rather than self-correcting towards cooperation through clearing out 
                                                 
45
 Justice Legitimacy descriptive statistics: Mean is near 0, standard deviation equals .99. Total rage of values is –
3.09 to 2.49.  Eigenvalue of .99.  
46
 Assembly Legitimacy descriptive statistics: Mean is near 0, standard deviation is 1.89. Total range of values is -
3.7 to 5.41. Eigenvalue of 3.58.   
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parties or assembly members that are ineffective during elections. Indeed in Northern Ireland we 
have seen entrenchment of Sinn Féin and the DUP as the dominant parties, while the more 
moderate sectarian designated parties (SDLP and UUP) have lost seats since 1998.  
 
Table 4.7 Legitimacy Factors  
  
Justice Legitimacy 
 
 
Assembly Legitimacy  
Treatment 
-.46* 
(.24) 
-.29 
(.35) 
Constant  
.24 † 
(.12) 
.15 
(.25) 
N 120 120 
R
2
 .053 .006 
OLS Regression, †p<.1, *p<.05  
 
4.4 Discussion  
There are a few takeaways from the analyses in this chapter. The two most important findings 
from this chapter are 1) elite conflict is likely influencing a reduction in confidence in certain 
institutions, and 2) that political identity is an important predictor for trust in specific political 
party ministers. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports the elite conflict aspect of 
Expectation 2, but not Expectation 1. The first finding that supports Expectation 2 related to 
confidence in institutions might be counter intuitive because only police and the justice system 
are hit by reduced levels of confidence after witnessing elite conflict, but this definitely has 
important day to day implications for a post-conflict society. The second set of findings provide 
support for Expectations 3 and 4 that posit ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust between the 
salient socio-political groupings, Unionists and Nationalists.  
Evidence from this chapter supports Expectation 2 regarding elite interactions and 
confidence in institutions. Exposure to the treatment, elite conflict between parties, has a 
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negative association with two areas of institutional confidence. Exposure to elected official’s 
behavior, the inability to resolve salient cross-community issues led to reduced levels of 
confidence in the police, and the justice system. While this is a student sample this experiment 
does provide preliminary evidence that elite behavior can directly influence individual level 
attitudes about institutions. There is no support that interactions between the political parties in 
the Assembly members is associated with declining confidence in the members themselves, but 
in other institutions that individuals interact with on a daily basis. While these findings are quite 
preliminary additional studies with a representative population sample would shed more light on 
this relationship between elite behaviors and confidence in institutions and trust. Expectation 1 
and 2 deal with both cooperation and conflict, but this chapter focused on elite conflict. It would 
be greatly beneficial in future studies to focus on the role of cooperation. Indeed testing for 
cooperation in societies that have entrenched partisan or sectarian conflict may prove fruitful in 
proving the importance of elite behaviors in ensuring legitimacy. 
Political identity is found to have a robust relationship with trust in political parties. 
Individuals who identify as one of the two political designations, Unionist and Nationalist, are 
more likely to trust the ingroup political party than the outgroup political party. Sectarian 
identified individuals also are more trusting of their own parties (ingroup parties) than others are. 
Unionist individuals trust Unionist parties more than Nationalist individuals or Unidentified 
individuals. Nationalist individuals are the more likely to trust Nationalist designated political 
parties than Unionists, but not more likely than unidentified individuals. While this is not a novel 
finding, this dynamic relationship that draws from social identity theory is important for 
understanding the complex relationship between political parties and individuals in society. This 
has particular importance in the postconflict society that utilizes consociational institutions to 
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maintain stability. Sectarian identities are, unsurprisingly, still salient within political contexts in 
Northern Ireland. These identities influence political trust and there are additional implications 
for how individuals interpret cues from a more trusted ingroup party versus a less trusted 
outgroup party and how cues effect on  interactions with others in society. I investigate these 
relationships in the next chapter.  
Building from the findings on legitimacy in the next chapter I move to the second 
component of social cohesion, social capital. I test how social capital is associated with several 
factors including legitimacy attitudes and elite behavior.  I focus on cross community trust and 
reciprocity levels first by using a social trust game and experiment, and then by using survey 
data to focus on social distance. I will look at general trust, ingroup and outgroup social trust, 
and preferences of individuals for interacting with outgroup members as measures of social 
capital. The next chapter on social capital helps to shed light on if and how elite behaviors 
influence not only attitudes about the elites and institutions themselves but relationships between 
individuals in society.  
 
5 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
“An empirical task for social capital research is to explore the connections, if any, 
between government policies and structures, and social capital.”  
(Kenneth Newton 1997, 580) 
5.1 Introduction  
Many have argued that social capital has a pivotal role in working and productive democratic 
societies. I also argue that social capital is an essential part of understanding social cohesion at 
the individual level. This chapter addresses a few questions using social capital as the dependent 
variable to test its relationship with other predictors in my conceptual model: How does social 
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capital operate within the social cohesion framework? How does political identity to inform trust 
decisions? What impact does elite behavior have on social capital? As discussed in Chapter 2 
social capital is defined as an actor’s belief that commitments by other actors will be upheld. I 
operationalize social capital as general social trust, ingroup social trust, outgroup social trust, and 
willingness to integrate with a political outgroup. These measures take into consideration 
bonding and bridging social capital, interactions within and across social groups, and generalized 
social trust. Utilizing all four measures of social capital allows me to test a variety of hypotheses 
about how elite behaviors and interactions might affect attitudes and behaviors differently across 
societal contexts. This chapter employs a variety of empirical tests to test how political conflict 
and stagnation impacts the social capital component of social cohesion, and how legitimacy links 
them together.  
In this chapter I analyze data and discuss findings from an original survey trust game and 
experiment conducted at Queen’s University Belfast (QUB) from October 2014 to March 2015. 
First, the trust game portion of this study allows us to unpack the cross-community social trust 
and reciprocity structures that exist within the sectarian political system present in Northern 
Ireland. Second, I look at treatment effects from the elite prime experiment to see if there are any 
direct effects on social capital attitudes. Third, additional examination of the Northern Ireland 
Life and Times Survey and posttest questions from the QUB Survey are analyzed to understand 
the role of cross community elite trust on willingness to integrate with the established outgroup. 
In short, this chapter focuses on how societal level attitudes and behaviors manifest regarding 
trust and interactions and how elite behavior influence these components of social capital across 
Northern Ireland’s main ethno-political divide.  
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5.2 Trust, Reciprocity, and Willingness to Integrate Hypotheses  
Chapter 2 expounds on theory and expectations regarding the relationships between elite 
behaviors and the three components of social cohesion. Expectations 3 through 7 lay out several 
expectations for societal level attitudes and behaviors as the dependent variables. This chapter 
lays out testable hypotheses for these expectations about how elite behaviors and social 
interactions might influence the social capital component of social cohesion.  
Expectation 3 states that outgroup mistrust will exist between individuals who self-
identify with different social groups. Individuals will be less trusting for members of the 
outgroup as compared to the ingroup. In the Northern Ireland context this expectation will be 
tested on the trust differences between self-identified Unionists and Nationalists. Individuals are 
expected to show less trust to a member of one’s outgroup. Based on this expectation the 
hypothesis, that an individual who identifies as Unionist (or Nationalist) will be less trusting of 
individuals who are not ingroup members as compared to the level of trust shown to an ingroup 
member, follows. Unionists are expected to trust Nationalists less than they will trust another 
Unionist, and Nationalists will trust Unionists less than other Nationalists.  
 
Hypothesis 5.1: Individuals will trust a member of their outgroup less than they 
trust a member of their ingroup.  
 
Ingroup bias is a second expectation about the trust and reciprocity relationships that 
might exist within a society. Broadly, ingroup bias is the idea that individuals will be supportive 
of their own group members and less supportive or discriminatory of all others whether that 
individual is a member of the primary outgroup or another group, even if the “other”  is not a 
member of the salient socio-political cleavage. Expectation 4 in Chapter 2 explains that a 
historically dominant group member is more likely favor their ingroup more than a historically 
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subjugated group favors their ingroup members. A historically dominant group member is, 
therefore, more likely to display greater ingroup bias than the minority group. In Northern 
Ireland Unionists are the historically dominant group therefore, ingroup bias will exist for both 
Unionists and Nationalists but Unionists will have greater ingroup bias.   
Hypothesis 5.2: Unionist and Nationalist will trust individuals identified as an 
ingroup member more than will trust an individual identified as an 
outgroup member OR an unidentified member.   
 
Hypothesis 5.3: The difference between the levels of trust for ingroup members 
and outgroup member OR ingroup members and unidentified 
individuals will be greater for Unionists than for Nationalists.   
 
 
I also test if elite interactions are associated with trust and reciprocity. Following 
Expectation 6 (Chapter 2) I expect that individuals who identify as Unionist or Nationalist and 
are aware of conflict between the Unionist and Nationalist parties will be less trusting of 
individuals identified as outgroup members.  
Hypothesis 5.4:  Individuals who receive the elite conflict treatment will be more 
trusting of ingroup members and less trusting of outgroup 
members than their counterparts.  
 
The next hypotheses deal with reciprocity as the dependent variable rather than trust. 
First, the same expectation regarding trust and outgroup mistrust, ingroup bias, and elite 
interactions are also expected to exist for reciprocal behaviors: 
 Hypothesis 5.5: Unionists and Nationalists individual trustees
47
 will reciprocate 
trust to a lesser degree when interacting with a member of the 
outgroup than when they interact with member of the ingroup.  
 
Hypothesis 5.6: Unionist and Nationalist individual trustees will reciprocate to 
individuals identified as ingroup members to a greater extent than 
they will reciprocate to an outgroup member OR an unidentified 
individual.  
 
                                                 
47
 “trustee” here is the second mover (P2) in the administered trust game.  
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Hypothesis 5.7:  Individuals who witness cross-community conflict reciprocate 
more to ingroup members and less to outgroup members than their 
counterparts.  
 
I argue in Expectation 5 (see Chapter 2) that receiving trusting behaviors will increase 
reciprocating behaviors, or that trust will moderate group biases. Another way to think of this is 
if an individual is expected to fulfill a commitment because another individual has seen them as 
trustworthy or put trust in them, that individual will be more likely to fulfill that commitment and 
reciprocate by fulfilling that commitment. Within the Northern Ireland context an example of 
this is if a Unionist individual puts greater trust in a Nationalists by investing funds, a good, or 
service, that Nationalist would be more likely to reciprocate by fulfilling the expectation and 
returning the good or service in kind.   
Hypothesis 5.8:  There is a positive relationship between receiving trust and 
reciprocity.  
 
The next two hypotheses follow from Expectation 7 about the influence of elites on 
individuals, regarding how cross-community vertical trust might influence cross-community 
horizontal interactions. In the last section of this chapter I investigate the role of cross 
community trust in MLAs on the third area of social capital, willingness to interact with the 
outgroup as the dependent variable and revisit trust to see how cross community trust is affected.  
Hypothesis  5.9: Individuals who trust ingroup elites will be less willing to 
interact with an outgroup member than those who are less trusting 
of ingroup elites, and individuals who trust outgroup elites will be 
more willing to interact with outgroup members than those who do 
not trust outgroup elites.  
 
Hypothesis 5.10: Nationalist and Unionist individuals who trust ingroup elites will 
be less trusting of outgroup members and more trusting of ingroup 
members than other Nationalist and Unionist individuals who are 
less trusting of ingroup elites.  
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Lastly, I expect that elite conflict has the same effect on willingness to integrate that is 
expressed in Hypothesis 5.4 for trust and Hypothesis 5.7 for reciprocity. Following Expectation 6 
I expect that:  
Hypothesis 5.11: Individuals who witness elite conflict will be less willing to 
interact with the outgroup than individuals who did not.   
 
 
There are clearly many hypotheses to examine in this chapter. I utilize several different 
methodologies to appropriately test the above hypotheses. In the section that follows I illustrate 
the original experiment, trust game, and survey that will be analyzed to test these hypotheses.  
5.3 Experimental Procedures and Trust Game 
A survey experimental trust game and survey was conducted to collect original data on Northern 
Ireland to test the social capital component of social cohesion and the role of elite behavior. 
Participants for this study were recruited from the student population of Queen’s University 
Belfast in Northern Ireland between October 2014 and March 2015. This study combines an elite 
influence experiment (e.g. Nelson, Sanbonmatsu, & McClerking, 2007) and trust games (e.g. 
Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe 1995). In the elite influence experiment, subjects are exposed to one 
of two elite behavior primes: political elite conflict (treatment group) or no information (control 
group). Participants were assigned to one of four randomized groups. Two groups received the 
elite conflict prime and two groups did not (see Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Participant Random Assignment  
 Elite Conflict Prime  Trust Game Role  
Group A Treatment - Read Article Player 1 
Group B Treatment - Read Article Player 2 
Group C Control -  No Article  Player 1 
Group D Control - No Article  Player 2 
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Subjects in the Elite Conflict treatment group were asked to read the following passage, 
derived from an article about cross-community elite interactions in The Guardian (McDonald 
and Murray, 2013):
48
   
The five main political parties in Northern Ireland: the Democratic 
Unionists, Ulster Unionist party, Sinn Féin, the SDLP and Alliance have 
hit deadlock on outstanding issues in the peace process after a 
marathon overnight session of talks. The talks covered a range of issues 
from Northern Ireland’s history including unsolved murders from the 
Troubles, the route of loyalist parades and the flying of national flags.   
 
Participants assigned to the control condition did not read anything but rather skipped to the next 
phase of the study, the interpersonal trust games.  A dichotomous variable is included in various 
analyses in the next section to indicate if the individual received the elite conflict treatment 
(treatment received = 1, control group = 0). 
The trust game (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995) is designed to assess how 
subjects trust and reciprocate with others. One group from each elite prime condition, discussed 
above, were assigned the first player role in the trust game, and the other two groups were 
assigned to the the second player role (Table 5.1).  General trust, ingroup trust, and outgroup 
trust are measured through three raffle ticket exchanges. A raffle ticket represents a valued 
transaction within the game while facilitating recruitment and online game play (e.g. Fowler and 
Kam 2007; Carlin and Love 2013). The number of tickets that a participant has at the end of the 
experiment equals the number of entries into the drawing for one of six £50 prizes. Each ticket 
earned has an equal chance of winning one of the prizes. All players are aware of the rules of the 
game before game play starts and understand that an increase in tickets increases the chance of 
winning one of the six prizes. The trust game instructions explicitly stated that the more tickets 
they have the more likely they are to win a £50 prize.  
                                                 
48
 Emphasis added, bolding is included in segment seen by participants.  
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The trust game is played in the following Player 1 and Player 2 sequence. Each subject is 
allocated 10 tickets at the outset of each trust game and reads detailed instructions about game 
play. The first player/mover in the pair selected between 0(none) and 10(all) of his/her tickets to 
give the second player/mover. The number of tickets given by the first player was tripled before 
being received by the second player. The second player then has the option to give back any 
number of tickets in his/her possession (zero to the total number of tickets they have after 
receiving tickets from the first player which ranged from 10-40 tickets). The greater the number 
of tickets indicates an increased level of trust or reciprocity, the first mover’s actions test trust, 
and the second mover’s behavior tests reciprocity.  The maximum number of lottery tickets that a 
player can win in a game is 40 tickets.  The minimum is 0. The amount that the second player 
received was randomly assigned to the second player and later matched with a first player who 
sent that amount (Fehr et al.2003; Carlin & Love 2013).  
Each player, first mover and second movers, played the game three times parse out 
variation in general, ingroup, and outgroup trust and reciprocity. In the first game participants 
played a fully anonymous other player. Second, each subject played another player identified 
only as a Unionist.  Third, each played another player identified only as Nationalist. Ingroup and 
Outgroup dynamic was determined during analysis based on players self-identified political 
categorization as Unionist or Nationalist. Therefore, in certain models that follow the sample is 
constrained to self-identifying Unionists and Nationalists. In sum, the two phase experiment 
accounts for how legitimacy and social interactions might affect individual level attitudes and 
behaviors.  
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5.3.1 Trust and Reciprocity Measures  
I measure trust and reciprocity in a few ways for the descriptive statistics and hypothesis tests 
that follow. 1) The raw number of tickets that Player 1 gave in each of the three games 
measuring trusting behavior, the more tickets given again indicating a larger amount of trust that 
Player 2 will reciprocate (Trust).  2) I calculate the difference in number of tickets given an 
ingroup memver and an outgroup member to measure the differences in trust to each group. The 
number of tickets that Player 1 gave to the ingroup minus the number of tickets that the same 
individual Player 1 gave to the outgroup (ingroup trust – outgroup trust = Sectarian Trust Gap). 
A positive value for Sectarian Trust Gap indicates an observation of outgroup mistrust and 
ingroup bias. 3) Similarly, I calculate the ticket difference for the number of tickets that Player 1 
gave to the ingroup minus the number of tickets that the same individual Player 1 gave to the 
unidentified Player 2 (ingroup trust - anonymous trust = Anonymous Trust Gap).
49
 This ticket 
difference, Anonymous Trust Gap, indicates ingroup bias for one’s socio-political ingroup when 
this variable is positive (e.g. a Unionist giving more tickets to the Unionist Player 2).  
Reciprocity variables are generated similarly but are on a different measurement scale 
because additional considerations are required because the number of tickets received from 
Player 1 varies and impacts the number of tickets available to Player 2. I measure reciprocity in 
the trust game as tickets returned by Player 2. The number of tickets available to give back is 
dependent on the number of tickets received (e.g. Player 1 gives Player 2 5 tickets. The 5 tickets 
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 Trust Gap variables are comparable to Carlin and Love 2013 Partisan-Co-Partisan Trust Gap generated. Using the 
Trust Gap variables reduces the N available because I can only compare individual players who identify as 
Unionists or Nationalists to assess their ingroup and outgroup and generate the trust gap based on the number of 
tickets they give to each. i.e. The values for Sectarian Trust Gap for  individual who identifies as Unionist is 
generated as the number of tickets given to the Unionist Player 2 minus the number of tickets given to the 
Nationalist Player 2. Anonymous Trust Gap for Player 1 who identifies as Unionist is generated as the number of 
tickets given to the Unionist Player 2 minus the number of tickets given the Anonymous Player 2.   Both Trust Gap 
and Anonymous Trust Gap are limited to players who identify as Unionist or Nationalist in the sample because an 
ingroup and outgroup must be identified. This restriction of sample included reduces the available number of 
observations for analysis.  
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are multiplied by 3 and Player 2 receives 15 tickets. Player 2 had 10 tickets to start with, so 
Player 2 now has 25 tickets that he can keep some portion of and give back some portion to 
Player 1). The number of tickets available to Player 2 varies from 10 to 40 tickets.  I measure 
reciprocity in two primary ways in the analysis. 1) The raw number of tickets returned to Player 
1, variable Reciprocity-Tickets, ranging from 0-40. To account for the number of tickets received 
(0-30) a control variable is included in models using the raw number of tickets returned as a 
dependent variable. 2) The second measure of reciprocity captures the number of tickets 
available in the reciprocity variable.  
Reciprocity in this second variable, Reciprocity-Percent, is measured as percent of tickets 
available given back to Player 1. Two players may give 8 tickets each, but one may have had 25 
tickets available, and another player may have had 40. The reciprocity is greater for the player 
who started with 25 tickets because he is giving 32 percent of his available tickets (keeping 17 
tickets for himself, and ensuring that Player 1 has 13 tickets at the end of the game). The other 
Player 2, having 40 tickets available is giving only 20 percent of her available tickets (keeping 
32 tickets for herself and ensuring Player 1 only has 8 tickets at the end of the game). This differs 
from the calculation of Player 1 Trust because each participant that has been assigned with 10 
tickets each therefore more tickets given directly indicates more trusting behavior. I calculate the 
Reciprocity-Percent variable as the number of tickets returned divided by the number of tickets 
available ([# of tickets returned by Player 2 / (number of tickets given by Player1*3)]*100 = 
Reciprocity-Percent).    
Trust and Reciprocity are the dependent variables for several hypotheses tested in this 
chapter. I have already stated the general expectations in this chapter, but I will now clearly 
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identify specific testable hypotheses with the specific trust and reciprocity variables: Trust, 
Sectarian trust gap, Anonymous trust gap, Reciprocity-Tickets, and Reciprocity-Percent.  
5.3.2 Trust Analysis  
In this section I test hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 using the number of tickets given by the 
first mover (Player 1).  The mean number of tickets sent by the first mover (Player 1) varies 
depending on the political identification of Player 2. Without knowing the identity of Player 1 
the average number of tickets given to an Anonymous P2 is 4.49 tickets, 4.38 to a Nationalist 
P2s, and 4.51 to a Unionist P2 (see Figure 5.1).
50
 There is no meaningful difference between 
these values across political designations for P2 without information of the first mover’s identity 
with a 95 percent confidence interval. When the means are broken down within the context of 
political identity designation for Player 1 there are greater differences in mean value and t-tests 
indicate that there are a few significant differences with a 95 percent confidence interval (see 
Figure 5.3-5.5).   
Figure 5.2 shows the mean values for treatment and control group samples expressed 
separately. The trust game took place after the elite prime, discussed in the previous section; 
therefore it is relevant to look at the treatment and control samples independently.  I will discuss 
both the full sample differences of means and the treatment and control sample differences of 
means.  
Within the full sample the difference of means for Unionist individuals giving to a 
Unionist counterpart and Unidentified individuals giving to a Unionist counterpart is 1.31.
51
 This 
also holds in the control only sample. Unionist individuals who did not receive the treatment 
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 Standard Errors for mean number of tickets sent:  to Anonymous (.25), to Nationalist (.27), to Unionist (.26). N = 
84.  
51
 Standard error of the difference of means is .57, with a 95percent confidence interval of [.17, 2.46].  
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gave an average of 1.925
52
 more tickets to a Unionist than a politically unidentified individual 
would give to a Unionist counterpart. This is the only difference across political identities for 
first movers within the same type of game, but provides support for Hypothesis 5.2 and 5.3 for 
ingroup bias by Unionists, and greater ingroup bias for Unionists over Nationalists.  
If we look at means for individuals who identify as Unionist or Nationalists there are also 
differences within these groups according to if an identifying individual is playing an ingroup or 
outgroup member, or an anonymous individual. The mean for Unionists playing other Unionists 
is statistically different from when Unionists play Nationalists, and when Unionists play an 
Anonymous counterpart. Unionists give on average 1.44 more tickets to ingroup members than 
they give to an outgroup member, and .83 more tickets to an ingroup member than they give to 
an anonymous player.
53
 Likewise, Nationalists give more tickets on average to other Nationalists 
than they give to Unionists with a .72
54
 difference of mean tickets given. However there is not a 
statistically significant difference between the number of tickets given to Nationalist ingroup 
members and anonymous players.  
All other differences in the full sample are statistically indistinct from each other. Only 
two of these differences of means hold statistical significance in the treatment or control 
samples. For Unionist individuals who received the treatment they gave on average .91
55
 more 
tickets to other Unionists than they gave to Anonymous individuals. No other within Player 1 
differences are significant for Unionists or Nationalists who received the treatment and none of 
the differences are significantly different for Unionists or Nationalists who were in the control 
group.   
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 Standard error of the difference of means is .93, with a 95 percent confidence interval of [.002, 3.85]. 
53
 Standard errors are .53 and .29 respectfully.  
54
 Standard error .73  
55
 Standard error .31  
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Figure 5.1 Average amount Player 1 gave to Player 2 across three political identity conditions  
(with 95% confidence interval, N=84) 
 
 
Figure 5.2  Treatment and Control Groups Number of tickets given  
(Treatment N = 37; 7 Unionists, 11 Nationalists, 19 Neither/Other/Don’t Know; Control N = 45; 
11 Unionists, 7 Nationalists, 27 Neither/Other/Don’t Know) 
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Figure 5.3 Average amount Player 1 gave to Player 2 across three political identity conditioned 
games by Player1’s political Identity  
(with 95% Standard Error Confidence Interval; N = 82; 18 Unionists, 18 Nationalists, 46 
Neither/Other/Don’t Know) 
 
There is evidence in these differences of means of outgroup mistrust (Hypothesis 5.1), 
since fewer tickets are given to outgroup members by both Nationalists and Unionists. The 
outgroup mistrust for Unionists is twice as great as the differences for Nationalists providing 
some evidence for Hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. We see outgroup mistrust for both Nationalists 
and Unionists, but it is greater for Unionists, the historically dominant political group. In the last 
category of P1s, those individuals who do not identify as Unionist or Nationalist do not tend to 
discriminate on the basis of P2’s political identity. Unidentified first movers gave an average of 
4.13 tickets to Unionists, 4.22 tickets to Nationalists, and 4.24 tickets to other unidentified 
individuals. These values are not statistically different from each other. These descriptive 
statistics provide some clarity on the relationships between ingroup and outgroup trust in that we 
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see higher levels of trust for ingroup members and less trust for outgroup members and 
unidentified individuals. Utilizing OLS models in the next section I will test my hypotheses 
further.  
 
Figure 5.4 Average amount Player 1 gave to Player 2 across three political identity conditioned 
games by Player1’s political Identity (Control Group Sub Sample N = 45; 11 Unionists, 7 
Nationalists, 27 Neither/Other/Don’t Know) 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Average amount Player 1 gave to Player 2 across three political identity conditioned 
games by Player1’s political Identity  (Treatment Group Sub Sample N = 37; 7 Unionists, 11 
Nationalists, 19 Neither/Other/Don’t Know) 
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Table 5.2 contains the first set of statistical models in this chapter, using two dependent 
variables to measure trust. I use two variables to account for the differences in ingroup game 
play, outgroup game play, and anonymous or unidentified game play. The first variable is the 
sectarian trust gap, the difference between tickets given to the ingroup andtickets given to the 
outgroup. The second dependent variable is anonymous trust gap, the number of tickets given to 
the ingroup minus the number given to the anonymous counterpart. A positive value for either of 
these variables indicates a positive net level of trust towards the ingroup over the outgroup; 
individuals trust the ingroup member with whom they are playing more than the outgroup 
member (sectarian trust gap) or the unidentified member (anonymous trust gap). OLS models 
are utilized to test the differences in number of tickets given based on identity controlling for 
receiving the elite conflict treatment.  
Exposure to the elite conflict treatment is a positively associated with the number of 
tickets given. Reading about conflict between parties in Northern Ireland increases the number of 
tickets given to the ingroup than outgroup or anonymous players. This positive association holds 
across the two model specifications for both dependent variables. While none of the treatment 
coefficients are statistically significant the patterns that exist are worth noting. Models I and III, 
the two bivariate models with the treatment show that the increase in ticket difference is nearly 
twice that for the sectarian trust gap than the anonymous trust gap. The full shift in ticket gap is 
.61 in the first model, and .33 in model III.  In fact a larger treatment effect for the sectarian trust 
gap over anonymous trust gap is seen when comparing all model specifications. This difference 
suggests that reading about elite conflict seemingly widens the trust gap between ingroup and 
outgroup more than it widens the trust gap between ingroup and unidentified individuals. So 
while statistical power is limited, arguably due to the small sample size, the substantive patterns 
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across these OLS models do provide some limited support for expectations about how elite 
behavior might influence individual level social trust. Elite conflict within the consociational 
system is increasing outgroup mistrust for sectarian identified individuals, as seen by the larger 
sectarian trust gap. This evidence while preliminary provides enough support hypothesis 5.4 that 
witnessing elite conflict (the treatment here) has bearing on social trust between individuals with 
a salient political identity to warrant further investigation in to the role of vertical extended 
contact.  
Coefficients for P1_Unionist across models (see Models II and IV), are positive ranging 
between .7 in Model IV and .997 in Model II.  This larger ticket gap for Unionists indicates that 
within the QUB sample there is a larger sectarian gap or ingroup bias for Unionists than for 
Nationalists (consistent with Hypothesis 5.3) Unionists in the sample are therefore giving, on 
average, more tickets to other Unionists than they are giving to unidentified or Nationalist 
participants. However, again this is not statistically significant value.   
Table 5.2  Sectarian and Anonymous Trust Gap –  
Differences in Number of Tickets Given to Ingroup, Outgroup, and Unidentified Trustees 
  
Sectarian Trust Gap 
 
Anonymous Trust Gap 
 
 I 
 
II III IV 
Treatment .61 
(.63) 
.55 
(.64) 
.33 
(.42) 
.26 
(.43) 
P1_Unionist 
ID  
 .997 
(.68) 
 .70 
(.46) 
P1_ID 
Strength  
 .71 
(.47) 
 .37 
(.31) 
Constant .78 
(.45) 
-.13 
(.66) 
.39 
(.3) 
-.15 
(.45) 
N 36 36 36 36 
R
2
 .02 .12 .02 .097 
* p<.05, OLS models 
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Table 5.3 provides two models to assess the role of ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust. I 
use panel data, where each participant is the unit of analysis or group, and each of the three 
games is one play in a sequence of plays for that individual (3 sequential observations). Two 
models are specified to compare individual first mover decisions across all three games. Fixed 
effect time series modeling is used to account for the relationship between games played and 
treatment effects that are constant for each player in all three games played.  This allows for 
examination of how a player gives to ingroup members, outgroup members, and unidentified 
players. To account for the context of player identity dichotomous independent variables are 
included to identify if Player 1 is giving to an ingroup member (e.g. Nationalist Player 1 is 
giving to a Nationalist Player 2), outgroup member (e.g. Nationalist Player 1 giving to a Unionist 
Player 2), or anonymous Player 2. Giving to the outgroup Player 2 is excluded as a right hand 
side variable and is therefore the reference category for the coefficients. The dependent variable 
in these models is the number of tickets given in each game, not the gap between tickets given in 
different contexts. Additionally, a subsample of only the control group is used in the following 
models to exclude any possible treatment effects from the results.  
The fixed effects (Table 5.3) and random effects (Table 5.4) models provide some more 
evidence for ingroup bias and outgroup mistrust. In the first model (Trust), the outgroup game 
play value, the constant, is 4.1 tickets. Politically identified individuals give on average of about 
one (.64) ticket more to ingroup members than they give to outgroup members. This difference is 
statistically significant indicating that we can be confident that this greater trust towards the 
ingroup is being caused by identity differences. There are similar associations in the second 
model that only includes Unionist and Nationalist players. We observe a bias in terms of the 
number of tickets given to the ingroup member (.78) and an anonymous partner (.39 tickets) as 
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compared to outgroup members. Both of these coefficients indicate that individuals who identify 
with a sectarian group are more trusting of the ingroup than the outgroup and, in the case of 
Unionists and Nationalists, less trusting of each other than an unknown individual. These two 
models of social trust, therefore, provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 5.1 (Outgroup 
Mistrust) and Hypothesis 5.2 (Ingroup bias). Indicating that politically identified sectarians are 
likely to trust individuals in their ingroup more than individuals that are unidentified and more 
than the outgroup.  Social identity therefore may inform the levels of trust and the likelihood of 
future interactions with the outgroup. If mistrust is reinforced through isolation within the 
ingroup, societal cleavages will be perpetuated and potentially alter the frequency and types of 
political participation. I test for these possible effects in the next chapter.  
 
Table 5.3 Player 1 Trust Game Panel Analysis of Ingroup, Outgroup, and Anonymous Trust 
  
Trust 
Trust 
(Unionists and 
Nationalists only)  
Ingroup Partner  .64* 
(.25) 
.78* 
(.33) 
Anonymous Partner   .12 
(.18) 
.39 
(.33) 
Constant 4.1** 
(.11) 
4.39** 
(.23) 
N 111 54 
Groups 37 18 
R
2
 within .08 .14 
R
2
between .05 .01 
R
2
overall .03 .01 
F-Test 23.84 23.52 
* p<.05, ** p<.001, Fixed effect models 
DV = Number Tickets Given  (0-10) 
Control Group Subsample Only  
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Next, I look at the role of elite conflict again in greater detail. Hypothesis 5.4 argues that 
cross community elite interactions are associated with societal level trust. I specify two models 
with the treatment variable and treatment interacted with partner relationship. An interaction is 
used to capture how players’ political identity conditions the effect of elite conflict on trust.  
 Replicating the analysis above testing Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2, we see a statistically 
significant bias against outgroups. Exposure to a news story exhibiting conflict between the 
executive parties does not, however, on its own produce a substantive or significant difference in 
number of tickets given in Model I (Table 5.4).  
In Model II, there are changes in the treatment coefficients indicating that within the 
sample the conflict prime is on average moving responses for individuals in the expected 
directions. Model II includes interactions between game play and the elite treatment effect. The 
differences between ingroup, outgroup, and anonymous game play and the elite treatment are 
illustrated in Figure 5.6. I will discuss adjusted outcomes here. Individuals playing ingroup 
members that received the treatment are giving an average of .16 more tickets, an average of 5.3, 
compared to their counterparts playing ingroup members who did not receive the treatment 
(giving an average of 5.17). Individuals playing an anonymous player 2 and receiving the 
treatment are giving an average of 4.62 tickets, .17 fewer tickets than individuals that did not 
receive the treatment with 4.79 tickets. Lastly, individuals who received the treatment and who 
are playing outgroup members are giving an average of 3.95 tickets, this is the smallest number 
of tickets given in any of the game play contexts at almost half a ticket less than those who play 
outgroup members and did not read the conflict treatment (4.39 tickets given). In Figure 5.6 it is 
clear that the treatment has different effects on outgroup trust than it has on ingroup trust or 
general trust. While the differences for all three types of game play are not statistically 
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significant at the 95 percent level. The effect that of conflict between elites has on individual 
attitudes and behaviors with this data in not certain, however, this does provide some preliminary 
evidence of the way that elite behaviors may be impacting the relationships between individuals 
and groups in society and the importance of contextualizing trust along the lines of group 
identity. Reproducing this experiment with a larger and more representative sample would be 
useful in the future to better test these propositions.  
Table 5.4 Elite Behavior Treatment and Trust   
 
I II 
Ingroup Partner 
1.08***    
(.26) 
.778*  
(.37) 
Anonymous Partner 
.528*     
(.261) 
.389    
(.37) 
Treatment 
-.148         
(.861) 
-.444   
(.91) 
Ingroup Partner*Treatment 
 
.611     
(.53) 
Anonymous Partner*Treatment 
 
.278    
(.53) 
Constant 
4.241     
(.63) 
4.389   
(.65) 
N 108 108 
Groups 36 36 
R
2
 within .1969 .2126 
R
2
between .009 .0009 
R
2
overall .0275 .0297 
Χ2 17.19*** 18.39** 
Random effects model, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p< .001, Standard 
error in parenthesis.  
 
There are a few possible reasons that the data and models are producing largely null 
findings. The treatment article excerpt read by participants in the treatment groups may not have 
been strong enough to illicit a different perception from the individual.  There are two most 
likely culprits. First, the conflict between parties was not obvious enough to produce a response 
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by participants, or second, the treatment echoed the status quo political environment to 
individuals. On the second possible weakness, the elite conflict prime may highlight the already 
long-standing problems with political stagnation in the Assembly that was ongoing at the time of 
the study. This preexisting perception of conflict by all participants including those in the control 
group could mitigate the treatment effect. That is, the treatment might not be “treating” the 
subjects but, rather, underscoring the status quo. Indeed, during the time of the experiment 
Northern Irish politics was characterized by ongoing stagnation in political dealings; mentioning 
it again to the participants may not have been additional information to inform participants’ 
behaviors for trusting ingroup and outgroup members, but rather reinforcing preexisting notions 
of how politics works in their society.  
Future studies should focus not only on a conflict prime, but also a cooperation prime to 
better understand how vertical extended contact operates. Perhaps more importantly, priming 
cooperation would  help us better understand how in a society that has experienced division, 
political conflict, political stagnation and polarization how elite behaviors of cooperation might 
signal progress towards a more effective and working government and lead to an increase in 
cooperation and interaction at the societal level.  The small-n sample size, and therefore lack of 
statistical power, is obviously a contributor to the statistically null result. These findings do not 
give strong support for the relationship between elite behavior and social trust, but this 
association cannot be ruled out and more studies are needed to provide clearer evidence in the 
future.  
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Figure 5.6  Number of Tickets Given by Player 1and Trust Interaction from Table 5.3 Model II. 
Adjusted Margin Plots with 95% Confidence Intervals. 
 
This section has tested the trust hypotheses in this chapter.  Thus far we have seen some 
evidence in support of outgroup mistrust (H 5.1), ingroup bias (H5.2), and greater dominant 
group ingroup bias (H 5.3). Evidence regarding Hypothesis 5.4, the treatment effect of conflict 
between elites, is inconclusive because of null statistical results, but findings in this study 
indicate that future studies into vertical extended contact are an important avenue of study. For 
Unionists and Nationalists trust in the outgroup is weaker than it is for ingroup members. 
Individuals who identify as Unionist or Nationalists are consistently giving fewer tickets to 
outgroup members than they are giving to ingroup members.  This difference indicates that 
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Unionists and Nationalists do not believe outgroup members are trustworthy to reciprocate by 
sending tickets back. Sectarian individuals do not believe that outgroup will uphold their 
commitments to reciprocate. We see a greater number of tickets given to the ingroup in 
descriptive statistics and t-tests, as well as statistical models by Unionists. Unionists, the 
dominant political group, show greater ingroup bias than Nationalists, as expected. Lastly there 
is not strong evidence supporting a treatment effect on trusting behaviors, but we do see small 
differences in the sample. Exposure to elite conflict does seem to exacerbate ingroup bias and 
outgroup mistrust as see in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.6. These findings help us to understand how 
one social trust functions and the link between political identity, elite behavior, and social 
capital. In the next section I look at the second movers, the trustees, behaviors from trust game 
play. I also investigate if trusting behaviors by first movers influences the likelihood that an 
individual will uphold a commitment to reciprocate.   
5.4 Findings on Reciprocity 
Individual reciprocity behaviors, the return of trusting behaviors, are also an important part of 
social capital. Reciprocity behaviors are measured and tested as dependent variables in this 
section. In a trust game I measure reciprocity as the actions of the second mover (i.e. the trustee), 
by the number of tickets that Player 2 decides to return to Player 1. The second action in a two 
person interaction effectively gauges reciprocity. Player 2 has received a number of tickets, 
perceiving that the more tickets they receive the more Player 1 is trusting them to return those 
tickets and then some tickets that the researchers have allocated. It is then the choice of Player 2 
to honor the trust (number of tickets) Player 1 has placed in them or renege and keep all or most 
of the tickets received for themselves. In this section I test hypotheses about individual level 
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reciprocity, the effects of increased trust on reciprocity, and how identity impacts reciprocal 
behaviors.  
Reciprocity is measured with two variables: the number of tickets returned to player one 
(Reciprocity-Tickets), and the percentage of tickets available returned which accounts for the 
number of tickets received by Player 2 (Reciprocity-Percent).
56
 The latter is perhaps the better 
measure in that it is a standardized measure for all participants accounting for how many tickets 
they received after they were given additional tickets in the game play.  Figure 5.7 shows the 
mean for Reciprocity-Percent by Player 2’s political attachment and displays the percent of 
tickets available returned in trust game with a Unionist, Nationalist, and Anonymous first 
movers. Unionists and Nationalists both gave the greatest percentage of tickets back to ingroup 
members, 30.3 percent and 29.7 percent of tickets available, respectively.  Tickets available 
range from 10 to 40 tickets and is dependent on the number of tickets given by P1 [(P1 tickets 
given * 3) + 10 = P2 available tickets]. Unionist and Nationalist identifying players also gave the 
lowest percentage of tickets to outgroup members, 24.3 percent and 24.6 percent of tickets 
available. Next, I use OLS regression modeling to test the association of reciprocity with the 
ingroup and outgroup identity contexts of player interactions. .  
In Table 5.5 both Reciprocity-Tickets models show that the number of tickets received 
affects the number of tickets returned in both ingroup and outgroup game play. During ingroup 
partner interactions there is an increase of .5 tickets returned for each ticket received. Therfore 
each ticket given by P1 Player 2 receives 3 tickets and is expected to give an average of 1.5 
tickets back. This is a direct split of the tickets received from an ingroup member.  Receiving 
tickets from the outgroup does not generate as high of a return rate with only a .356 ticket 
increase for each ticket received from an outgroup member, Approximately 1 ticket is returned 
                                                 
56
 Possible Range of Reciprocity-Tickets is 0 to 40. Range of Reciprocity-Percent is 0 to 100  percent.  
91 
for each ticket given by Player 1 in an outgroup game.  This ticket return difference being larger 
in the ingroup context than it is in the outgroup game provides evidence supporting outgroup 
mistrust or that a pre-existing ingroup bias exists between outgroup members (Hypotheses 5.2 
and 5.5).  Individuals have biased reciprocal behaviors toward individuals who are part of their 
social group and reciprocity is diminished when sectarian identified individuals interact with an 
individual from the outgroup.   
 
 
Figure 5.7 Percent of Tickets Returned in each game by Player 2’s Political Identity.  
(N= 77; 22 Unionists, 18 Nationalists, and 37 Neither/Other/Don’t Know 
* Tickets available range: 10-40)  
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The last three models in Table 5.5 utilize Reciprocity-Percent variables as dependent 
variables. The first two Reciprocity–Percent57 models look at game play with ingroup or 
outgroup gameplay. The third model combines both ingroup and outgroup games with a “gap” 
variable that measures the differences in percent of tickets given to the ingroup partner as 
compared with the outgroup partner. (Percent tickets given to the ingroup – Percent tickets 
available given to outgroup = Reciprocity Percent Gap).  Within the sample, in both ingroup and 
outgroup games the percentage of tickets returned increases slightly when subjects received a 
greater number of tickets. Neither percent changes are statistically significant.  In the ingroup 
games, the percentage returned increases by .56 for every ticket received. The impact is slightly 
less for the outgroup games with a percentage increase of .397. The number of possible tickets 
received ranges from 0 to 30. Therefore, an individual playing an ingroup member who received 
30 tickets would on average give 16.8 percent more of the available tickets than someone who 
received 0 tickets. An individual playing an outgroup member receiving 30 tickets would return 
a little less than 12 percent more of the available tickets than an individual who received 0 
tickets. Receiving trusting behavior increases reciprocity but the reciprocity return is magnified 
during ingroup interactions, while outgroup reciprocity is harder won but still produces 
reciprocal behaviors.  
The last model in Table 5.5 utilizes the percent gap dependent variable, percent available 
tickets returned to the ingroup minus the percent available tickets returned to the outgroup. This 
variable much like the trust gap variables used in an earlier section allow us to see how 
individual players decisions regarding ingroup and outgroup counterparts manifest. The larger 
the gap value the greater the difference in reciprocity for the ingroup and outgroup. Within the 
reciprocity gap model when a greater number of tickets are received from an outgroup member 
                                                 
57
 Range of Reciprocity-Percent is 0 to 100 percent.  
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the gap is greatly reduced. Every additional ticket received by an outgroup game reduces the 
ingroup-outgroup percent gap by .815. However, tickets received will be in 3 ticket increments 
because the number of tickets given have been tripled, so for every ticket given, 3 are received, 
therefore, a one ticket increase given by the outgroup partner reduces the reciprocity gap by 2.4 
percent of available tickets. The gap has the potential to be reduced by a percentage of 24 if 
Player 1 gives all 10 tickets. The number of ingroup tickets given increases the ingroup-outgroup 
percentage of available tickets returned grows by an average percentage of .164. This is 
substantively a small increase and it is not statistically different than zero. Therefore we cannot 
be confident that there is any effect from the number of tickets given by an ingroup member. 
This may also be an indication of an inherent trust level between ingroup members because of a 
shared identity. These findings provide some support for Hypothesis 5.7 that receiving trusting 
behavior from another person impacts reciprocity behaviors for an individual, and that trust can 
mitigate pre-existing outgroup mistrust. This finding is in line with the contact hypothesis that 
interactions between outgroup members reduce bias.  
Additional models using Reciprocity-Tickets and Reciprocity-Percent as dependent 
variables are used in a panel data structured data set to control for other factors including the 
elite conflict prime.
58
 The first two models in each table use a subsample of the data and only 
compare the outgroup and ingroup games. The last two, right most, models in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 
include comparison of all three games, outgroup, ingroup, and anonymous pairings. In all models 
(I-IV) in Table 5.6 the number of tickets received is associated with an increase in tickets 
returned. The increase ranges from .38 to .49 more tickets returned for every ticket received, 
which reinforces the findings from Table 4.5. To assess the elite conflict prime in these models 
the Treatment variable is included, and three dichotomous variables are created for the type of 
                                                 
58
 Data used is the same as utilized in Table 4.4 Analysis. 
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partner during game play.
59
 The elite conflict prime (Treatment) does not have a statistically 
significant association with the number of tickets given in either Model II or Model IV, and the 
substantive difference within the sample is very small.   
 
Table 5.5 Reciprocity – Player 2 Tickets Returned 
 Reciprocity - Tickets  Reciprocity – Percent  
 
# of tickets 
returned to 
ingroup 
# of tickets 
returned to 
outgroup 
% returned 
to ingroup 
% 
returned 
to 
outgroup 
 
Difference 
in % of 
tickets 
returned 
(ingroup – 
outgroup)  
Tickets 
received 
from 
ingroup (0-
30 tickets) 
.502*** 
(.116) 
 
.555 
(.442)  
.164  
(.203) 
Tickets 
received 
from 
outgroup   
(0-30tickets)   
 
.356** 
(.112)  
.397  
(.422) 
-.815***   
(.218)  
Constant 
.833 
(1.869) 
1.182  
(1.852)  
22.76   
(7.11)  
18.9  
(6.96)  
14.8  
(4.49) 
N 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 .3294 .2087 .0397 .7707 .2826 
Adjusted R2 .3118 .1879 .0144 .7647 .2439 
F test .0001 .0030 .2178 .0000 0.0021 
OLS regressions for Player 2 , * p<.05, **p<.01,  ***p< .001 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59
 Ingroup and Anonymous game variables are included making the Outgroup game play the reference category 
captured in the constant value.  
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Table 5.6 Reciprocity-Tickets and Elite Behavior 
 
I II III IV 
Tickets received 
from P1 (0-30)  
.490***              
(.053) 
.477*** 
(.055) 
.389*** 
(.038) 
.375*** 
(.03) 
Elite Treatment 
.379                   
(1.98) 
-.332   
(2.11) 
.136    
(1.77) 
-.466    
(1.98) 
P1 Political 
Ingroup 
1.69             
(.722) 
.789   
(1.17) 
1.60* 
(.759) 
.276      
(1.21) 
P1 Anonymous 
  
.484    
(.759) 
.688 
(1.19) 
P1 Political 
Ingroup * 
Treatment 
 
1.483 
(1.52)  
2.19   
(1.56) 
P1 Anonymous * 
Treatment  
   
-.354 
(1.53) 
Constant 
-.932                     
(1.717) 
-.313 
(1.83) 
.625    
(1.53) 
1.18 
(1.63) 
N 80 80 120 120 
Groups 40 40 40 40 
χ 2 88.27*** 88.94*** 107.54*** 112.01*** 
Random Effects GLS model, Dependent variables in each model is the 
number of tickets Player 2 returned to Player 1 (0-40). Outgroup Player1 
is excluded as a third dummy variable and is the reference category. * 
p<.05, **p<.01,  ***p< .001  
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Figure 5.8 Number of Tickets Returned by Player 2 and Trust Interaction by Identity Context of 
Game Play from Table 5.6 Model IV. (Adjusted Margin Plots with 95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
We see similar findings when using Reciprocity-Percent as the dependent variable. 
Models in Table 5.7 (V - VIII) all show a positive association with the percent of tickets returned 
ranging from .19 percent to .47 percent increase for each ticket received. Models I through II this 
expected change is statistically significant. Model IV which has additional controls and 
interactions for treatment effects with partner type included is not statistically significant. 
Models IV and Model VIII include interactions with type of partner and the treatment. There are 
differences within the sample for the number of tickets and percent of tickets that are given to an 
ingroup partner if the elite conflict prime was received. Figure 5.8, and Figure 5.9 are graphical 
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representations of this change. At a 95 percent confidence interval the differences are not 
statistically significant. It is interesting to note nonetheless and if this interactive effect is found 
in future studies with larger and more representative samples it would provide evidence that 
conflict prime reinforces or magnifies ingroup bias. This is not sufficient evidence to support 
hypothesis 5.7, but at a minimum it indicates that more research in this area is required.    
Thus far in the chapter I examined trust and reciprocity as dependent variables to test the 
role of elite behaviors on cross-community and intra-community trusting and reciprocity 
behaviors. Trust and Reciprocity are one aspect of social capital. Analyzing original data from a 
social trust game that was paired with am elite priming experiment I find some limited evidence 
that elite behaviors may impact  ingroup bias (Hypothesis 5.8) .  Individuals that identify as 
Unionist or Nationalist do seem to have ingroup bias and outgroup misstrust on average. It is 
encouraging however that receiving trusting behavior is associated with greater outgroup 
reciprocity (Hypothesis 5.7). Future studies will need to greatly expand on the conditions 
included in such experimental trust games in Northern Ireland and other societies and include 
larger more representative samples so that we can determine if these relationships are robust at 
the national level and generalizable beyond the Northern Ireland case.  
Beyond behavior in strategic games, social cohesion can be bolstered by positive 
attitudes towards integration across group lines and preferences for mixing and interacting with 
outgroup members. The next section of this chapter will look at descriptive data from the 
Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey and test hypotheses, particularly Hypothesis 5.9 and 
5.10,  about the effects of cross-community and within-community elite trust on preferences for 
cross-group social interaction and trust using original survey data.  
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Table 5.7 Reciprocity-Percent and Elite Behavior - Player 2 
 
V VI VII VIII 
Tickets received 
from P1 
.47**  
(.15) 
.43**  
(.16) 
.23*  
(.12) 
.19  
(.12) 
Elite Treatment 2.8 
(7.7) 
.99 
(7.9) 
1.3      
(7.1) 
.68 
(7.6) 
P1 Political Ingroup 5.9**  
(1.97) 
 3.7      
(.03) 
5.8*    
(2.4) 
2.5 
(3.8) 
P1 Anonymous 
  
2.4      
(2.4) 
4.4 
(3.8) 
P1Ingroup* 
Treatment   
3.8    
(4.2)  
5.4 
(4.9) 
P1 Anonymous* 
Treatment     
-3.4 
(4.9) 
Constant 
16.2**  
(6.3) 
17.9**     
(6.6) 
20.3*** 
(5.9) 
21.4*** 
(6.1) 
N 80 80 120 120 
Groups  40 40 40 40 
χ 2 17.93*** 18.67*** 9.2* 12.57* 
Random Effects GLS model. Coefficient is percent (range from 0% to 100% 
of tickets returned – calculated value from number of tickets returned 
divided by available tickets.  Standard error in parentheses.  
* p<.05, **p<.01,  ***p< .001   
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Figure 5.9 Percent of Available Tickets Returned by Player 2 and Trust Interaction by Identity 
Context of Game Play from Table 5.7 Model VIII. (Adjusted Margin Plots with 95% Confidence 
Interval) 
5.5 Willingness to Integrate 
Preferences for interaction with outgroup members, willingness to integrate, is measured using 
four survey questions that target the preference for mixing with another community based on 
religious grouping (i.e. if you identify as Catholic how do you feel about interacting with 
Protestants or the Protestant community). Four areas of integration preference include 
neighborhoods, work, children’s school, and familial marriages. These four questions have been 
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consistently asked in the Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) Survey, with a few 
exceptions.
60
 I also included these questions in the posttest of the QUB survey administered 
during 2014 to 2015 that is analyzed later in this section.  
The NILT survey responses show a consistent majority preferring mixing in all four 
areas, however, in the three most recent years displayed there is a decline in the proportion of 
respondents that prefer mixing and a rise in individuals’ preferences for maintaining separate 
religious communities (see Figure 5.10). An additive variable from these four questions produces 
a score of 4, while preference for separate community spaces in the four areas produces a score 
of 0 for the individual.  These four questions along with other regarding cross-community elite 
trust were included in the QUB survey.  This section will test Hypotheses 5.9 regarding how 
cross-community elite trust impacts willingness to integrate.. Trust in ingroup political parties 
and outgroup political parties are variables determined from questions asking if respondents  
would trust a minister from the two largest Nationalist parties (SDLP and Sinn Féin) and two 
largest Unionist parties (DUP and UUP). The possible responses for each question range from 0 
(Definitely Distrust) to 5 (Definitely trust) for each political party. Trust in outgroup ministers 
ranges from 0 to 6 once combined,  and trust in the ingroup ministers ranges from 0 to 8. 
Unsurprisingly the maximum value for ingroup trust is greater than the outgroup trust maximum 
value, already indicating that participants had lower levels of trust in the outgroup.  
Lastly, a gap variable measuring the difference in individual trust in the ingroup and 
outgroup political parties is generated. The ingroup-ougroup gap variable equals the ingroup 
trust minus outgroup trust in political parties. Therefore, a score of zero would indicate no 
difference in the amount that that person trusts the outgroup and the ingroup. Whether the 
                                                 
60
 The marriage preferences questions were not included in 1999 and 2000 surveys and the 2011 survey responses 
were not collected due to insufficient funds to conduct the survey in that year.  
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amount of trust is great or small if they have equal trust or mistrust for political parties of the 
ingroup and outgroup they will have a score of 0. A positive score indicates that the individual 
trusts ingroup parties more than outgroup parties and an individual has a negative score if they 
trust outgroup party members more than ingroup party members. This later group, those with 
negative scores, is only present for 3out of 72 participants in the sample used in this portion of 
the study. The majority, at 48 participants or two-thirds of the sample, trust ingroup parties more 
than outgroup parties. This leaves approximately 29 percent trusting ingroup and outgroup 
parties equally. Per hypothesis 5.9 it is expected that trust in outgroup ministers will increase the 
probability of an individual’s willingness to integrate while trust in ingroup ministers will reduce 
the propensity for one’s preference for mixing.  
 
Figure 5.10 Preference for Mixing in Four Areas for all Respondents  
Data Source: Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (ARK 1999-2015) 
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I also include the variable Treatment to test for Hypothesis 5.11. Again, the Treatment 
variable indicates if a respondent received and read the article contacting conflict between main 
political parties in the Northern Ireland Executive.
61
 Models including only the control group can 
be found in Appendix A. Additional mechanisms to be tested are income, general trust in 
politicians, satisfaction with MLAs, individual cross community contact, and confidence in 
institutions. Future income measures respondents expectation that their household income will 
fall behind (-1), keep up with (0) or go up more than prices (1).  Trust in politicians generally 
ranges from definitely distrust (0) to probably trust (3), the full range of possible responses goes 
to “definitely trust” (4) however none of the participants responded with the highest “definitely 
trust” option. Satisfaction with Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) ranges from “very 
dissatisfied” (0) to “very satisfied” (4), like trust in politicians no respondents were “very 
satisfied” so the full range of existing responses if from 0 to 3. Contact in school is a 
dichotomous variable that indicates if a respondent attended a mixed school prior to college. 
Lastly, various measures for institutional confidence are included. Each of the institutional 
confidence variables ranges from 0 to 3, 0 indicating no confidence at all, and 3 indicating a 
“great deal” of confidence. Models also include index variables used in Chapter 4 for measuring 
legitimacy: Justice Legitimacy and Assembly Legitimacy.  
5.5.1 Findings on Willingness to Integrate  
Models with each of the four component parts of the willingness to integrate show consistent 
positive relationship between trust in outgroup ministers and preference for mixing, and 
consistent negative relationships between trust in ingroup ministers and mixing.  Logit models 
for each of the individual components of willingness to integrate are displayed in Table 5.8 and 
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 Models including control group only are included in Appendix A.  
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5.9. Trust in outgroup ministers increases the probability that an individual will be willing to 
interact with the outgroup, these values are statistically significant in areas of Neighborhood 
mixing and mixing in schools. Trust in ingroup ministers on average is associated with a 
reduction in willingness to interact in all areas. Areas of work, children’s school, and familial 
marriage are statistically different from zero. Predicted probabilities for these models are in 
Appendix A. Individuals who were exposed to the elite conflict treatment are more likely to 
prefer interacting with others in three of the four areas (work, school, and family marriage). The 
difference between control and treatment is statistically significant in the area of sending ones 
children to a mixed school. This is somewhat counter intuitive to expectations stated in 
Hypothesis 5.11, where elite conflict predicts a reduction in willingness to integrate. I will look 
at another model of wiliness to integrate to see if this relationship holds.   
 
Table 5.8 Four Areas of Mixing Comprising Willingness to Integrate with Treatment 
 Neighborhood Work School Marriage 
Trust in Outgroup 
Ministers  
.43* 
(.25) 
.53 
(.48) 
.46** 
(.18) 
.36 
(.29) 
Trust in Ingroup Ministers   
 
-.05 
(.17) 
-1.38* 
(.83) 
-.33** 
(.15) 
-.56* 
(.29) 
Treatment -.16 
(.76) 
2.61 
(1.65) 
1.01* 
(.61) 
1.29 
(.99) 
Constant 1.32 
(.89) 
8.81 
(5.18) 
.67 
(.74) 
3.92** 
(1.7) 
χ 2 3.58 11.74** 12.15** 7.38* 
N 58 62 62 72 
Logit models, * p<.1, **p<.05,  ***p< .01 Data from QUB 2014 Survey 
 
A more useful way of looking at these four areas across levels of elite trust is to utilize 
the gap variable that measures the difference in ingroup minister trust and outgroup minister trust 
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for each individual.
62
  In all four areas there is a negative association between a greater elite trust 
gap and preferences for mixing (see Table 5.9). All are statistically significant excluding mixing 
in Neighborhoods. Three of the four are statistically significant excluding mixing in 
Neighborhoods. The treatment effect is positive in this model specification as well. Those who 
were exposed to elite conflict are more likely to prefer interactions in three of the four areas. 
Predicted probabilities in Table 5.10 show that moving from trusting the outgroup more than the 
ingroup to trusting both elite groups equally there is minimal substantive change. The greatest 
change is seen in school mixing where there is an 12.1 percentage point change for those in the 
control group, and a 6 percentage point change for those who read about elite conflict. The 
greater differences however, occur as we move from equal trust to trusting the ingroup ministers 
more than the outgroup ministers. In all areas of mixing there is at least a 20 percentage point 
decline in preferences for mixing, most notably in school mixing there is 62 percentage point 
reduction in the probability that the individual would want their child to attend a mixed school 
when they are more trusting of the ingroup elites for both treatment and control groups.  
Similar shifts are seen in the other areas with a 82.9(Control) and 30.3(Treatment) 
percentage point reduction in preferences for mixing at work, and 56.7 percentage point drop in 
accepting a member of their family marrying an outgroup member for those in the control group. 
A smaller dip in areas of mixing in neighborhoods at 21.7(Control)  and 23.5 (Treatment)  
percentage points lower for an individual who has an 8 point gap in elite ingroup-outgroup trust.  
These consistent associations provides some limited evidence in support of Hypothesis 5.9 that 
individuals who trust outgroup elites will be more willing to interact with the outgroup while 
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 The range for the Ingroup-Outgroup Minister variable is -2 to 8 where -2 indicates an individual trusts the 
outgroup ministers more than the ingroup ministers, 0 indicates that the individual trusts or mistrusts both groups of 
ministers equally, and 8 indicates a great deal of trust for ingroup ministers and little to none for the outgroup 
ministers.  
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those who trust ingroup elites will be less willing to interact with the outgroup. It is unclear why 
those who read about elite conflict and greatly trust the ingroup elites and not the outgroup elites 
are more likely to prefer mixing than those who greatly trust their ingroup elites over outgroup 
elites and did not read the conflict prime.   
 
Table 5.9 Four Areas of Mixing and Elite Trust Gap 
 Neighborhood Work School Marriage 
Trust in Ingroup – 
Outgroup Ministers   
-.18 
(.15) 
-.87** 
(.41) 
-.38** 
(.13) 
-.46** 
(.20) 
Treatment  -.14 
(.75) 
2.44* 
(1.49) 
.99* 
(.61) 
1.33 
(.99) 
Constant  2.27*** 
(.68) 
5.31** 
(2.12) 
1.02** 
(.47) 
3.29*** 
(.93) 
χ 2 1.71 10.77** 11.78** 7.15** 
N 58 62 62 72 
Logit models, * p<.1, **p<.05,  ***p< .01 Data from QUB 2014 Survey 
 
 
Table 5.10 Predicted Probabilities for Elite Trust Gap and Treatment Assignment (Table 5.9)  
 Area of Mixing 
 Neighborhood Work School Marriage 
 C T C T C T C T 
Minimum Political Trust Gap 
(Ingroup-Outgroup)  (-2)  
93.3 92.4 99.9 99.9 85.7 94.2 98.6 99.6 
No Political Trust Gap 
(Ingroup-Outgroup)  (0) 
90.6 89.4 99.5 99.9 73.6 88.2 96.4 99 
Maximum Political Trust 
Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup)  (8) 
68.9 65.9 16.6 69.6 11.5 26 39.7 71.4 
Values are percentages, C= Control group assignment, and T= Treatment group assignment in 
the Elite Treatment Experiment  
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Next, using an additive variable that combines the four areas of mixing as the dependent 
variable, I specify five models with additional right hand side variables (see Table 5.11).
63
 
Findings on political trust, economic prospects, cross community contact, and trust in police are 
directionally consistent across models. The likelihood that an individual will be willing to 
integrate declines as the elite trust gap grows for individuals. This is consistent across all five 
model specifications in Table 5.11. Perception of economic security in the future also impacts 
the probability of willingness to integrate. Personal contact with the outgroup community 
through attending an integrated school greatly increases the preference for mixing in four areas. 
Additionally, when controlling for confidence in institutions only confidence in the police 
produces a meaningful difference in the probability of preference for mixing. To understand the 
magnitude of this change we look to predicted probabilities in Table 5.12.  I focus on 
interpretation of Model 4 in this section, predicted probabilities for the remaining models can be 
found in Appendix A. All predicted probabilities are specified for the probability that an 
individual is willing to integrate in all four areas. I set the right hand side variable at the value 
stated in the table, and all other variables at their means.  
As individual trust gap increases from negative two to zero we see a reduction of 4.5 
percentage points in the likelihood that an individual would be willing to integrate in all four 
areas. There is an even greater shift from zero, indicating equal trust in both ingroup and 
outgroup parties to trusting the ingroup parties completely, and a score of 8, having no trust in 
the outgroup party. There is a staggering decline in the likelihood that an individual would be 
willing to integrate in all four areas, moving from 94.6 percent likelihood to 1 percent at the 
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 Additional models utilizing separate independent variables for outgroup political trust and ingroup political trust 
can be found in Appendix A. I focus on using the gap variable in this chapter to be parsimonious in discussion.  
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greatest ingroup-outgroup trust gap. This provides support for Hypothesis 5.9 that elite trust is 
impactful on cross community social interactions.  
Prospects of future income security increases the probability that an individual will be 
willing to integrate by 61.6 percentage points moving from expectation of reduced future income 
to increased future income, and even maintaining ones current income produces an 80.3 percent 
probability of being willing to integrate in all four areas. Trust in politicians generally has an 
inverse relationship with willingness to integrate. An individual who probably trusts politicians 
is 70.4 percentage points less likely to be willing to integrate in all four areas than an individual 
who definitely distrusts politicians.
64
 This could be indicating that individuals who are 
dissatisfied with the sectarian and divided political system are more willing to integrate. Personal 
contact is positively associated with willingness to integrate. Previous interaction with the 
outgroup increases the probability of preference for mixing in all for areas by 58.1 percentage 
points. This evidence supports existing contact theory evidence that interaction with the outgroup 
increases positive sentiment about the outgroup. Lastly, high levels of confidence in police is 
positively related to the preference for mixing. Individuals who have a great deal of confidence 
in the police are 74.8 percentage points more likely than individuals have no confidence at all in 
the police to interact in all four areas of integration. The remainder of the confidence in 
institutions variables: confidence in the press, the government, the churches, the justice system, 
and parties generally are not statistically significant. Confidence in the press, the government, 
and the churches are negatively associated with willingness to integrate while confidence in 
political parties and the justice system are positively associated.   These models on willingness to 
integrate provide some evidence that elite behaviors may be impacting the attitudes and 
behaviors of individuals in society, if not directly then indirectly through legitimacy attitudes.  
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 There was an option for definitely trust politicians on the survey, but none of the participants selected this option.  
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Table 5.11 Willingness to Integrate  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trust in Ingroup – 
Outgroup Ministers   
-.45*** 
(.13) 
-.77*** 
(.18) 
-.94*** 
(.28) 
-.94*** 
(.28) 
-1.03*** 
(.36) 
Increase in Future Income  
 1.74* 
(.71) 
2.3* 
(.96) 
2.01* 
(.96) 
2.4† 
(1.3) 
Trust politicians 
 
  -1.26* 
(.59) 
-1.18* 
(.62) 
-1.07 
(.84) 
Satisfaction with MLAs 
 
  .53 
(.58) 
-.37 
(.77) 
-.53 
(.98) 
Contact in School 
 
  3.5 
(1.93) 
3.61† 
(2.02) 
4.47† 
(2.72) 
Confidence :       
     In the Catholic Church 
 
    -.4 
(.68) 
     In the Protestant Church 
 
    -.6 
(.71) 
     In the Police 
 
   1.29† 
(.68) 
1.7† 
(.94) 
     In the Justice System 
 
    .16 
(.94) 
     In the Government  
 
    -.22 
(1.8) 
     In the Parties 
 
    .49 
(1.18) 
     In the Press 
 
    -.26 
(.8) 
Treatment  .65 
(.57) 
-.29 
(.69) 
-.19 
(.84) 
-.009 
(.9) 
-.26 
(.8) 
χ 2  15.58*** 29.33*** 37.26*** 40.85*** 40.69*** 
N 56 44 37 36 33 
Ordered Logit model, † p< .1, * p<.05, **p<.01,  ***p< .001 
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Table 5.12 Predicted Probabilities for Model 4 Table 5.11 
Minimum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup)  (-2)  99.1% 
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup)  (0) 94.6% 
Maximum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup)  (8) 1% 
Income Future (-1) 35.2% 
Income Future (0)  80.3% 
Income Future (1)  96.8% 
Trust Politicians (0) 82.8% 
Trust Politicians (2)  12.4% 
Contact  (0) 37.6% 
Contact (1)  95.7% 
Confidence in Police (0)  14.2% 
Confidence in Police (3)  89% 
 
Next, I use the PCA generated legitimacy index variables: assembly legitimacy and 
justice legitimacy.
65
 In Table 5.13 I use them as independent variables. The relationships found 
in Table 5.11 models are reaffirmed. The gap in ingroup and outgroup minister trust are 
negatively associated with willingness to integrate while attitudes about future income and 
previous contact with the outgroup are positively associated with preferences for mixing. The 
area of justice regime legitimacy is also positively associated with preferences for mixing while 
assembly legitimacy is not.  
Predicted probabilities for Table 5.13 are in Table 5.14. The predicted likelihoods for 
ingroup outgroup elite trust gap, contact, and future income are approximately the same as we 
see in Table 5.11 so I will focus on Justice legitimacy. There is a 93.2 percentage point 
difference between the lowest levels of justice legitimacy and the highest level. Therefore, 
having confidence in the justice system, including the police drastically changes the likelihood 
that an individual will prefer mixing with the outgroup. If we recall from Chapter 4, exposure to 
elite conflict (treatment) influences justice legitimacy and not assembly legitimacy. Elite conflict 
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 See Chapter 4 for left hand side analysis of these two variables.  
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was found to reduce levels of trust in police and the justice system more broadly, so while the 
treatment does not have a direct effect on willingness to integrate, there is very likely an indirect 
relationship where willingness to integrate social capital generally are influenced by elite actions.  
Next I continue investigations around Expectation 7 and test Hypothesis 5.10 regarding cross 
community elite trust and cross community social trust.  
 
Table 5.13 Willingness to Integrate and Legitimacy Indexes 
Trust in Ingroup – Outgroup Ministers   -.92*** 
(.28) 
Increase in Future Income  1.84† 
(.95) 
Contact in School 
 
4.36* 
(1.9) 
Assembly Legitimacy  -.14 
(.22) 
Justice Legitimacy  1.21** 
(5.1) 
Treatment  .49 
(.89) 
χ 2  28.29*** 
N 36 
Ordered Logit model, † p< .1, * p<.05, **p<.01,  ***p< .001 
 
Table 5.14 Predicted Probabilities for Table 5.13 
Minimum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup)  (-2)  99.2% 
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup)  (0) 95.5% 
Maximum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-Outgroup)  (8) 1.3% 
Income Future (-1) 42.7% 
Income Future (0)  82.5% 
Income Future (1)  96.7% 
Contact  (0) 38.5% 
Contact (1)  98% 
Justice Legitimacy (min ~ -3.09) 4.2% 
Justice Legitimacy (max ~ 2.49) 97.4% 
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5.5.2 Elite Trust and Social Trust – Survey Question Analysis  
Revisiting social trust, I use survey responses rather than trust game outcomes to measure 
individuals attitudes about social trust. Individuals were asked if they feel that Nationalists are 
generally trustworthy and if Unionists are generally trustworthy. Responses for sectarian group 
trust range from “not very trustworthy” (0)  to “very trustworthy” (3). Like other measures in this 
chapter I generate a  variable measuring the difference between ingroup and outgroup social trust 
for Unionists and Nationalists.  This social trust gap variable could range from -3 to 3 where 
negative values indicate greater ingroup trust than outgroup trust, and a postive number would 
indicate greater outgroup trust. The actual range of responses is -2 to 0. This is coded inversly to 
the elite trust gap variable so that the direction of social trust gap moves in the same direction as 
willingness to integrate, a larger value of  the social trust gap indicates greater bridging social 
capital and a negative value indicates greater bonding social capital. None of the Unionist or 
Nationalist identifying respondents trust the outgroup more than their own ingroup, however 
many trust each group equally, and most find both groups “somewhat trustworthy”.   
 
Table 5.15 Elite Cross Community Trust and Cross Community Social Trust 
Trust in Ingroup – 
Outgroup Ministers 
-.82* 
(.32) 
Increase in Future Income  
1.44 
(1.03) 
Contact in School 
 
-1.36 
(1.46) 
Assembly Legitimacy  
.33 
(.31) 
Justice Legitimacy  
.05 
(.69) 
Treatment  -.45 
(1.14) 
χ 2  12.85 
N 40 
Ordered Logit model, † p< .1, * p<.05, **p<.01,  ***p< 
.001 
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Table 5.16 Predicted Probabilities for Table 5.15 
 
No Social Trust 
Gap (0) 
Bonding 
Social Trust 
(-1) 
Stronger 
Bonding 
Social Trust 
(-2) 
Minimum Political Trust Gap 
(Ingroup-Outgroup)  (-2)  
99.9% .06% .05% 
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-
Outgroup)  (0) 
99.3% .3% .3% 
Maximum Political Trust Gap 
(Ingroup-Outgroup)  (8) 
18.4% 13.3% 68.4% 
 
I find the expected negative association between cross community elite trust and cross 
community social trust. Predicted probabilities show that individuals who have greater trust in 
the elite ingroup show greater bonding social trust. Individuals who are most trusting of the 
political ingroup ministers are about 81 percentage points more likely to trust ingroup members 
in the community more than outgroup members.  My theory argues for a clear direction; 
community elite trust leads to social trust. It is possible that cross community social trust leads to 
cross community trust. I argue that these findings provide some evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 5.10 and in combination with evidence on the relationship between elite cross 
community trust and willingness to integrate, additional support for Expectation 7. In the next 
section I will discuss some of the implications from analyses in this chapter.  
5.6 Discussion  
This chapter deals with questions about social capital and the relationship between legitimacy 
and elite political leader behaviors. Of the ten hypotheses tested in this chapter, we see some 
evidence supporting all of these propositions. This chapter aimed to illustrate the importance of 
identity context on social capital, particularly trust and preferences for interacting with outgroup 
and ingroup members. While there is a vast literature on the role of bonding and bridging social 
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capital this chapter goes on to highlight the relevance ingroup and outgroup elite trust and the 
ramifications for social trust and interactions. Additionally, this chapter tests the influence of 
elite actor behaviors and the relationship between legitimacy attitudes and social capital.  
The analyses in this chapter do not provide   robust evidence for a direct link between 
cross-community elite behavior and social capital. However, legitimacy attitudes are associated 
with social capital variables, and there may be an indirect effect from elite behaviors. In the last 
chapter we saw that elite conflict reduced Justice Legitimacy. In this chapter Justice Legitimacy 
is associated with an increase in preferences for mixing with the outgroup. Political identity 
plays an unsurprising role in social interaction preferences and willingness to integrate. 
Individuals who identify as Unionist or Nationalist are likely to take that identity into account 
when determining behaviors, as the findings from the social trust game indicate.  
This study, if nothing else, does indicate that future research is needed to better 
understand this dynamic relationship between elite behaviors, attitudes about intuitions and 
actors, and attitudes about others in society. Trust in elite ingroup and outgroup ministers is 
associated with social trust, as is confidence in justice institutions including the police. The 
behavior of political leaders and political parties both have the potential to drive societal discord 
or unity.  
There is variation in the degree to which identity plays a role in attitude formation and 
behaviors, including which political group one belongs to. Cross-community political trust has 
the potential to grow social interactions, while ingroup political trust can reduce preferences for 
social interaction. Arguably social interactions and trust can ultimately build political trust. It is 
clear that accounting for socio-political identity and the context of that identity within the larger 
societal structure is important for future research.  
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In the next chapter I look at how legitimacy and social capital factors might impact 
political participation. I test four Expectations (8-11) from chapter 2 that get at the next step in 
the relationship between elite behavior and the components of social cohesion. Political 
participation is unpacked and I make an argument for and test how legitimacy and social capital 
may interact to inform individual decisions about when and how to participate in the political 
system.  
 
6 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
“One key way in which democracies can change is in the arena of political 
participation, which virtually all theories of democracy regard as essential to its 
functioning. In essence, if there is no participation, there is no democracy.”  
(Booth and Seligson 2005, 538) 
The final component of social cohesion that my theory contemplates is political participation. 
The last of three components, following legitimacy and social capital, political participation is 
integral to the proper functionality of democratic polities. Political participation comes in many 
different forms from voting and other forms of conventional participation to unconventional 
participation that includes violent protest against the government. I argue in Chapter 2 that the 
method or methods of political participation that individuals choose to utilize to interact with the 
political system is dependent on attitudes about actors and institutions, and attitudes about others 
in society. The interaction of legitimacy and social capital attitudes inform an individual’s 
decision to abstain from voicing preferences to participating in conventional or nonconventional 
modes of participation. In societies with historical social cleavages, inclusion or exclusion of 
groups from the political system can be an important factor in determining one’s form of 
participation. Exclusion in some cases can prevent access to voting or the feeling that a vote is 
not impactful in determining representation or policy positions of the government. This chapter 
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focuses on political participation and finding answers for the following questions. What factors 
influence choices about when to participate and how to participate?  
In Chapter 2 I lay out my theory of social cohesion and several expectations about the 
three components. Adding on to Booth and Seligson’s theory of a U-Shaped relationship 
between legitimacy attitudes, I argue that the role of bridging and bonding social capital impacts 
political participation decisions. The context of ingroup and outgroup interactions and trust can 
play an important role in determining what method of participation, if any, will be most 
effective. Expectations eight through eleven detail outcomes for method and likelihood of 
political participation and will be addressed in this chapter. I make the argument for an integrated 
theory with an interactive effect of legitimacy and social capital mechanisms. In this chapter I 
recap the theory as it pertains to political participation, discuss measures of concepts relevant to 
analysis, and lay out hypotheses assessed in this chapter.  Lastly, I test the four hypotheses about 
political participation and discuss the implications of my findings.  
6.1 Gauging Participation 
In this chapter political participation includes electoral and non-electoral forms of participation. 
Political participation is a vertical interaction between individuals and the government, the last 
step in the top down cycle I proposed and illustrated in Figure 2.1. The primary focus of this 
chapter is to understand how legitimacy and social capital might interact to impact individual 
level political participation. In this section I will look at descriptive statistics for political 
participation in Northern Ireland from the original survey conducted October 2014 to March 
2015. The survey includes a student sample from Queen’s University Belfast with a total of 218 
respondents. Data from this survey is assessed to determine how social capital and legitimacy 
might influence political participation..  
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Questions on political participation asked respondents to indicate if they had participated 
in the past or would participate in the future in five separate areas of political voice: voting, 
signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending a peaceful demonstration, and continuing a 
demonstration that becomes violent. I adapted the questions on political participation from the 
World Values Survey question about political action.
66
 The political action series of questions 
asks about signing a petition, joining in boycotts, and attending a peaceful demonstration. Voting 
and continuing in a protest once it turns violent are added to the participation series of this 
survey to address a larger scope of potential participation. Violent protest is an important 
measure to include in many societies but particularly in societies with a legacy of violent conflict 
and protest. Past participation response options included “Have done” and “Have NOT done”. 
Possible future participation response options included: “Would do”, “Might do”, “Would Never 
do”.67  
 Descriptive statistics of responses to the line of political participation show that there are 
varying methods of participation and many respondents that have not participated in the past are 
willing to engage in the future in various ways. Figure 6.1 shows the percent of respondents who 
self-reported past political participation. A little more than 40 percent stated that they had voted. 
The most frequent form of past participation is signing a petition, with 51.5 percent having 
signed some petition in the past. Over 10 percent had joined a boycott, and 16.6 percent had 
participated in a peaceful protest. Less than one percent had continued in a demonstration that 
had turned violent.
68
   
                                                 
66
 Political Action Questions are variables v96 through v103 in the 2005-2009 wave of the World Values Survey 
(Inglehart 2014).  
67
 Both Past participation questions and Future Participation response options included “No Answer” and “Don’t 
Know”. These responses are excluded from descriptive statistic figures and later analyses.  
68
 This number may be under reported because of the nature of the activity asked about. The sample population may 
have lower levels than we would see in a full population sample. 
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Figure 6.2 shows the percent of respondents that would or might participate in the five 
areas of participation.  Sixty-eight percent of respondents indicated that they might or would vote 
in the future an increase of 12 percentage points from past participation.
69
 Sixty-eight percent of 
respondents also claimed that they might or would participate in a peaceful demonstration, a 
steep increase from only 16.6 percent who said they had participated in a past demonstration.
 70
 
There was also a steep increase for individuals joining a future boycott from 10.5 who had, to 
53.7 percent who might or would.
71
 40.6 percent of respondents might or would sign a petition.
72
 
This is the only category of participation that sees a decline from past to potential future 
participation dropping from 51.5 percent who said they had signed a petition in the past. Of 102 
respondents who stated they had signed a petition in the past 24 of those stated that they would 
not sign in the future. This could be that they feel that petitions are not effective in voicing 
political opinion. All 24 who said they would not sign in the future said they would or might vote 
in the future, and most are likely to participate in other areas, none of the 24 said they would 
continue in a demonstration if it turned violent even though 21 said they would participate in a 
peaceful demonstration and the other 3 said they might. Therefore, it does not seem that people 
who are feeling frustrated with the ineffectiveness of a petition would turn to violence, but 
continue other conventional and unconventional methods of participation.  
The percentage of respondents who said they would continue in a demonstration that 
turned violent also increased from less than one percent of respondents who had participated in a 
                                                 
69
 In the 2008 European Values Survey wave for Northern Ireland (n=500) found that 62.6 percent would vote if 
there was an election tomorrow (EVS 2016). Percent values include missing for QUB and EVS samples, so percent 
reflected is taken out of 229 respondents (QUB) and 500 respondents (EVS). Approximately 30 percent of those 
who entered the survey did not answer these participation questions in the QUB study.  
70
 The 2008 EVS found that 14.4 percent say they have attended peaceful demonstrations as compared to 16.6 
percent in the sample. The questions in the QUB survey were split into two separate questions of past and future 
participation and therefore are slightly different than the EVS.    
71
 11.4 percent of the EVS sample said they had boycotted something, 31.2 percent said they might in the future.  
72
 46.8 percent of the EVS sample said they had signed a petition in the past.  
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violent protest in the past to over 8 percent that might or would be willing to continue in a 
violent protest.
73
  Parametric and non-parametric difference of means tests for each area of 
participation, except signing a petition, indicates that levels of past and likely future participation 
are statistically different values.
74
    
Unpacking participation by political identity is pertinent to understanding if there is a 
substantive difference in the amount and methods of participation used by those identifying with 
a particular political sect or not. Figure 6.3 shows the levels of past participation and Figure 6.4 
shows future participation by respondents identifying as Unionist or Nationalist and those who 
do not identify with either political group. Nationalists are slightly more active in most areas of 
past participation except for violent demonstrations.  The largest differences are in joining a 
boycott and participating in a demonstration. Nationalists are much more likely to participate in 
these forms of participation than Unionists or individuals who do not identify with one of the two 
primary political designations. Nationalists are the political minority, and have been throughout 
the long and checkered history, this higher rate of unconventional political participation is not 
surprising, given the tradition of needing to use politically unconventional methods to have their 
voice heard.  Nationalists within this sample are also voting slightly more than Unionists, but 
that they still choose to participate unconventionally as well may speak to the past, or to ongoing 
frustration with the level of inclusion in the political system.  
  
                                                 
73
 This question is not asked in EVS or WVS surveys so representative sample responses are not comparable.  
74
 Difference of means t-tests that assume interval level variables with normal distribution, and Wilcoxon signed 
rank sum tests that assume ordinal variables both produce similar outcomes in terms of statistical difference of the 
past and future participation.  
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Figure 6.1 Past Participation – Percent of Respondents that “Have done” 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Future Participation - Percent of Respondents that “would” or “might” participate 
in the future. 
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Figure 6.3 Past Political Participation by Political Attachment 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Future Political Participation by Political Attachment  (respondents who would or 
might participate) 
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The number of respondents who stated that they would or might participate in the future 
is greater than past participation in every area except for signing a petition. When divided by 
political identification there are moderate differences between groups and levels of likely 
participation. A larger portion of respondents have the desire to or consider the possibility of 
participating in politics, through voting, boycotting, demonstrating, and continuing in a 
demonstration that turns violent, than have participated in such activities in the past. Now that I 
have discussed the concept of political participation I turn to the specific hypotheses tested, and 
the variables and specific measures that are utilized to test them.  
6.2 The Interaction of Legitimacy and Social Capital  
Political participation is the dependent variable of interest within this chapter. In the above 
section the statistics for both past and future participation are considered. There are four primary 
hypotheses that will be defined and tested in this chapter. I argue that political participation is 
influenced by attitudes about the current actors and institutions, and social capital. Chapter 4 and 
5 disclose specific measures of legitimacy and social capital in more detail. In this section, I 
explain how concepts are measured for analysis and posit several hypotheses that I test in this 
chapter.  
Legitimacy, social capital, and political participation are the three components of social 
cohesion and each is seminal to my theory. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to 
generate index variables for both political participation and legitimacy. Using the responses for 
an individual’s likely future political participation I used PCA to create two variables to measure 
political participation: Sign&Boycott, and Vote&Demonstrate. First, Sign&Boycott, responses for 
Boycotting and Signing a Petition loaded together strongly as a component of future 
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participation.
75
 Responses for being unwilling to continue participation in a demonstration that 
turns violent, voting, and participation in a demonstration loaded together strongly (generating 
Vote&Demonstrate).
76 
 
Two principal component variables measure individual attitudes about legitimacy. I ran 
PCA on responses from several questions targeting attitudes about the government. Four 
questions on individual perceptions loaded as strongly correlated for the first component, 
Assembly Legitimacy. The four areas of legitimacy included confidence in the government, 
confidence in parties, satisfaction with Members of the Legislative Assembly, and trust in 
politicians generally.
77
  The second component, Justice Legitimacy strongly loaded on individual 
confidence in police and confidence in the justice system.
78
 The two legitimacy composite scores 
created encompass first the legitimacy of representative government, and the second component 
measures the legitimacy of the justice system.
79
  
Last of the three primary components, social capital, is measured with a variety of 
questions throughout the study. In this chapter, I rely on a measure that gauges an individual’s 
preference for mixing across four areas. Four questions from the QUB survey measure an 
individual’s preference for mixing with their religious outgroup in four contexts: housing, 
neighborhood, familial marriages, and work. I adopt the question wordings from recurring 
questions on the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey. These questions ask about religious 
outgroup and work as a proxy for Unionist and Nationalist outgroup, because the political and 
religious identities align in the Northern Ireland context. The four areas of mixing include work 
                                                 
75
 Eigenvalue of 2.34, range of values for component 1 are -3.9 to 3.08.     
76
 Eigenvalue of 1.04, range of values of component 2 are -3.17 to 1.04.    
77
 Eigenvalue 3.58  
78
 Eigenvalue .99. 
79
 Violent participation is not included because only one participant self-reported as having continued 
participation in a demonstration that turned violent. 
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environment, neighborhoods, children’s school, and inter-faith marriage by someone in the 
respondent’s family.80 The additive variable values range from 0 to 4. 0 is no preference for 
mixing, or preferring to be with one’s own religious group in all four areas, and 4 is an individual 
who prefers to mix with the religious outgroup in all areas.
81
  Additional measures of social trust 
are included: general trust, ingroup trust, and outgroup trust questions. Each of these three 
variables ranges from 0 to 3 where 0 is the least trusting and 3 is the most trusting of the 
specified group.
82
 Now that the three primary concepts are operationalized I will move to the 
discussion of hypotheses.  
6.2.1 Participation Hypotheses  
There are several propositions on how social capital and legitimacy impact political 
participation. There is a great deal of literature on each, but these are individual literatures. I 
make an argument in Chapter 2 for an integrated model of social cohesion at the individual level 
that includes an interactive effect between social capital and legitimacy on individual political 
participation. The first proposition for political participation deals with electoral participation. 
After Booth and Seligson, Expectation 8 predicts that extreme legitimacy positions will increase 
electoral participation. Therefore, an individual who highly supports or greatly rejects the current 
political system is more likely to vote than individuals who have moderate positions about the 
current regime.   
Hypothesis 6.1:  Individual’s with high or low legitimacy positions will vote more 
than individuals with mid-range legitimacy positions.  
 
                                                 
80
 A question asking if a respondent thinks others mind if family members marry outside of their religion 
but factor analysis indicates this is targeting another base concept. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the four 
variables included in Mixing Preferences is .5837.  
81
 See Chapter 5 for more detail about Social Capital variables.  
82
 Please note that while question wording is accurate in the survey the wording of the responses for trust 
in Nationalist and Unionist individuals did have an error. I do not believe that this impacted the results, 
but there may be additional error due to this incorrectly saved survey wording.   
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The next set of expectations laid out in Chapter 2, Expectation 9-11, include additional 
forms of political participation. While electoral participation is important to the democratic 
process, it is far from the only form of participation that is used by groups and individuals to 
voice a political position. The first hypothesis considers only legitimacy as a right side variable, 
the next set of hypotheses also include social capital as a predictor. Bridging and bonding social 
capital are both addressed in my theory and can produce divergent forms of political 
participation. Bridging social capital occurs when there are high levels of trust and preferences 
for interaction with the outgroup. An example of this in the Northern Ireland case would occur if 
a Unionist was very trusting of Nationalists or willing to interact with Catholics in different areas 
of life. Bonding social capital, often considered detrimental to cohesion in societies occurs where 
individuals have high levels of trust and preferences for interaction amongst their own group. 
Unionists being more trusting of other Unionists preferring to live with other Protestants instead 
of Catholics is an example of this in the Northern Ireland context. Expectation 9 argues that 
individuals who have high levels of bonding (ingroup) social capital, and low legitimacy 
positions will be more likely to engage in violent protests. 
Hypothesis 6.2: Individuals with high levels of trust in the ingroup and/or do not 
prefer to mix with the outgroup, and have low legitimacy positions 
will be more likely to engage in violent protest.   
 
Expectation 10 argues that individuals with high levels of bridging social capital and low 
levels of support for the current institutions and actors will participate more by voting and in 
peaceful demonstrations.  
Hypothesis 6.3: Individuals with high levels of trust for the outgroup and/or 
preferences for mixing with the outgroup and low level of 
legitimacy will participate by voting and peaceful demonstration 
than others.  
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The last expectation for political participation looks at what might occur if an individual 
has low levels of social capital indicated by low levels of general trust or low levels of ingroup 
and outgroup trust. Individual with low levels of social capital and does not support the current 
institution and actors will participate less in politics in all forms than individuals who have high 
bridging or bonding social capital.   
Hypothesis 6.4: An individual who does not trust ingroup or outgroup and has low 
levels of legitimacy will participate less electorally and non-
electorally.  
  
This subsection has clarified the expectations for political participation given varying 
legitimacy and social capital conditions at the individual level. There are of course other 
predictor concepts and variables to consider for analysis; I discuss these in the next section.  
6.2.2 Additional Concepts to Consider  
In addition to the three main components of social cohesion, other factors may impact an 
individual’s preferences to participate politically and the method of participation chosen.  
Strength of political identity is likely to impact the willingness of an individual to participate, 
much like party attachment strength of political attachment is included in many of the models in 
the next section. Strength of Attachment ranges from zero to three. Zero indicates an individual 
has no political id, they do not consider themselves to be a Unionist or a Nationalist.  Values one 
to three indicate first that the individual identifies as a Unionist or a Nationalist. As the variable 
value increase the strength of attachment grows, with three indicating the individual is attached 
“Very Strongly” as a Unionist or Nationalist. Religious Upbringing is also important to the 
divisions that exist in Northern Ireland. The political division and the religious separation of 
Protestants and Catholics are intertwined. Nearly all Unionists come from a Protestant 
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background and nearly all Nationalists come from a Catholic upbringing. Dichotomous variables 
are created to indicate if an individual has a Catholic, Protestant, or Non-Religious background. 
Income is an ordinal variable where 40 categories of income range from less than £519 to more 
than £52,000. Male is a dichotomous indicator for respondent sex where male is equal to one. 
Outgroup contact, lastly, is an important predictor when looking at ingroup and outgroup 
behaviors.  Contact with the outgroup has been found to increase preferences for mixing and 
bridging social capital. Therefore, it is potentially a contributing factor to increasing outgroup 
trust. In the next section, I analyze data from the QUB survey to test the relationship between 
legitimacy and political participation. 
6.3 Analysis Political Participation and Legitimacy  
In the first set of analyses I plot the relationships between political participation and the 
legitimacy PCA component variables. Figures 6.5 to 6.8 each contain two prediction lines.  The 
first line is a linear prediction of the relationship between the legitimacy variable and the 
political participation variable (seen as the dashed line).  The second fitted value line is the 
quadratic prediction, the relationship between the squared legitimacy values and political 
participation values (seen as the solid line). The quadratic relationship is utilized to account for 
the curvilinear or U-shaped relationship between legitimacy and participation predicted in 
Hypothesis 6.1.  Sign&Boycott and Assembly Legitimacy (see Figure 6.5) shows the expected U-
shaped relationship. Individuals with very low levels of support and very high levels of support 
for the government and assembly members are likely to participate more than individuals who 
have mid-range support for the government. Sign&Boycott participation and Justice Legitimacy 
(Figure 6.6) on the other hand produces an inverted U indicating that individuals who have high 
levels of confidence and low levels of confidence in the justice system will sign petitions and  
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Figure 6.5 Petitioning and Boycotting  by Assembly Legitimacy 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Petitioning and Boycotting by Justice Legitimacy 
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Figure 6.7 Voting and Peacefully Demonstrating by Assembly Legitimacy 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Voting and Peacefully Demonstrating by Justice Legitimacy 
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boycott less than individuals who have mid-range support for the police and the justice system. 
Moving on to the second political participation component, the quadratic relationships between 
Vote&Demonstrate and both Legitimacy components produce a flatter fitted values line.  
The quadratic prediction line is closer to the linear relationship predicted than in the other 
relationships (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). This indicates that as support for the government increases 
voting and peaceful demonstration increases, but we do not see the curvilinear relationship. 
These four figures provide bivariate predictions for legitimacy and political participation. These 
predicted values provide some evidence in favor and in opposition to Hypothesis 6.1, that we 
should see a U-shaped relationship. Next, I test the other hypotheses stated in this chapter to 
better understand the role of social capital predictors and other individual level factors that may 
impact individual decisions to participate in conventional or unconventional ways.   
6.3.1 Analysis – Predictors of Political Participation  
In this section, I look at multivariate analyses of future political participation. I include different 
model specifications for comparison of legitimacy, social capital, and other factors.  Testing the 
four hypotheses posited in this chapter requires use of different model specifications.  I include 
both legitimacy variables and social capital variables in the same models. First by interacting two 
variable sets, and second by constraining the sample in each model to individuals with high 
bridging social capital, high bonding social capital, or low levels of social capital. The second 
method produces fully interactive models that allow me to assess the impact of legitimacy and 
other factors in different social capital contexts.  
In the preliminary models, in Appendix B, that included only legitimacy, and not social 
capital variables, justice system legitimacy is not statistically significant in any of the models. I, 
therefore, exclude justice legitimacy and focus on the interactive effects of assembly legitimacy 
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and social capital on political participation. Models II and IV in Table 6.1 include two interaction 
terms. The first interaction term is between Assembly legitimacy and ingroup trust. The second 
is between outgroup trust and assembly legitimacy. Neither interaction is statistically significant, 
however in model II trust in ingroup, general trust, and legitimacy are significantly different 
from no change.  
According to Model II individuals with higher levels of support for the government and 
the people that run the government have lower scores for signing petitions and boycotting. 
Individuals with high levels of trust generally, are also scoring lower in this area of likely 
participation. Lastly, ingroup trust is positively associated with Sing&Boycott providing some 
initial evidence that bonding social capital may motivate certain forms of political action. 
Ingroup trust and outgroup trust have inverse relationships to the different forms of political 
participation. Ingroup trust is positively associated with Sign&Boycott while outgroup trust is 
negatively associated. In contrast, ingroup trust is negatively associated with Vote&Demonstrate 
and outgroup trust is positively associated. This again provides some evidence for the context of 
political identity and the role of bonding and bridging social capital on individual level decisions 
about how to participate.  
Table 6.2 goes further to assess the role of legitimacy and social capital context by 
utilizing fully interactive models. Utilizing full interaction models by restricting the model to 
only high bonding, high bridging, and high general trust variables allows to isolate the role of 
legitimacy on political participation in these social capital contexts. I exclude Justice legitimacy 
and social capital variable preference for mixing from models in Table 6.2. Assembly legitimacy 
is associated with both Sign&Boycott and Vote&Demonstrate political participation components. 
In all Sign&Boycott models (Models V-VII) a positive U-shaped relationship is found. 
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Therefore, for individuals who have high levels of social capital, whether it is bridging, bonding, 
or general trust, individuals with high levels and low levels of legitimacy are signing petitions 
and boycotting more than individuals who have mid-range support for the government. This 
finding provides support for Hypothesis 6.3 high bonding trust and extreme legitimacy positions 
will result in voting and peaceful demonstration.  
The second set of models in Table 6.2 utilize the second political participation 
component, Vote&Demonstrate, in three fully interactive models. The bonding social capital 
model (Model VIII) there is an inverse U-shape relationship, this provides some evidence for 
Hypothesis 6.2 that individuals with high levels of bonding social capital will be more willing to 
continue in a protest once it turns violent, but this support is very limited. Models IX and X, high 
bridging and high general trust, predict higher levels of support for voting and peaceful 
demonstration. This provides some additional support for Hypothesis 6.3.   
The role of political attachment strength is consistent across all six models, although only 
statistically significant in the Sign&Boycott models. All models indicate that an individual who 
strongly identifies is going to participate more by signing petitions and boycotting something, 
than individuals who feel less strongly attached to the Unionist or Nationalist grouping. 
Additionally, income plays a role in an individual’s willingness to sign and boycott. Both of 
these impacts are potentially tied to general political efficacy, the belief that the individual can 
impact politics. Overall there is some evidence to support the hypotheses in this chapter. 
However, much more work is needed to determine the robustness of these findings. 
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Table 6.1  Legitimacy, Social Capital, and Political Participation 
   
Sign&Boycott 
 
 
Vote&Demonstrate 
 
      
 
 
 I II III IV 
Legitimacy      
Assembly   -.097 
(.131) 
-1.404* 
(.815) 
.062 
(.095) 
.264 
(.512) 
Assembly 
Squared 
 .049 
(.046) 
-.008 
(.054) 
.027 
(.033 
.05 
(.034) 
Social Capital      
Preference for Mixing  .344 
(.297) 
.166 
(.342) 
-.133 
(.214) 
-.174 
(.215) 
General Trust  -.887 
(.669) 
-1.982** 
(.872) 
.577 
(.481) 
.663 
(.548) 
Trust Ingroup  1.29 
(.814) 
1.714* 
(.913) 
-.910 
(.586) 
-.918 
(.573) 
Trust Outgroup 
 
 -.924* 
(.483) 
-.515 
(.501) 
.875** 
(.384) 
.574 
(.314) 
Legitimacy  & Social 
Trust 
 
    
RL*Ingroup Trust  
- 
.478 
(.367) 
- 
.209 
(.230) 
RL*Outgroup Trust  
- 
.116 
(.215) 
- 
-.337 
(.135) 
 
Strength of  
Political Attachment 
 
.358 
(.36) 
.25 
(.398) 
-.076 
(.259) 
-.077 
(.25) 
Income   .022 
(.024) 
.033 
(.024) 
.013 
(.017) 
.007 
(.014) 
Contact  -.697 
(.901) 
-.515 
(.702) 
-.254 
(.648) 
.535 
(.441) 
Constant  .157 
(2.38) 
-.515 
(.702) 
-.082 
(1.72) 
-.318 
(1.55) 
N  28 28 28 28 
R-Squared  .534 .496 .484 .5752 
* p<.1, **p<.05 ,  note there are not “other political group in this model because 
ingroup/outgroup variables require respondents to identify as Nationalist or Unionist to 
have an socio-political ingroup or outgroup.  
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Table 6.2  Legitimacy, and Bridging and Bonding Social Capital on Participation  
   
Sign&Boycott 
 
 
Vote&Demonstrate 
 
   
V VI VII VIII IX X 
 
 
 High  
Bonding 
 
High 
Bridging 
High 
General 
Trust 
High  
Bonding 
 
High  
Bridging 
High 
General 
Trust 
Legitimacy        
Assembly   -.177* 
(.087) 
-.168* 
(.089) 
-.197** 
(.086) 
.150** 
(.06) 
.118* 
(.059) 
.116* 
(.06) 
Assembly 
Squared 
 .071* 
(.036) 
.063* 
(.036) 
.064* 
(.034) 
-.006 
(.024) 
.005 
(.024) 
.009 
(.024) 
 Justice    - - - - - - 
 Justice 
Squared  
 
- - - - - - 
Strength of  
Political 
Attachment 
 
.497*** 
(.163) 
.461*** 
(.167) 
.564 
(.171) 
.091 
(.111) 
.164 
(.111) 
.067 
(.119) 
Income   .026* 
(.014) 
.025* 
(.014) 
.029 
(.014) 
.011 
(.009) 
.008 
(.009) 
.009 
(.01) 
Contact  .088 
(.406) 
.007 
(.408) 
.347 
(.396) 
.341 
(.278) 
.366 
(.271) 
.221 
(.275) 
Religious 
Upbringing 
 
      
Catholic  -.234 
(.553) 
-.264 
(.552) 
-.24 
(.577) 
-.290 
(.379) 
-.299 
(.366) 
-.444 
(.401) 
Protestant  -.65 
(.526) 
-.748 
(.527) 
-.538 
(.544) 
-.199 
(.262) 
-.148 
(.35) 
-.338 
(.378) 
Male  -.171 
(.383) 
.082 
(.401) 
-.383 
(.401) 
-.197 
(.262) 
-.295 
(.266) 
-.131 
(.279) 
Constant  -.764 
(.731) 
-.650 
(.73) 
-1.078 
(.743) 
-.182 
(.501) 
-.187 
(.484) 
.008 
(.517) 
N  87 83 86 87 83 86 
R-Squared  .235 .222 .247 .155 .159 .118 
* p<.1, **p<.05 ,  Bonding and Bridging Ranges are from Ingroup and Outgroup Trust variables, 
individuals with values greater than or equal to 2 are considered to have strong bridging or 
bonding trust levels.  
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6.4 Discussion  
This study provides some evidence that attitudes about institutions and the government may 
impact an individual’s decisions about participating in the political process. Moreover, there is 
evidence supporting Expectations 8 through 11 stated in Chapter 2.  
The U-shaped relationship between legitimacy and political participation seems to hold in 
the Northern Ireland sample used in this study. Individuals who have high levels of support or 
rejection of the current government will participate more than individuals who have mid-range or 
indifferent opinions. There is evidence supporting hypotheses that bridging social capital impacts 
the type of political participation that an individual is more willing to engage in. There is initial 
support that there is an interactive effect between social capital and political participation a larger 
and more diverse sample to further test the link would be useful. A larger more representative 
sample that includes larger portions of the population with low social capital values is important 
to comparing individual behaviors with low social capital and individual behaviors for those with 
high bridging and bonding social capital.  
The measures of social capital could also be expanded to include other forms of social 
interaction beyond trust. Participation in civic groups was not measured directly in this survey, 
however, I measured church attendance and there was no evidence that increased church 
attendance has a role in participation. This study does not test the role of ongoing civic 
participation on political participation for which there is extant literature providing evidence of 
that linkage within societies. Studies have focused on the role of bridging and bonding 
interactions in a social context as having important implications for future social interactions.  
With the current data there is not robust support for the interactive effect of social capital 
and feelings about legitimacy on political participation.  Again, a larger representative survey of 
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the Northern Irish population might provide a clearer picture of the interactive influence of social 
capital and legitimacy on political participation. The QUB sample is a convenience sample of 
college students. While there is still value in this evidence a larger representative sample would 
provide greater variation and allow for inferences about the population to be made.  The QUB 
sample is likely skewing towards higher levels of trust and social interaction than the general 
population. This increase in sample variation would be valuable particularly in understanding the 
social capital aspects of this theory. College students are more likely to have cross community 
contact that the general population of Northern Ireland. The QUB sample is also a younger 
sample than the population. Generational effects and levels of bridging and bonding social 
capital may also be relevant in the Northern Ireland case. This original data collection and 
analysis does point to the importance of including cross-community measures of social capital, 
distinguishing between bridging and bonding social capital is important to include in future 
studies that aim to understand how legitimacy and social capital influence decisions about how 
and when to participate inside of and outside of the political system.  
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Components of social cohesion are complexly intertwined at the individual level. Understanding 
the linkages that exist between cross-community elite behavior and social cohesion is important 
particularly in a society with convocational institutions. Grasping the individual level factors of 
social cohesion can help us to understand how to mitigate divisions and grow cohesion within a 
society. While this study has focused on post-conflict societies and Northern Ireland in 
particular, we have seen a growing level of dissatisfaction with governance, increases in 
frustrations with political leaders, growing social distance, and reductions of bridging social 
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capital within societies, and increases in political demonstrations that have turned violent in 
many polities around the world.  The implications of social cohesion for the sustainability of 
democracy are vastly important.  
This dissertation has tackled clarifying a working definition of social cohesion at the 
individual level. I identify and unpack three constituent components, evaluate how they relate to 
each other, and how elite interactions affect them. Chapter 2 lays out an integrated individual 
level theory of social cohesion. The theoretical chapter sets out eleven expectations that I test 
throughout three empirical chapters. Chapter 3 set up the case of Northern Ireland for study, and 
detailed my original data collection. Each subsequent chapter tests hypotheses derived from 
these expectations pertaining to the three components of social cohesion: legitimacy, social 
capital, and political participation. In this chapter I review the main findings of the three 
empirical chapters, discuss implications, and directions for future research.  
Chapter 4 deals with the first of the three components legitimacy as a dependent variable. 
The legitimacy chapter focuses on the effects of cross community interactions between elected 
members of the Northern Ireland Assembly on trust in the main Northern Ireland political parties 
and politicians generally, and confidence in institutions. Expectations 1 and 2 argue that elite 
cross community conflict (and cooperation) should directly impact the level of trust in political 
elites and confidence in political institutions. I tested the first part of both of these propositions 
with an experiment by priming a treatment group with a news article excerpt expressing an 
inability of the executive parties to make progress on important cross community issues. There 
was not any support for the first expectation. There was no treatment effect for non-community 
specific trust or trust in Unionist and Nationalist political parties.  There was, however, some 
limited evidence in support of Expectation 2.  
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I found treatment effects for confidence in the police and the justice system, but not the 
Assembly or the Government. This is a surprising finding in that witnessing behaviors of MLAs 
was not impactful of trust in the MLAs or confidence in the Assembly that they operate but did 
reduce confidence in the police and the justice system. Individuals have the potential to interact 
with the police and the justice system on a daily basis and in ways that they may not interact with 
Assembly members, therefore, confidence in these institutions is paramount within a society. 
The breakdown of confidence in these institutions is potentially problematic for the everyday 
operations. These findings should be taken with a grain of salt in that they are from a student 
sample.  
The findings should be taken as a starting point for future studies to investigate these 
relationships more fully with representative samples of Northern Ireland and other polities.  This 
study looked at the conflict side of Expectations 1 and 2. The second part of these expectations 
that deals with cross community elite cooperation was not tested empirically in this study. This 
is definitely an area where future research should focus. Investigating the role of cooperation 
between elites and the influence on social cohesion would provide a clearer picture of the 
potential that elected leaders have for growing social cohesion rather than stifling and polarizing 
a polity. Future examination of elite cooperation and conflict should include a larger 
representative sample where possible. Cooperation is arguably of particular importance in 
societies that have preexisting divisions where conflict or stagnation is the status quo. Elite 
conflict seems to have limited effects on many areas of legitimacy, except the justice system. 
While the robustness of these findings needs to be tested further it will be important to see if the 
cooperation has a longer reach in influencing legitimacy attitudes increasing trust and confidence 
more than conflict reduces them. Using a representative sample and including elite cooperation 
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in future studies on social cohesion at the individual level will be seminal to understanding the 
links between cross community elite behaviors and social cohesion.  
Chapter 5 moves on to the second component of social cohesion and tests several 
expectations about social capital. My theory states that social identity and legitimacy attitudes 
will influence individual values for social capital. I focus on social trust, reciprocity, and 
willingness to integrate as measures of social capital. The main method for testing the social 
capital expectations (3 through 7) is a trust game where each participant as the opportunity to 
trade tickets with an unidentified individual, a Unionist, and a Nationalist. Original survey data is 
also used to address questions related to willingness to integrate and social trust.  
Social identity, belonging to a group, is an important predictor for trust. Unionists and 
Nationalists were both more trusting of ingroup members than they were of unidentified 
individuals and outgroup members supporting Expectation 3. There is some preliminary 
evidence supporting Expectation 4 that groups will show ingroup bias, and that the dominant 
group (Unionists) will show more ingroup bias than Nationalists. This evidence comes from 
difference of means tests, but further attempts to test associations with OLS models show 
positive but insignificant relationships. This indicates that additional tests with larger and 
representative need to be conducted in the future to determine the nature and robustness of this 
association. Evidence for Expectation 3 tells us what other studies have shown before, that 
individuals are more trusting and more likely to reciprocate trust of and to individuals that 
belong to the same social group and less trusting of those who are not.  
Chapter 5 in addition to trust investigates reciprocity. Expectation 5 argues that receiving 
trusting behaviors will be met with reciprocal action. Evidence from this study greatly supports 
this. Increases in tickets received were matched with increases in the number of tickets returned. 
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Indeed when individuals received more tickets, greater trust, from an outgroup member it greatly 
reduced the difference in reciprocity towards outgroup members, while the number of tickets 
from an ingroup member did not. This follows assertions of contact theory that interaction with 
an outgroup member will reduce negative feelings about the outgroup. The implications of this 
are not novel, but important. Fostering contact between salient ethnic groups can produce 
positive outcomes for social capital particularly bridging social capital that is important to the 
overall social cohesion of a society. Producing bridging social capital can buttress the political 
stability and generate productive political participation that is important in polities after violent 
conflict.  
Critics of consociationalism state that a problem with maintaining the salient identities 
within the political system can entrench identities that produce conflict, and therefore division 
and resurgence of conflict and violence may be inevitable. However, individuals who identify as 
Unionist and Nationalist can interact and produce trust even while social groups and group 
conflict exists. Eventually, the saliency of these divisions may be reduced, but this process of 
trust building and contact must be ongoing, beyond initial development of peace accords and 
new institutions.  
Next I look at the connection between elite conflict and social capital. Expectation 6 
argues that cross community elite conflict will have a direct effect on social capital.  Evidence 
from the QUB experiment and trust game does not support this expectation. In contrast, there is 
some evidence indicating that those who witness conflict are more willing to have their children 
attend a mixed school and work with members of the outgroup. While this evidence is mixed, it 
is counterintuitive to the theory I posit. The behavior of elites in any polity has the potential to 
sustain norms, progress them, or destroy them. Interactions between elected representatives, I 
140 
argue, can have important consequences for the social cohesion of a polity. In a post conflict 
society, particularly those with consociational arrangements, the manner in which parties and 
elected officials interact to produce policy, and discuss issues and problems that the community 
faces may be linked to legitimacy and social capital.  
This study has somewhat surprising findings surrounding the link between cross 
community elite conflict and legitimacy and social capital. Only confidence attitudes about 
justice and the police were reduced by elite conflict. Only willingness to integrate in workplace 
and children’s schools were impacted by elite conflict it increased propensity for preferring 
mixing. It is not entirely clear why seeing conflict might be increasing preferences for mixing in 
these areas. More research on the association of elite conflict on social trust is needed in the 
future to clarify the relationship. 
Chapter 5 also tests Expectation 7 to determine how legitimacy factors might influence 
willingness to interact with an outgroup member. Confidence in the police and Justice 
Legitimacy are associated with increased willingness to interact, as is trust in ingroup and 
outgroup ministers and trust in politicians generally. Political legitimacy is associated with 
increases in preferences for mixing. So while there is limited or contradicting evidence for a 
direct relationship between elite behaviors and social capital there are some clearer links between 
legitimacy and social capital.  Therefore, cross community elite behaviors may be indirectly 
influencing social capital factors. Elite influence, therefore, may still be relevant to social 
cohesion in ways that this evidence does not clearly show. This study does however set the stage 
for future research in this area.   
Additional findings in chapter 5 include that ingroup and outgroup trust in political elites 
is important for individual social capital. It is important in studies interested in social capital to 
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incorporate more specific measures for political trust that tap these identity specific associations. 
Focusing on political trust broadly or general social trust only misses important nuance in the 
understanding of the links between legitimacy and social capital that are integral to the individual 
level account of social cohesion. 
The last empirical chapter tackles political participation, the third component of social 
cohesion. My theory of social cohesion argues for an interactive model of political participation. 
Legitimacy and social capital values influence the type of political participation and the 
likelihood that an individual will participate. Bridging and bonding social capital are important to 
this portion of the theory in that they will lead individuals to peruse different types of political 
participation. Expectation 8, following from Booth and Seligson, that there will be a U shaped 
relationship between legitimacy and electoral participation. The next three expectations argue for 
the interactive effect between social capital and legitimacy. Evidence from the survey portion of 
the QUB study analyzed in chapter 6 provides mixed support for the U-shaped relationship 
between legitimacy positions and political participation.  
Bridging social capital is associated with the type of political participation an individual 
used to voice their positions and some support for an interactive effect between legitimacy and 
social capital. Increases in bonding social capital and extreme levels of assembly legitimacy 
associated with increased likelihood that an individual would continue in a protest once it turned 
violent. Increases in bridging social capital and extreme legitimacy attitudes are associated with 
increased voting and peaceful protests.  There was not sufficient evidence to support the 
likelihood of low levels of social capital because of the distribution of individuals with low 
social capital in the sample was minimal. While it is limited by a convenience sample and small-
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n, this study provides initial backing for an interactive model of legitimacy and social capital on 
political participation.  
There are a few take aways for future research. Moving forward with research on social 
cohesion it is important to include social capital questions and political questions within the same 
surveys so that individual level analysis of social cohesion factors is possible. Inclusion of both 
social and political questions more consistently on nationally representative surveys would be 
incredibly useful for studying questions of social cohesion. Many surveys have certain questions 
that I have incorporated into analysis in this study, but it is difficult to find them in surveys 
together. Social surveys focus on social capital questions, political and electoral surveys ask 
about political participation and legitimacy. Using these questions in aggregate level analyses is 
doable, but individual level analysis is not. We need interdisciplinary queries that can provide 
representative evidence of the links between the three areas of social cohesion, legitimacy, social 
capital, and political participation.  
Next, there are a few questions that should be included in future surveys. First, I 
recommend that political trust in specific parties and leaders in a given polity are more 
consistently included. These questions would allow researchers to contextualize and understand 
trust according to salient political divisions rather than only assessing trust or confidence in the 
government generally. This distinction may be important in a variety of political contexts, but is 
definitely relevant in post conflict societies with consociational systems, and other societies 
where there are reinforcing political cleavages. The Northern Ireland General Election Survey in 
2015 and 2017 included feeling thermometers for party leaders, but do not ask about trust 
specifically (Tonge et al. 2015; 2017).  Trust in specific parties and leaders have been asked on 
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the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey but only in 1998, 2000, 2007, and 2008.
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 Second, 
surveys should include alternative methods of participation beyond voting. Many surveys 
including the European Values survey and World Values survey include questions about non-
electoral participation, but should also include questions about the likelihood of violent protest 
beyond legally sanctioned or peaceful political protests. In societies with divisions, particularly 
those with histories of violent conflict, understanding if and when individuals would turn to 
violent protest to voice political frustrations should not be ignored.   
Lastly, additional experiments using a cooperation prime rather than, or in addition to a 
conflict prime is important for validating the role of cross-community interaction within this 
theoretical framework. Positive elite contact, while not tested in this study should be the next 
step in understanding vertical extended contact theory.   
In sum, this study provides preliminary evidence for the integrated theory of social 
cohesion.  Additional studies with representative samples in Northern Ireland and other societies 
is essential for determining if these findings are robust across Northern Ireland and other cases. 
This theory focuses on understanding social cohesion at the individual level and contributes a 
dynamic model of social cohesion.  I also shed light on the importance of social identity 
measures related to all three components. While future research is needed to buttress the 
empirical evidence in this study, the theory posited holds water and deserves further inquiry.  
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A:  Chapter 5 Additional Models and Predicted Probabilities 
The predicted values listed are the expected value of the maximum dependent variable value, 
willingness to interact (1) in the logit models, and willingness to interact in all four areas (4) in 
the ordered logit models. I generate the expected probability for each independent variable value 
(e.g. outgroup political trust (0) the predicted value is for if the individual as the least amount of 
trust in the political outgroup), and set the rest of the variables in the given model at their mean 
values.  
Table A.1: Probabilities for Models Table 5.8 
 Area of Mixing 
 
Neighborhood Work School Marriage 
MIN _Outgroup Political Trust (0)  &  
MIN_Ingroup Political Trust (0) 
77.9% 99.95% 74.8% 98.8% 
MIN_Outgroup Political Trust (0)  & 
MAX_ Ingroup Political Trust (8) 
69.8% 42.4% 21..2% 57.8% 
MAX_Outgroup Political Trust (6)  & 
MAX_Ingroup Political Trust (8) 
96.8% 83.5% 75.0% 87.4% 
MAX_Outgroup Political Trust (6)  & 
MIN_ Ingroup Political Trust (0) 
97.9% 99.9% 97.0% 99.8% 
 
Table A.2 Four Areas of Mixing Comprising Willingness to Integrate - Control Only Sample 
 Neighborhood Work School Marriage 
Trust in Outgroup 
Ministers  
.63 
(.45) 
.58 
(.80) 
.42* 
(.23) 
.16 
(.31) 
Trust in Ingroup Ministers   
 
-.11 
(.24) 
--- -.41** 
(.21) 
-.31 
(.30) 
Constant  1.37 
(1.08) 
1.18 
(1.42) 
1.07 
(.9) 
3.07* 
(1.62) 
χ 2 2.99 .78 6.21** 1.29 
N 29 10 32 34 
Logit models, * p<.1, **p<.05,  ***p< .01 Data from QUB 2014 Survey 
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Table A.3: Probabilities for Models Table 5.9 
 Area of Mixing 
 Neighborhood Work School Marriage 
Minimum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-
Outgroup)  (-2)  
92.98% 99.8% 88.8% 98.9% 
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-
Outgroup)  (0) 
90.1% 99.4% 79.9% 97.5% 
Maximum Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-
Outgroup)  (8) 
66.97% 51.8% 20.4% 60.7% 
 
Table A.4: Four Areas of Mixing and Elite Trust-Gap -- Control Group Only   
 Neighborhood Work School Marriage 
Trust in Ingroup – 
Outgroup Ministers   
-.25 
(.23) 
-1.11* 
(.68) 
-.42** 
(.18) 
.24 
(.23) 
Constant  2.47*** 
(.9) 
6.5* 
(3.5) 
1.09** 
(.54) 
2.58*** 
(.23) 
χ 2 1.25 7.88*** 6.21** 1.14 
N 29 29 32 34 
Logit models, * p<.1, **p<.05,  ***p< .01 Data from QUB 2014 Survey 
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Table A.5: Additional Table for Willingness to Integrate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trust in Outgroup Parties  
 
.394* 
(.161) 
.577** 
(.222) 
.796* 
(.324) 
.803* 
(.322) 
.886* 
(.388) 
Trust in Ingroup Parties  
 
-.476** 
(.162) 
-.977*** 
(.247) 
-1.068** 
(.341) 
-1.068* 
(.341) 
-1.234** 
(.443) 
Increase in Future 
Income  
 2.082** 
(.759) 
2.32* 
(.966) 
2.004* 
(.949) 
2.561† 
(1.36) 
Trust politicians 
 
  -1.142† 
(.596) 
-1.067† 
(.625) 
-.896 
(.855) 
Satisfaction with MLAs 
 
  .481 
(.555) 
-.375 
(.729) 
-.683 
(1.001) 
Contact in School 
 
  3.811* 
(1.91) 
3.793† 
(1.97) 
4.843† 
(2.85) 
Confidence:       
     In the Catholic 
Church 
 
    -.569 
(.726) 
     In the Protestant 
Church 
 
    -.539 
(.727) 
     In the Police 
 
   1.295† 
(.677) 
1.824† 
(.976) 
     In the Justice System 
 
    .213 
(.961) 
     In the Government  
 
    -.216 
(1.84) 
     In the Parties 
 
    .576 
(1.22) 
     In the Press 
 
    -3.46 
(.829) 
χ 2  14.42*** 31.34*** 37.87*** 41.41*** 41.55*** 
N 56 44 37 36 33 
Ordered Logit model, † p< .1, * p<.05, **p<.01,  ***p< .001 
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Table A.6: Predicted Probabilities for Models in Table A5 
 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3)  
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Outgroup Political Trust (0) 38.5% 34% 43% 33.2% 25% 
Outgroup Political Trust (6) 87% 94% 98.9% 98.4% 98.6% 
Ingroup Political Trust (0) 91% 98.9% 99.5% 99% 99.5% 
Ingroup Political Trust (6) 19.2% 3.6% 26.3% 26% 1.1% 
Income Future (-1)  30% 43.4% 37.8% 27.4% 
Income Future (0)  77.7% 88.7% 81.8% 83% 
Income Future (1)  96.5% 98.7% 97.1% 98.4% 
Trust Politicians (0)   88.8% 82.7% 74.8% 
Trust Politicians (3)   44.8% 16.4% 16.8% 
Contact  (0)   50.1% 39% 27.2% 
Contact (1)   97.8% 96.60% 97.9% 
Confidence in Police (0)    15.60% 5.5% 
Confidence in Police (3)    90% 93.2% 
 
Table A.7: Predicted Probabilities for Models in Table 5.11 
 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3)  
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Minimum Political Trust Gap 
(Ingroup-Outgroup)  (-2) 
90% 97.8% 99.4% 99.1% 99.3% 
No Political Trust Gap (Ingroup-
Outgroup)  (0) 
79% 90.2% 96.4% 94.6% 94.7% 
Maximum Political Trust Gap 
(Ingroup-Outgroup)  (8) 
10.3% 1.8% 1.5% 1% .5% 
Income Future (-1)  33.7% 41.1% 35.2% 26.6% 
Income Future (0)  74.3% 87.6% 80.3% 79.9% 
Income Future (1)  94.28% 98.6% 96.8% 97.8% 
Trust Politicians (0)   88.9% 82.8% 75.8% 
Trust Politicians (3)   16% 12.4% 11.2% 
Contact  (0)   48.9% 37.6% 26.7% 
Contact (1)   97.2% 95.7% 97% 
Confidence in Police (0)    14.2% 5.6% 
Confidence in Police (3)    89% 91.7% 
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Appendix B:  Chapter 6 Supplemental Model 
Table B.1 Legitimacy and Future Participation    
  Sign&Boycott Vote&Demonstrate 
  
I II III IV 
 Legitimacy      
Assembly   -.185** 
(.082) 
- 
.125 
(.056) 
- 
Assembly 
Squared 
 .057* 
(.034) 
- 
.011 
(.023) 
- 
 Justice    
- 
.050 
(.169) 
- 
.028 
(.114) 
 Justice 
Squared  
 
- 
-.143 
(.129) 
- 
.020 
(.088) 
Political 
Attachment  
 
    
Unionist  -.494 
(.605) 
-.532 
(.633) 
.330 
(.413) 
.371 
(.429) 
Nationalist  -.717 
(.624) 
-.711 
(.65) 
.617 
(.412) 
.554 
(.441) 
Strength of  
Political 
Attachment  
 
.785*** 
(.29) 
.828*** 
(.301) 
-.149 
(.198) 
-.154 
(.204) 
Income   .029** 
(.013) 
.028** 
(.014) 
.010 
(.009) 
.008 
(.009) 
Contact  .025 
(.397) 
-.009 
(.42) 
.305 
(.271) 
.315 
(.283) 
Religious 
Upbringing 
 
    
Catholic  -.39 
(.567) 
-.47 
(.591) 
-.312 
(.387) 
-.362 
(.401) 
Protestant  -.714 
(.52) 
-.805 
(.541) 
-.237 
(.355) 
-.19 
(.367) 
Male  -.316 
(.374) 
-.407 
(.393) 
.019 
(.255) 
.032 
(.266) 
Constant  -.661 
(.724) 
-.231 
(.718) 
-.246 
(.494) 
-.178 
(.487) 
N  92 92 92 92 
R-Squared  .253 .195 .143 .088 
* p<.1, **p<.05  
 
 
